Most Lebanese parties have sought to benefit from the convening of a Saudi-Syrian summit and the related positive aspects in treating their disputes, which have left Lebanon without a government for more than four months following the June parliamentary elections. None of these parties has gambled on opposing what the Summit produced on Lebanon, i.e. an agreement to speed up the formation of a government, whether this was in the Saudi or Syrian statements issued about the Summit, or the contacts by Riyadh and Damascus with their allies, to be flexible and facilitate the formation of this cabinet. If the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agree, among other things, on not intervening in the Lebanese details and letting the Lebanese deal with issues complicating the government's formation, by relying on their understanding of the new phase ushered in by the Summit, and ending the disputes between the two states as part of a new way of dealing with Arab and regional crises, then the non-intervention decision will likely cause the Lebanese to get used to conducting political settlements, without totally giving up the reins of power to the outside world. Thus, they can perhaps engage in a tiring drill: making the outside world a supporting element, instead of the deciding party, as was the case during the period of disputes and escalation, and the resulting domestic struggle among Lebanese, which at times was dangerous. Hence, the fact that this post-Summit adjustment by the rival sides is taking some time, amid the new dynamism it launched at the Arab level (it has been a week since the meeting), appears to be natural, since many of these groups need time to move from the discourse of confrontation to the discourse of settlement. It could have taken even more time, if the recent weeks had not seen the dynamism of dialogue that took the country from crisis when Saad al-Hariri, the prime minister designate, opted out of a forming a government on 10 September, to a climate of openness and coming together of rivals, thanks to an initiative by al-Hariri himself. Indeed, the latter generated a precedent after he was designated prime minister a second time on 16 September, by his holding intensive consultations with parliamentary blocs in order to exploit the climate of calm and the return of trust and contacts upon the convening of the Summit, although this Summit had not been agreed to when he began his consultations. Al-Hariri was wagering on the revival of Saudi-Syrian understandings that took place in June and July, and the granting of new momentum to completing the formation of a government, after it had entered a period of crisis and paralysis. If this method by al-Hariri was aimed at following up these understandings, then the Summit enshrined them. This will lead to the formation of a government soon, because none of the parties can stick fast to its demands and ignore the movement generated by the Summit on the inter-Arab relations front, coinciding with rapidly-developing movement in the region. There are the negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, the Arabs' preparations to deal with conditions in Iraq, as the US prepares to withdraw, and the dealing with the ramifications of America's stumbling role in the peace process amid Israeli intransigence and the rising pace of measures aimed at Judaicizing Jerusalem and Al Aqsa mosque. However, there is Lebanon's accommodation with the requirements of seeing inter-Arab ties move to a new phase, along with the need to adjust to Syria's method of dealing with a new situation in Lebanon as well. The Lebanese need to practice drafting domestic political agreements, while the Syrians face a “drill” themselves: engineering relations with Lebanon that are different than the period of direct management prior to the withdrawal by Damascus in 2005, when things were characterized by dictates, pressure and oppression, and the post-2005 period when institutions were paralyzed by Syria, in alliance with Iran. The Saudi-Syrian Summit allowed many political groups to conclude that it was the signal for renewing the role and influence of the Syrians in Lebanon, and the impact of this on Lebanese decision-making. There was a move to consider this one of Syria's prizes in hosting the Saudi King in Damascus. Thus, Syria's al-Assad had a telephone conversation with President Michel Suleiman on the eve of the summit, to inform him of an agreement on accelerating the formation of a government. However, the Summit also lets one conclude that a return to this influence will allow a joint Syrian-Saudi management of Lebanon's political decision-making, instead of the Syrians being alone in this position, as in the pre-2005 period. In this case, it is an alternative to the Syrian-Iranian management at a time of crisis and paralysis, and considering Lebanon an arena for conflict. Moving from one type of management to another has its requirements. The Summit also lets one understand the impact of new inter-Arab relations, bringing about a new role for Syria in Lebanon, which relies on its influence on a different basis, after a normalization of ties between the prime minister-designate, Saad al-Hariri, and Damascus, and between Damascus and the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt. This will let Damascus re-focus on these two pillars in exercising its influence, as during the days of the late Rafiq al-Hariri. However, the differences between the periods of the elder and younger al-Hariri make going back to the past very difficult, not to mention the fact that conditions in Lebanon and the region have changed.
