Three major Middle Eastern issues are on the discussion table both internationally and regionally: the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, the Syrian crisis, and the Iranian nuclear file. These issues cannot be dissociated from one another, nor can they be separated from other files with which they are intersecting and interacting, and are also ablaze. This is true whether in Iraq, where the political crisis is deepening to the beat of the expansion and escalation of violence, or in Lebanon, whose institutions are about to collapse in a way threatening the state's entire entity. In the meantime, the country is about to witness presidential elections next spring amid an obstruction affecting most of its constitutional institutions, as well as a vertical civil division between its sects and denominations that is seriously threatening the coexistence formula. This is also true in Yemen where the fire suddenly erupted in its North and South, at a time when the reconciliation conference was proceeding with great difficulty. The noticeable common denominator among the three major files – despite the different actors in them – is the timeframe. Firstly, we have the talks between Benjamin Netanyahu's government and the Palestinian authority, which are supposed to end with an agreement over all the pending issues (the final status issues) by next April, or so was agreed by the two sides under the supervision of Washington, i.e. the main sponsor of the negotiations, prior to their resumption following a long period of severance. Secondly, there is the Geneva 2 conference, which is supposed to implement the Geneva 1 decisions and end with an agreement between the fighting parties over the formation of a transitional authority with full executive prerogatives, in order to manage the stage until the end of President Bashar al-Assad's term next spring. The end of this term is expected to coincide with the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal, or most of it. And despite all the objections, conditions and counter-conditions being issued, the conference might see the light even in the absence of any hope of it achieving the desired goals, especially for the Syrian opposition. Thirdly, there are the Geneva talks held by Iran and the P5+1 during the last couple of days. These talks are on the verge of securing a transformation or achieving real breakthrough, as the "framework agreement" between the two sides discussed concomitant measures featuring Tehran's freezing of wide activities in the context of its nuclear program, in exchange for the alleviation of some of the banking and oil-related sanctions, especially the American ones which are the fiercest and the harshest among the ones imposed by the Security Council at earlier stages. The agreement set a six-month deadline for these joint measures, i.e. also until the spring of 2014, a period during which a comprehensive and final agreement would be secured. Was it a coincidence that these three thorny issues were tied to one schedule? Maybe. But what is known is that American diplomacy, the main actor in all three issues, has been very active lately on the Middle Eastern front. It thus benefitted from the dynamic of the understanding with Russia to destroy the Syrian regime's chemical arsenal, and quickly met President Hassan Rohani halfway to launch a new approach vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear file. It had previously pushed the Palestinian and Israeli sides to resume the peace talks, without resorting to any new aggressive strategy. President Barack Obama's first administration had tried and failed to launch talks between the authority and Benjamin Netanyahu's government, and had addressed more than one message to the Iranian people and government during the days of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but was always warded off. It had even decided not to become involved in the Syrian crisis since its eruption two and a half years ago, thus refusing all forms of intervention or even the provision of qualitative military assistance to the opposition it supports. President Obama thus remained loyal to the slogan of international and regional understanding and partnership in approaching the solutions, far away from wars, confrontations, and intervention. The reasons for that do not require much explaining, as America became tired of wars which depleted its economy and did not want to be the only one assigned to manage the world's affairs, without this meaning that it has relinquished its leading and advanced position despite the weakness it suffered, as no power can constitute a real threat to its military force. What the current administration wants is to explore other areas in the Far East, and it consequently needs a period of calm or truce on the Middle Eastern front. In other words, its diplomacy might not necessarily reach its targets at the level of whichever regional issue. The Middle Eastern populations have coexisted for a long time with the Palestinian cause, but also for many years with the repercussions of the Iranian revolution and its nuclear file. In addition, the American administration was able to close the Syrian chemical file which worried its ally Israel, and was probably forced to take into account the anger of its allies among the Friends of the Syrian People, who felt it betrayed them and limited the Syrian crisis to this file alone. Therefore, it is nowadays trying to active the Geneva 2 conference, although none of the sides in it believes it will accomplish its desired goals. On