The Syrian subpoenas for a number of Lebanese politicians, media figures and judicial and security officials, before Prime Minister Saad Hariri heads to Damascus to begin a trip of normalization (expected to take place before the end of the month), prove that this journey will be difficult. It will be full of bumps, difficulties, hurdles and contradictions that the Lebanese-Syrian relationship is pregnant with, due to the accumulated developments of recent decades, crowned by the animosity of the last five years. There has also been oppression by Damascus and grandstanding by Syria's Lebanese rivals. The majority, headed by Hariri, has realized the need to open up to Damascus and normalize relations with it in the coming phase, as a result of changes in regional and international conditions, and as a result of the need to defuse the hostility with Syria. This is in order to achieve a minimum level of domestic stability, to keep up with external changes, such as the behavior of Damascus itself in the regional arena. Syria has its own reading of this openness to it, since it believes itself to be the victor, while the others are coming to it defeated. Although members of the majority, or Hariri's allies, have each expressed their support for or understanding of his imminent visit to the Syrian capital, and the ushering in of a new phase in bilateral relations, they also agreed, despite their disparate readings of the changes, that the Syrian-Saudi rapprochement is a new factor that renders Hariri's visit a natural development. This is in light of American engagement in a dialogue with Syria, through seeking dialogue to implement the decisions of the National Dialogue sessions in Lebanon, with regard to removing Palestinian armed centers outside the refugee camps, controlling weapons inside them, demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian borders, and solving the issue of Lebanese believed to be in Syria. This view is also based on what the Cedar Revolution achieved, namely a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. These justifications of support for Hariri's step bring together those who adhere to the Cedar Revolution, such as the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, and those outside the majority (and remaining in it) as part of a policy of protecting the Druze community, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, despite the differences between the two men. The members of the majority are seeking cohesion of various levels behind Hariri, at a time in which Damascus appears unprepared to recognize the alliance that the leader of the Future Movement rests on, as it wants him to be its guest by himself. Syria doesn't recognize the previous era in Lebanon, and what it led to. In such a situation, it is natural for the leaders of the majority to see the Syrian subpoenas as a signal from Syria that it does not recognize the past era. It is a message that, in their view, Hariri's visit to Syria to begin normalization and turning the page means turning the page on the past, which should be accompanied by their exclusion, or punishment. It recalls the phase of consolidation of detailed Syrian management of Lebanese affairs, after the election of former President Emile Lahoud in 1998, when he demanded that the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri exclude certain people who were then close to him. Some of these individuals were forcefully and unfairly excluded from public life through various means of oppression, by pressure through Lebanese security officers and some of the submissive judiciary, when most media were co-opted by the then-president. This phase prompted many to jump to the conclusion that the Syrians have not changed their method of dealing with Lebanon, despite the changes that have taken place, because it is no coincidence that the subpoenas target judges, security officers and politicians close to the young Hariri, and include members of the media. Although the explanation for the subpoenas that has been given, when a friend of Damascus telephoned and advised that they be withdrawn because they were influencing the atmosphere of rapprochement, was that the Syrian judicial move was separate from political convergence and had nothing to do with it, in parallel to the claim by Hariri and the majority that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is separate from the “fraternal” relationship with Damascus. Moreover, it was said that Syria is unconcerned with its allies' anxiety about the impact of the subpoenas on the various Lebanese sides. Most likely, Damascus is also unconcerned with the anxiety of foreign capitals, such as Paris, Riyadh and Ankara, about the resumption of relations between Beirut and Damascus. Is Syria's goal to receive Hariri so that the discussion is limited to the subpoenas and their withdrawal, in return for his “withdrawal” of the demands on his neighbor, such as demarcating borders, removing the armed, allied Palestinian presence outside the camps, and treating the issue of the missing and disappeared? Is this so the visit will achieve a handshake with the Sunni leader, and not the prime minister of the government of Lebanon? Syria might not have changed its methods with regard to Lebanon. However, Saad Hariri is coming under circumstances that differ from those in which his father took office, and differ from how Syria formerly played its role in Lebanon.
