Finally, the first direct contact occurred between the "Great Satan" and the "Axis of Evil." Indeed, President Barack Obama and President Hassan Rohani spoke on the phone after around one quarter of a decade of severance, thus marking the culmination of meetings, positions, speeches, and statements that launched a new dynamic ahead of numerous events and developments, before changing the face of the region as it is hoped by the overly optimistic. The contact/event was a mere gesture of good intention. The two presidents stood on the start line, while facing a long road before the settlement of the pending issues between the United States and Iran. Still, what is important is that both sides are expressing willingness to launch the diplomatic wheel as the only way to solve all the problems comprehensively, or at least manage the conflict, regulate the dispute, and set the rules to prevent the standoff from turning into a threat facing world peace, the intertwining international interests and the interests of the region, until the circumstances are ripe for the greater deal! An understanding between Washington and Tehran under the ceiling of the dispute is not impossible to achieve. It was seen before when President George Bush Jr. waged war on Afghanistan then Iraq, while placing Iran at the head of the Axis of Evil. Today, the testing of the two sides' intentions might not take long, in light of the meeting which is to be held mid next month in Geneva between Iran and the P5+1 states, and the Geneva 2 conference expected to take place in mid-November. In parallel, the wheel of dialogue is bound to be launched – even if slowly – between Obama's and Rohani's administrations, seeing how they both want guarantees. However, it will not be easy for the two presidents to reconcile these guarantees and their announced positions. Indeed, the Iranian president wants the international recognition of his country's right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its soil, the beginning of the lifting of the sanctions and non-interference in the republic's internal affairs. The American president on the other hand wants cooperation at the level of numerous files, from the nuclear file to the Syrian crisis, the situation in Lebanon and the appeasement of the scene in the Gulf. Both of them are thus studying their steps carefully and proceeding with caution as though on a tightly pulled rope held by more than one side domestically and abroad. The last Iranian presidential elections, during which the people expressed their wish to turn the page of the dispute with the West and with America in particular, are the main reason behind the leniency shown by Tehran. Before that, the Iranians had expressed this same wish when they voted in favor of Sayyed Muhammad Khatami for two consecutive terms, ones which ended without achieving this desire. At the time, one of the leaders of rejectionism summarized the situation by pointing to what he dubbed a "paradox" between the Arab and Iranian people. He said that unlike their populations, the Arab governments dealt and reached understandings with the United States, whereas the Iranian government is hostile to America, unlike its people who want to end this severance between the two countries! Among the primary reasons for that is the sanctions and blockade policy's fulfillment of its tasks, after the economic and social situations became intolerable, while the drop in the oil revenues and the rise of inflation and unemployment rates pushed the Iranian people – who are insisting on the nuclear program as a symbol of national dignity – to sense this program's hefty cost. And what deepened the crisis was the confusion affecting the policies of former President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's governments. The Guide was not far away from the developments. And this time around, he listened to his people's aspirations which were ignored in the 2009 elections that ended with the renewal of President Ahmadinejad's term, thus provoking an oppression campaign that almost divided the Iranians and caused an acute polarization that could have threatened the fate of the revolution. The regime can no longer tolerate the consequences of an open economic war, which could turn the people against it and put its existence at risk instead of pushing them to rally around it as it is waging more than one battle. So far, the regime has been using the course of resistance against America and its allies to deter its domestic opponents, but also to strengthen its supporters and followers. And this is the greatest challenge that should be overcome by the new president, considering that the Revolutionary Guard is already mobilized and issuing warnings, while the conservatives are also lurking for the new president although he received wide support from Guide Ali Khamenei. This is why he will be moving slowly so as not to upset his internal opponents, knowing the West might not settle for his offer to place the Iranian nuclear facilities under the transparent monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency while proceeding with the enrichment on Iranian soil. The question at this level surrounds the extent of the concessions which might be tolerated by the Iranians, and the extent of the commitment by the Revolutionary Guard's hawks to the call made to them by the president and the guide not to interfere in politics, although they are the ones managing the conflict on more than one arena, from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. But the Iranian predicament is met with an American predicament. Indeed, had the United States and its partners wanted war against the Islamic Republic, the diplomacy, sanctions, and electronic war option against the oil facilities, and the pursuit of Iranian scientists with assassinations, would have lasted that long. Washington