If President Hassan Rohani convinces the leaders he will meet at the United Nations General Assembly this week about his country's seriousness to settle the nuclear file, this will constitute one step on a long and complicated road. On the eve of this session, he issued a serious of positions that seized the West's attention, especially the United States', after he welcomed the "positive and constructive" tone of President Barack Obama. For its part, the White House had announced "there have been a lot of interesting things said out of Tehran," but that "actions speak louder than words." Hence, diplomacy and dialogue have a chance, and if the two sides do launch this dialogue, the American administration will be facing three tests or challenges: The Palestinian-Israeli negotiations file, the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal to reach the settlement of the crisis, and the resolution of the pending problems with Iran throughout the past three decades. These three issues constitute the main Middle Eastern crises today. So will Obama achieve three accomplishments at the level of foreign policy, to restore America's status as a country capable of managing the world's affairs on the basis of international cooperation and partnership and not on that of preemptive wars and the exclusion of the United Nations? There are many factors and transformations that affected the general scene in the Middle East, thus pushing all the sides to reconsider their calculations and conduct a new repositioning imposed by the collapse of most of the elements of the previous system. And far away from the extremist policy adopted by former Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic never expressed a wish to engage in dialogue with the United States. It was watching the military troubles endured by the latter in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with its domestic economic problems, choosing patience in the hope that the extended hand of Obama and the confusion and reluctance which characterized his policy will bring it further gains and concessions. But the picture changed during the past two years, considering that in addition to its suffocating economic crisis, the Arab Spring cost Iran some of its positions and influence. This is true in Iraq where the threat of civil war lurks in a manner that provokes Tehran's concerns and jeopardizes its influence, presence, and the authority of its allies that control all the decisions in Baghdad, but also in Yemen where the promising national dialogue conference ought to settle the files of the South and its Hirak, and the North and its Houthis. This is also true in Gaza where the calculations and policies have shifted away from Iranian influence and in Lebanon where Hezbollah is waging a depletion war, whether a political one on the internal scene or a military one on the Syrian theater of operations. And finally there is Syria, where the Islamic Republic and its allies are being financially and militarily depleted. But these transformations do not mean that the anticipated dialogue between Washington and Tehran will be easy, especially after three decades of hostility in which many regional elements and forces were implicated and numerous overlapping and conflicting files and interests intersected. In light of this situation, bilateral dialogue will not succeed. Indeed, the United States cannot disregard the presence of these elements and forces that can facilitate the negotiations or obstruct and hinder them. It cannot ignore Russia and China, the Arabs and the Gulf populations in particular, Israel, Turkey or even Pakistan. The enumeration of all the parties concerned by this operation is enough to show the complexity of this dialogue, not to mention the impact of the internal political conflict in America and Iran over the entire process. Therefore, it would be correct to say that an American-Iranian agreement would change the face of the entire region and pave the way before the establishment of a new political and security system in the Great Middle East. The disputes surpass the issue of the frozen accounts in the American banks since the eruption of the revolution. They affect the understanding over the discontinuation of the interventions to undermine the Iranian regime, and the recognition of the role and interests of the Islamic Republic in the entire region, from Central Asia to the Mediterranean shores. On the American internal scene, it will not be easy for President Obama to get Congress to start lifting the sanctions imposed on a country that was always perceived by Israel and its supporters in the House of Representatives and the Senate as being a source of existential threat. In addition, it will not be easy for President Rohani to face the conservatives and convince them to accept the tradeoffs and concessions imposed by whichever settlement at the level of this or that file. This is due to the fact that the previous experiences during the days of President Mohamed Khatami were not encouraging, due to the multitude of the decision-making and political references, although the issue is always taken up with Guide Sayyed Ali Khamenei. On the other hand, any understanding between America and Iran will bother Russia, which fears that this would undermine its positions in more than one region or maybe even the emergence of a new alliance that is hostile to it in the Great Middle East, as it happened during the days of the Cold War. Today, it is benefitting from Iran's influence throughout the region - from the Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and the Central Asian states - just as it benefitted from it during the past years when it engaged in tradeoffs with the West and America at the level of the nuclear file. True, its relationship with the Islamic Republic was never a strategic one and was rather governed by joint interests. At the same time, the bickering and accusations