It has become clear, based on the outcome of the tour carried out by new American Secretary of State John Kerry, that President Barack Obama's administration will not change the policy it has adopted towards Syria during the past two years. It even stressed its rejection of the military option, as it is turning the page of the wars waged by President George W. Bush. At this level, the diplomacy it has adopted in the face of the Iranian nuclear file is being used to handle the Syrian crisis, and this was practically translated in its implication of the active regional and international powers in the attempts to seek solutions and settlements. Indeed, it prefers to remain in the back row, while pushing the partners to perform a role which the American forces were rushing to carry out until a few years back. Therefore, Washington is upholding its position, by which it is giving Moscow one opportunity after the other to find settlements or lead the warring sides within the Syria to the dialogue table. This is being done regardless of its insistence on the departure of President Bashar al-Assad, and regardless of the contradiction in the interpretation of the Geneva Declaration that calls for a transitional phase managed by a government with full prerogatives. Naturally, President Obama cannot disregard principles to which his predecessors adhered to maintain the United States' interests on one hand, and instate global security and stability. In other words, he cannot go back to President James Monroe's principle which was adopted in 1823 and which called for the country's turning towards the domestic arena, far away from international politics. This is due to the fact that the isolation which worked at the time and lasted until World War II is no longer valid. Indeed, the world has changed, along with the political and economic principles and the nature of international relations which no longer allows such reserve. Everything is now globalized and America cannot relinquish its leading role, the biggest proof for this being its strategic priorities' turn towards the Pacific Ocean to face China. This position reveals that the Iranian and Russian support offered to Al-Assad's regime is not the one obstructing the desired drastic change, but rather the American silence in particular and the European silence in general. The latter are thus extending the term of the regime and deepening the suffering of the Syrian people. So far, Washington has benefited from the open conflict in Syria on more than one level, as this conflict has constituted and still constitutes an ongoing depletion of the Islamic Republic on the political, military and even financial levels, while keeping its allies in Beirut and Baghdad preoccupied. And it was not a coincidence for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to express – at the same time – their fears towards the escalating sectarian instigation from the shores of the Mediterranean to the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and to warn against attempts to lead the two countries towards a civil war which is awaiting one uncalculated mistake or spark. How can Tehran remain calm while it is drowning in the Syrian quagmire, and watching the government of Al-Maliki growing weaker in the face of the rising voices of its opponents throughout the Sunni provinces, to demand the toppling of his government and regime, and Iran's exit? Iran cannot be at ease while being afraid of seeing Hezbollah dragged towards a confrontation or an internal conflict that would undermine its strength and remaining credit as a “resistance force," thus completely eliminating it from the equation of the conflict with Israel. Naturally, what the leader of the State of the Law Coalition said about the prevention of the smuggling of weapons to whichever side of the war in Syria is unconvincing, because he is aware – as are many others – of what is happening on the border between the two countries. At the same time, the outcome of the remoteness policy advocated by Najib Mikati's government is also known, considering that the flow of elements and weapons across the border is proceeding. So far, the bickering Lebanese and the bickering Iraqis have settled for fighting outside their border to compensate for their domestic clashes. But this fighting is like standing on the brink of the abyss, and the biggest fear for Iran's allies is the change coming from Damascus, regardless of how long the Syrians suffer. This is due to the fact that the latter change will induce a transformation in the rules of the political game in both Beirut and Baghdad, based on the demographic size of the Sunni bloc seeking to regain what it calls its legitimate right to power as a majority. Such an awaited change is behind the hastening of the Sunnis' action in the neighboring states, against what they perceive as being an injustice affecting them due to the expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region. This is also what is pushing the Iranian command to attempt to compensate on other arenas inside and outside the region, from Yemen to some African states, along with the activation of repressed ambitions by influential Shiite blocs in some Gulf Cooperation Council countries. On the other hand, the open conflict in Syria constitutes an arena for extremist religious groups, as an alternative for Western and non-Western scenes. At this level, Washington is not grieved to see the