The Lebanese are experiencing a very serious test as they try to remove the contradictions and divergences in interests among themselves, in order to bring these interests closer in the process of forming a new Cabinet. This constitutes practice for a period of government formation that is totally different than previous ones. The domestic political sides, prior to 2005 (when the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon) became used to not forming governments without direct Syrian intervention in the shares of influence, names and specific portfolios, giving the upper hand to this or that formation. The decrees forming a government would be issued at the end of each consultation process, only after the Syrian custodian had its say and obtained what and who it wanted, verifying that the internal division of power was in its interest. At times it would receive veto power (one-third of the Cabinet); at others half-plus-one of the seats, and up to two-thirds of the government, in the final years of its direct management of Lebanese affairs, which went as far as interfering in the appointment of doormen, in the municipal elections, etc. After 2005, things changed. The first government was formed to oversee the parliamentary elections, in a settlement among the Lebanese to get through the elections at the time. This took place with foreign sponsorship, to fill the vacuum left by the direct Syrian management. Western countries, namely the US and France under Jacques Chirac, took part in this sponsorship, along with the Iran of Sayyed Mohammad Khatami. After the elections, the west sought to supervise the process of forming the government. However, it did not succeed for several reasons, such as the inability to play the role that the Syrian administration had performed, in view of its limited impact compared to the Syrians, who were present on the Lebanese territory with their forces, security agencies and secret police. Meanwhile, Damascus assigned the task to its chief ally, Hizbullah. The west was unable to play the role of sponsor of the process of forming governments, as Damascus had done. One of the reasons was that part of the vacuum that Syria had left behind during its withdrawal was filled by the quadripartite alliance among Hizbullah, Amal, Future and the Progressive Socialist Party. The collapse of this alliance soon led to a conflict over decision-making in the country's political authority, i.e. the government. This led to Lebanon's 2006-2008 period of political and security instability that allowed Hizbullah, which was the most capable at changing the balance of power on the ground, to succeed in sponsoring a formula to at least form a government and control some ministerial portfolios via the Doha Accord – which was a settlement between the west, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on one side, and Iran and Syria (and Hizbullah) on the other, with Qatari sponsorship. The outgoing government saw a difficult birth, with some attempts by the Qataris to remove the obstacles through seeing that Hizbullah, the backbone of the opposition, received veto power within the Cabinet. The new test for the Lebanese this time involves these changes; they must reflect Hizbullah's ability to impose the formula it wants inside the government and its reassurance over the make-up of the next Cabinet. These changes are bound to worry Hizbullah and prompt it to link facilitating the formation of a government to guaranteeing that the changes will not affect its political influence. These changes, since the Doha agreement of May 2008, are as follows: 1-The election of a president, Michel Sleiman, who is completely different from President Emile Lahoud, who was inherited from the Syrians, and who followed the policy of the president who does not refuse a request, whether to Syria or to Hizbullah. President Suleiman is completely different. He is seeking, at the minimum, to establish a balance in his positions as the head of the executive branch. As the leading Christian politician in power, he is a competitor to Hizbullah's political umbrella and chief ally, General Michel Aoun. 2-The Saudi-Syrian rapprochement has produced a settlement about Lebanon that began before the parliamentary elections in June, which saw March 14 claim the majority. The agreement continued afterward, based on preserving stability, non-intervention in domestic issues, and implementing the Taif Accord in what this implies in terms of covering a normalization in Lebanese-Syria relations, which require a visit by the head of Future, MP Saad al-Hariri, to Damascus as prime minister. However, Iran, Hizbullah's chief ally and main sponsor, remains outside this rapprochement, which came about amid a specific regional-international climate. Damascus has been trying to regain its lost influence in Lebanon via this settlement, amid an Arab-international climate that is trying to limit Iran's influence in the region. Will the Lebanese be able to create a settlement over forming the government, based on these changes? Will Hizbullah adapt to them?