that characterized some stages of the relationship between President Ahmadinejad and President Dmitry Medvedev are still vivid in the memories of both states. But these relations grew stronger during the last few years against the backdrop of the support offered to the Syrian regime, while Moscow started to feel the need to regulate its ties with Tehran in light of the reactions provoked by its Syrian policy among numerous Arab states and forces opposed to President Bashar al-Assad's regime. This cooperation between Moscow and Tehran will likely be strengthened in view of the joint interests in Central Asia, where the Iranian presence could increase the Russian strength in the face of NATO's expansion in the former Soviet space. Moreover, they might have to reach further understanding following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan next year. Today, the United States feels the need to establish some sort of temporary cooperation with the two capitals to secure this pullout. At the same time, the return of the Taliban to Kabul will revive Russia's and Iran's fears, and they will consequently have no choice but to reach an understanding with America to deal with the next stage in this country whose situation is massively impacting the neighboring states, from Pakistan to the Central Asian countries. In other words, there is tripartite joint interest in reaching an understanding to deter the expansion of the extremist forces in this part of the world, which is why during its talks with Iran, the United States must take Russia's interests into account. Indeed, it knows that the latter has opposed and still opposes its southern neighbor's acquisition of the nuclear bomb. In addition, Moscow values its economic gains in America and Europe that exceed their counterparts with Iran, which is why it will not risk its relations and interests with the West. And while Russia enjoys such an influential presence at the level of the Iranian files, the United States cannot disregard China's presence, considering that the latter will be very protective of its investments that are estimated by the billions in the Islamic Republic and the Central Asian states in general, especially in the energy sector. This is not to mention its growing ties with the Arab countries, at the head of which are the Gulf ones. Still, geography plays the greatest role at the level of whichever critical dialogue. In other words, Obama's administration cannot disregard the concerns and fears of the Gulf populations towards any deal that does not take their security and economic interests or their position and size into account in any new system which might see the light. If the Gulf Cooperation Council states detect an inclination to neglect their interests in the context of an understanding between Washington and Tehran, they might seal a deal with their eastern neighbor. And there is no doubt that this would be beneficial for the two sides of the Gulf, and will enhance their positions in any understanding with the superpowers over the oil and non-oil interests throughout the region. Therefore, at a time when it is monitoring the exchanged friendly messages between President Rohani and King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz, America will avoid surrendering the oil, military, and security decision-making power in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East to the Islamic Republic. It knows that the lines of engagement or understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia extend from Yemen to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and from Lebanon to Syria and Iraq. Even Egypt, which is preoccupied with its internal problems, cannot relinquish its decision and position at the heart of the new Arab system, especially in the Gulf which it has always perceived as being part of its national, economic and military security. But Russia and the Gulf states are not the only influential factors at the level of the rebuilding the ties between the United States and Iran. There is also Israel and Turkey, whose Middle Eastern and Central Asian policy in the last few years appeared to be in constant competition and clash with the Iranian policy. Dialogue will primarily tackle the nuclear file, considered by Tel Aviv during the last ten years as being its first priority. But it knows - just like the Americans and Iranians - that the nuclear weapons are not built to be used, and rather serve deterrence purposes. This is why Iran focused on building a missile force that proved its efficiency during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 and will continue to be a source of threat, regardless of the efficiency of the Iron Dome and the Patriot anti-missile system. And there is no doubt that America's imposition of the destruction of the chemical weapons in Syria in the context of the understanding with Russia, will push many to insist on the slogan related to "a Middle East free of WMDs," which is mainly addressed to Israel that is the only one in the region to have a nuclear arsenal. This will also complicate the task of the American negotiator with Iran. The recent American-Russian agreement in regard to the Syrian chemical arsenal paved the way before possible international understanding and cooperation over other files in the region, including the Iranian nuclear one. And there is no doubt that the success of President Barack Obama's administration in getting everyone to commit to this agreement will mark a prelude for a political settlement in Syria, in a way that will dissipate all the fears expressed by Washington's allies towards the American administration's leniency and wasting of its interests and its allies'. Beyond that, this success will confirm that the president - who is accused of reluctance - is able to raise the challenge, impose the respect of America's will on its opponents before its partners, and pave the way towards Tehran.