wants to keep Tehran from acquiring the bomb, to prevent it from threatening, compromising and establishing a balance of terror with all the powers in the area - from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and Central Asia - or becoming an influential partner in determining the policies of these regions. At this level as well, progress is difficult, considering that this issue is linked to the situation in these regions and the role and position enjoyed by the Islamic Republic in them. And if Iran accepts to suspend its enrichment activities, as it was suggested during the two meetings held in Almaty at the beginning and in the middle of the year, it will not be easy for Obama's administration to start alleviating the blockade. This is due to the presence of voices in Washington warning the president against such as step, not only among the Republicans, but also within the Jewish lobby and Benjamin Netanyahu's government, which humored Washington with the resumption of the talks with the Palestinians although it did not want to. Nevertheless, America feels a need to reach an understanding with Iran, as this would allow it to tend to Southeast Asia and the China Sea. It is hoping that such an understanding would alleviate the Sunni-Shiite conflict throughout the Islamic region and facilitate the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, considering it is also in the Islamic Republic's interest for Kabul not to go back to being a stronghold for extremism and to reduce the Russian presence and influence in the overall Iranian space. There is no doubt that ongoing idleness in the face of the Syrian crisis will only lead to the escalation of Sunni-Shiite tension throughout the region, at a time when Washington and Tehran are both aware of the fact that if it explodes, this tension will not stop at Syria's border. Indeed, it has already started to reach Lebanon and Iraq, and nothing can prevent its expansion in the region. Such a scenario would neither serve the United States, its partners and allies, nor Iran which is suffering from financial burdens that it can no longer sustain, in light of the economic and social deterioration endured by the Iranian people. Moreover, there is no interest in seeing Syria's fall in the hands of extremist powers calling for the establishment of an Islamic state or in seeing the country's division, considering that this will have negative repercussions on regional states where sectarian and ethnic minorities have dreams of secession. This was never the wish of the international and regional parties fighting in and over Syria. And while Tehran's presence in the Geneva 2 conference is necessary – since it is part of the Syrian crisis – the meeting will test the ability of the two sides to reach an understanding, in light of numerous points of convergence, but also of divergence. Will President Rohani reconsider the shapes of interference in the crisis? Will he show willingness to discuss the departure of President Al-Assad, to meet Washington and its partners halfway and reach a settlement that does not exclude any sectarian, denominational or ethnic component? President Obama is reiterating there is no future for President Al-Assad in any settlement, without revealing the mechanism of his departure. For its part, Iran is insisting on his stay, as much as it is insisting on its own in Lebanon and Iraq, while aware of the fact that he could never go back to ruling Syria as he did before the eruption of war. As for Iran's presence in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq among other locations, it is also a complicated issue. This presence is based on religious and ideological foundations, and not just on temporary political or economic interests that could be traded with interests elsewhere or at the level of another issue. This is why one cannot simply rely on Tehran's position, as the stances, fates and roles of essential components in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq must be taken into account. Hence, it would be too early to count on the promised American-Iranian dialogue to drastically change the situation in these three countries, which constitute – alongside Yemen and Bahrain – an arena of confrontation with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. So will President Rohani's expected visit to Saudi Arabia pave the way before finding common grounds, turning the page of this conflict and appeasing the sectarian tensions? Will it enhance the presence and interests of the Arabs in whichever dialogue, settlement or deal? Or will it be a mere step aiming to facilitate Tehran's dialogue with Washington? In light of all these complications and obstacles facing dialogue between America and Iran, President Obama and President Rohani will have to work together to reassure Russia and China regarding the fact that the revival of bilateral ties will not be made at the expense of their interests. Moscow and Beijing have invested for a long time in the American-Iranian conflict, and the Islamic Republic acted as a compromise card they used with the West in general, whether at the level of the Middle East or Central Asia. However, they never reached the point of confrontation with Washington, being aware of their mutual need to settle issues for the preservation of international peace and stability, not to mention their intertwining interests that exceed whatever can be offered by the Islamic Republic. This is why the two capitals did not hesitate to approve the Security Council decisions to impose sanctions on Iran, a thing that was not grasped by Ahmadinejad's administration, thus continuing to dream about the establishment of a wider alliance with them to replace the United Nations, which was always considered by the latter administration as being a tool in the hands of the United States and its European allies!
