Syrian-Lebanese relations are headed for a period of testing, after a series of developments in recent months. The new element is the resumption of relations between Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and the Syrian leadership during an imminent visit by Jumblatt to Damascus, expected in the coming days. With this visit, Syria will have restored its relations with two pillars of the broad-based political movement that has fought it since 2005, the March 14 Coalition. These are the Hariri family leadership, represented by Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who remains the head of this coalition, and the Druze leadership, represented by Jumblatt, who left the anti-Syrian movement for a position that Jumblatt continues to insist is centrist. Syria's resumption of the relationship with these two leaders after years of hostility and rivalry has taken place after its relationship with another leader, who fiercely opposed Damascus for more than 16 years, namely General Michel Aoun, has become an alliance in the post-2005 period. Local developments since the civil strife of 7 May 2008 and new regional and international realities that produced a Saudi-Syrian rapprochement at the end of 2008 have generated Hariri's reconciliation with Damascus, followed by that of Jumblatt. This has created new developments in Syria's “political map” in Lebanon, rendering it different than the one that was used during the last five years. During this period, Syria compensated for the withdrawal of its troops on 26 April 2005, relying on Hizbullah instead of a direct military presence, and rendering the party the “exclusive (political) agent” of Damascus in the political arena. This took place under the aegis of the close Syrian-Iranian alliance, which was dictated by the American occupation of Iraq, and which required Damascus to follow a policy that took a significant portion of its former allies in Lebanon, and particularly the Hariri family and Jumblatt, out of the ranks of Syria's supporters. Damascus' resumption of its relations with Hariri and Jumblatt frees it from having Hizbullah as its exclusive representative on the domestic political map upon which Syria relies. But this does not cancel out the fact that its reliance on the party with regard to the regional dimensions of the Lebanese political scene, due to its continued, strong alliance with Iran. However, the Syrian leadership is acting vis-à-vis Lebanon as if it has returned to the country, stronger than it was during the days of its military presence, and is seeking to recover its position at the heart of the political order in Lebanon, as in the pre-2005 period, and this is something that Syrian officials have stated. However, there are several questions about Syria's ability to succeed in wielding its pre-2005 level of influence. Hizbullah's military influence compensated Damascus for its military withdrawal, during the struggle over Lebanon and in Lebanon. But can it compensate for the absence of its direct presence, in light of the reconciliations that have taken place up to now? If the answer implies that Syria's new role in Lebanon will remain one that lacks a direct military presence, then there are many questions in this regard. Will its alliance with General Aoun compensate for the drop-off in its ability to have a direct and decisive impact at the head of the political regime, namely the presidency, since President Michel Suleiman differs from former President Emile Lahoud? Can Suleiman's presidency be taken back to what it was in the days of Lahoud, while Christian political forces are competing to seize the political capital of the presidency's recovery of its strength and independence? Will Syria's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, followed by (probably) Egypt, and western openness to Damascus, be able to gain regional and international blessings for the Syrians to do whatever they want in Lebanon, or is this authorization unable to be reproduced, since Security Council Resolution 1559 remains in effect, and Arab reconciliations, which cover Lebanon, oblige the regional powers concerned with Lebanon (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey) to continue to support an improvement in relations between Damascus and Beirut? It is obvious, according to experts in Syrian politics who are always up-to-date with developments there, that the Syrian leadership “nostalgic” about its previous style of direct influence over Lebanese affairs. This is apparent in the attack by Syria's allies in Lebanon on President Suleiman, and Hariri, and the readiness to return to managing domestic contradictions in its neighbor, with the “completion” of its resumption of its former relations, thanks to the Jumblatt visit. The most important question is: Will Lebanese parties allow the resumption of the old-style direct intervention? Certainly, the relations between Lebanon and Syria are experiencing a transitional phase.