the Iranian level, all it wants is to reach an understanding that would reassure the Hebrew state, but also some Arab partners, especially in the Gulf. It would be too soon to conclude that the circumstances are ripe for a comprehensive deal on these three fronts and at the level of the files linked to them throughout the region. Had this been the case, it would have deserved the organization of an international conference next spring, to announce the arrival of spring in the entire Middle East! Quite simply, what is new in American diplomacy is that the sanctions system was able to push Iran towards a different approach in dealing with the international community. In the last few years, it was said that this regime had lost its efficiency, at least during the two terms of President Ahmadinejad whose successor addressed fierce criticisms to him and his administration, and held him responsible for the economic and international situation reached by the Islamic Republic. President Obama and his Secretary of State John Kerry managed to impose their viewpoint, which called for meeting President Rohani halfway and enticing him with the lifting of some sanctions, in order to get Tehran to cooperate with the demands of the P5+1. In exchange, he had to be given something with which he could face the hardliners on the domestic arena, i.e. the alleviation of some of the sanctions, as opposed to what was called for by a number of Congressmen who wanted to tighten the siege and push the Islamic Republic against the wall to force it to surrender. But this policy will not lead to any results and might push the vast majority of Iranians who voted in favor of normalization with the United States back into the lap of the hardliners, which would enhance their position. Those opposing rapprochement or agreement with Iran are blaming Obama's administration for giving the Islamic Republic a break, allowing it to mend part of its economy which is on the brink of collapse and to gain time. But in reality, Tehran can stop its high-grade enrichment and cooperate with the demands of the international community during this stage, no matter how short or long it is. Indeed, it now possesses the tools and scientific knowledge to manufacture the bomb, and this alone is enough for it to resume the acquisition of its weapon as long as it can re-launch its activities whenever it wants. Hence, the nuclear file is not the issue. What the oppositionists want, especially Israel, is to see whichever American-Iranian dialogue or agreement ending with a clear respect of the interests of the Hebrew state, just as it happened with the Syrian chemical file from which it came out as the biggest winner. This is also what is happening at the level of the talks with the Palestinians, considering that it wishes to see them recognizing the Jewish character of the state, while proceeding with the settlement activities on whatever is left of the land. What is therefore required is for the others to change their policies, strategies, and doctrines to go in line with Tel Aviv's, and what Netanyahu's government wants is not just the settlement of the nuclear file, but also Iran's clear and blatant relinquishing of its entire ideology. It wants it to recognize the right of the Hebrew state to exist and stop supporting its branches in Lebanon, Palestine and elsewhere. But this cannot be done by the Islamic Republic. What would be left for it from the revolution? And what would be left for it on the Arab street? It is aware of the fact that reaching this stage of the dialogue with the United States would mean the full relinquishing of a strategy which allowed it to outbid the Arabs in embracing the Palestinian cause and groups with which it converges ideologically and denominationally, and which it uses as a card to ensure its expansion and hegemony in the region, from its far Yemeni southern end to its Syrian north and Lebanese west. At this level, there is also another more complicated obstacle, i.e. Iran's repositioning in the regional system on the political, economic and security levels. This process will not be easy at all, as it involves regional players, whether close Arab ones on the shores off the Gulf or distant ones on the Nile banks, who linked their national security to that of the Peninsula on more than one occasion, along with the Turks and the Israelis. Hence, it will be difficult to reconcile between the seat which the republic wishes to reserve in this system and the objections that might emerge from within an influential Arab bloc, and other wide and various international blocs that deem themselves essential partners in whichever regional structure hosting the oil fields, seas and passageways. The United States needs to guarantee Israel's security in the region, and needs something to ensure stability - even if temporarily - in light of the circumstances sweeping the Arab world from North Africa to Syria, Iran and Egypt, in which the situation might not remain as calm. It is seeking a period of truce, in order to neutralize Iran if it is unable to reach comprehensive understanding or a major deal with it. Therefore, it would be difficult for the region's populations to expect quick settlements for chronic and complex issues, and all they can hope for is a period of calm to catch their breath. But what happens once the six-month stage expires in Palestine, Syria and Iran? And what will happen until then? Is this short period enough to secure transformations at the level of strategies, ideologies, interests and relationships whose building took decades?
