It is difficult to expect qualitative leaps in an improvement in Lebanese-Syrian relations, as nearly three months have gone by since what was described as the historic visit by Prime Minister Prime Minister Saad Hariri to Damascus. At the least, this is the reading based on the last few weeks, which saw media campaigns, whether directly Syrian, or Lebanese, on the part of Damascus' allies among leading Lebanese figures. These were accompanied by messages from this or that visitor to the Syrian capital, namely criticisms of this or that Lebanese official, or their dissatisfaction with the performance of this group, their unease with the behavior of so-and-so, and labeling yet another person in the ranks of the enemy. However, while this might indicate that the relationship remains full of defects, it does not deny that Hariri's visit caused a breakthrough, since it ended the broken ties between Damascus and a wide segment of Lebanese, as part of Arab reconciliations, which observers believe will take an important step forward with the imminent Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation. This is thanks to the movement by Saudi Arabia and Turkey between the two sides, and the event will coincide with the Arab Summit in Libya in two weeks, or before it. This will no doubt have a positive impact on relations between Beirut and Damascus, irrespective of how late the improvement in relations has been in coming. The currently poor state of relations does not cancel the impact of the political change undertaken by the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumbaltt, in two directions, domestically and vis-à-vis Syria. Neither does it cancel the change in the rhetoric of Syria's rivals among Christian leaders of the majority, who have followed the positive aspect of Hariri's new policies in relations with Syria, and supported these policies. Some Lebanese groups expected that Hariri's visit would generate rapid achievements on pending bilateral issues, such as the demarcation of borders, the beginning of settling the issue of the missing and prisoners in Syria, helping end the armed Palestinian presence outside the camps, re-evaluating agreements between the two countries, and modifying the tasks of the Higher Lebanese-Syrian Council. If these expectations have been dashed, it is because these politicians are not used to the long-term patience of Damascus, and they did not realize that it links progress on any issue to the regional and international situation, and not the meeting of Lebanese demands. The region's states have delayed taking stances on a number of issues in their relations with each other, as they await the ramifications of the Iranian-American confrontation, and which is linked to other issues, and Damascus is no different in terms of its role. The other aspect of its rejection of any progress on pending issues with Lebanon under any pressure, whether external or international, is its active readiness to approach these issues in exchange for an international “lightening up” toward Damascus. While realism requires those who have been disappointed to be a bit patient, a number of questions arise about the reason for the Syrian messages, whether delivered directly or through the media, in criticizing President Michel Suleiman, and Hariri, and responding to Jumblatt by setting more conditions on his visit to Damascus. These questions are being posed even by some figures in the opposition, the surprised allies of Damascus. President Suleiman is criticized for the way he organized the recent National Dialogue session and is accused of announcing it as a response to the summit in Damascus, of Syrian President Bashar Assad, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the secretary general of Hizbullah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and meeting international demands to do this. He is also accused of supporting the 14 March team and Hariri, and this is despite his consultation with Hizbullah with regard to certain people, his defense of the Syrian position during his foreign trips, and his being accused by majority figures of supporting the opposition too much. Prime Minister Hariri is being criticized in some Syrian circles for not reining in his media following the reconciliation with Damascus, and for the criticism of Syrian policies by some members of his movement. He is subject to a campaign based on the Syrian interpretation of his comments to an Italian newspaper, which he denied, and that he is paying special attention to his alliance with the head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, whom Damascus wants excluded. Hariri responded by saying only death would separate him from his allies, and is continuing to pursue a policy of positive ties with Syria, while confronting criticisms for his adoption of the clarification by high-level Syrian sources of the comments in The New Yorker about Assad's cited remarks that the regime in Lebanon should be changed. Hariri justifies Ahmadinejad's statements about his considering part of the confrontation between Iran and Washington, by saying that he was responding to Israeli threats. This campaign also ignores Hariri's political change in orientation toward Damascus. Meanwhile, the campaign against Jumblatt and the attempt to subject him to conditions for receiving him, despite his clarifications “to smooth things over,” as he said, and his call for acknowledging mistakes, both those he has made and not made, are all indications that Damascus has returned to its old policy in dealing with the Lebanese domestic situation and its complex make-up, and its political authorities, with the difference being that it intervenes in this make-up under a slogan of non-intervention, while carrying out the same policy of the years in which it had a military presence, only without this presence this time. Won't this lead to the same reaction?