extremists waging their Jihad in Syria, which always acted as a starting point for the fight against the American troops in Iraq since the US invasion of the country. Former American Secretary of State Colin Powell will never forget what President Al-Assad said when he asked him to stop the flow of fighters across the border with Iraq. He said there were only a few thousands of them, and that he was relieved to see the Americans getting rid of them instead of having to face them with his own army. There is also no need to recall the complaints of the Iraqis for a long time, at the head of whom is Al-Maliki, about Damascus' supervision of the transfer of Jihadists into the eastern neighbor, a supervision which somewhat resembles the one carried out by the Peshawar base during the days of the Jihad in Afghanistan. Today, it would not take the Syrian officials and their mission to the United Nations much effort to expose or publish the names and data of this base. But the American silence lasted more than it should have, which is now threatening the United States' interests throughout the region. This is due to the fact that full collapse in Syria will not only constitute an absolute loss for Russia and Iran that are wagering on Al-Assad's stay, but also the beginning of instability in the entire region. Indeed, Lebanon and Iraq are standing on the brink of sectarian war, and Jordan, Turkey, and Israel will not be spared by the spread of the emirs of the mujahedeen on their border with Syria. In addition, Syria's possible division – which is being promoted by some and adopted by the regime officials as a last resort – will open the door to the reconsideration of the map in the region, a step which might not be to the liking of the superpowers and might not suit their traditional interests, and which is not wanted by the influential regional forces, whether the Turkish or Arab ones. Hence, the outcome of the Syria's Friends conference in Rome, the European Union decision which preceded it to supply the Syrian opposition with defensive armored vehicles and the talk about the delivery of weapons to the fighters from Croatia among other countries with the knowledge of some friends and the funding of wealthy individuals, are all developments which cannot be ignored. There is also the tour conducted by Secretary of State John Kerry, his meeting with French President Francois Hollande and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the phone call which ensued between the latter and his American counterpart. True, all these developments and decisions did not please the opposition coalition. However, they could mark the beginning of a soft intervention, which might lead to a wider gradual intervention if the regime and its allies are not convinced that they should seriously proceed towards a settlement that would spare everyone from a resounding loss, and distance Syria from a bleak fate. And while the United States is growing closer to an understanding with Russia – which is inevitable between the two countries in light of their intertwining interests in more than one location – the question today is the following: Is Iran truly ready to reach an understanding with the international group over a series of issues related to it, to its role, and to its nuclear file? In light of the current transformations, the traditional balance of power that prevailed during the past years is no longer in favor of the Islamic Republic, which was pleased with the Americans' pullout from Iraq, their troubles in Afghanistan, and their inability to activate the settlement in Palestine. Today, the Republic is facing threats on more than one front, as it has almost lost its control over the political and security game in Lebanon and Iraq, and its attempts failed in the Arab Peninsula. And if President Obama is able to pave the way before the activation of the settlement attempts between Israel and the Palestinian authority during his next visit to the region, he might further weaken its role on the Palestinian level after Hamas exited its cloak. It is certain that the change affecting the balance of power will not persist if Iran hastens its attempts to acquire its nuclear bomb. But during its meeting in Kazakhstan with the P5+1 group, it proposed the discussion of all the files concerning it, from the Syrian file to the nuclear one, with all what this means in terms of willingness to engage in a trade-off. However, this issue is not linked to its sole wish and conditions, considering that the six states might have another approach based on the alleviation of the sanctions in exchange for the discontinuation of the enrichment activities and the authorization of a close monitoring of the facilities. With the imminent end of the two-year war in Syria, the question is: Can this country, along with the neighboring states, handle the repetition of the Lebanese experience with the renewal of war following the two-year prelude? Or is Obama's administration now able to impose a settlement to the beat of soft intervention and the diplomacy of partnership with Moscow, to allow both Russia and Iran to maintain some influence through a role and position for the minority still surrounding Al-Assad's regime? What is important is for the wait - until some problems are fixed or some events are seen here and there – not to last too long, i.e. until the date of the wide and decisive settlement, or at worst, the date of major strife!
