United Nations Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is inclined to request the postponement of Geneva 2 until the beginning of the New Year. A while ago, he wanted to abandon his mission – as done early on by his predecessor Kofi Annan – after he felt it would be impossible to organize the international conference. So, did he postpone his resignation, or did his tour reveal to him that the door will finally be opened before the concerned sides to sit around the negotiations table? He certainly knew that the road toward Geneva will remain closed if the regime, which has not yet recognized the decisions issued by Geneva 1, insists on perceiving its opponents as being "mere armed terrorist gangs," and if President Bashar al-Assad insists on reiterating his intention to run in the presidential elections next spring and proceeds with his military campaign while convinced he will settle the situation. Brahimi also knew that the negotiations door will remain closed if the political and military opposition insists on announcing in advance its "rejection of any role by the president and his group whose hands are drenched in blood," on requesting regional and international guarantees in that direction before engaging in any dialogue or negotiations and on securing a minimum level of balance on the ground. This is while some of its factions and supporters also believe there is no substitute for the military settlement, i.e. do not believe in the purpose of any settlement with Damascus. What was required was a great shock to turn these calculations and positions upside down. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces waited for the American strike while watching the Mediterranean Sea getting filled with fleets and destroyers. It prepared for the next day with plans and projects. But it was not alone in that, as many in the Friends group did the same, hoping that Western intervention, despite its limited character, would alter the balance of powers on the ground. Nevertheless, the chemical deal occurred between Washington and Moscow and the winds blew against the direction wanted by many. The crisis thus became more complicated and the regime did not heed the lessons after it grew close to the brink of the abyss. It even considered its consent to destroy its strategic arsenal as being a concession used to enhance its legitimacy, to the beat of the praise it received for its cooperation and quick submission to the logic of the deal! For its part, the opposition believed that the understanding between America and Russia reduced the crisis to the chemical weapons and downplayed the importance of the demands it has been fighting to achieve for two and a half years. More dangerously, many among the United States' partners, whether in Europe or in the region, perceived the behavior of President Barack Obama's administration as being a stab in the back, a belittlement of the partnership, alliance, and joint coordination, and a recanting of the positions this administration has been reiterating since the eruption of war in March 2011. Many doubts thus surrounded its policy, not to mention what followed it in terms of the launching of new dialogue over the Iranian nuclear file, to the beat of ongoing courtship between America and the Islamic Republic. Amid this climate, the meeting of Syria's Friends was held in London last week. Washington wanted to benefit from the dynamic secured by the understanding with Russia to hasten the opening of the Geneva 2 doors, while knocking on those of Tehran and its nuclear reactors. However, this dynamic pushed the sides fighting on the ground in completely different directions. President Al-Assad doubted the staging of the conference. Was it because he detected the seriousness of the two major actors concerned by it and predicted the outcome which might result from the opening of all these doors? He also reiterated his intention to run for a new term and launched the talk about Al-Qalamoun battle and its Lebanese extensions, because any settlement along this front would lift the threat lurking for Damascus and close the Western border in the face of the flow of fighters and weapons. But if the international understanding is so determined to prevent the expansion of the flames of Al-Qalamoun to Lebanon, then the opening of the Tripoli front will achieve the desired purpose. At this level, there is no need to demonstrate the Syrian regime's wish to trigger the Lebanese domestic arena and shift the world's attention towards a new front and away from it. It might even be asked to help extinguish the fire - just as its help was sought to destroy the nuclear arsenal - while it is no secret that the Lebanese are willing to continue destroying the remaining aspects of the state. Indeed, they are not only incapable of forming a new government, but might have also relinquished any wish to come together. They have thus linked their convergence, understanding, coexistence, and the future of their state and country to the war in Syria and the fate of this war, and not to the Geneva conference which might not be held! In the face of Damascus' strategy, the opposition does not seem to be growing closer to Geneva, knowing that the Free Army will not lament the conference if it were to slide into hell or face a miserable fate! And regardless of the pressures exerted on the Coalition – some of the sides in which might have wanted to test the negotiations just in case – the fighting factions on the ground are separated from the international conference by a sea of blood that cannot be easily crossed. Its position was conveyed by the opposition's delegation to the London meeting via a series of conditions preceding the launching of the negotiations, at the head of which comes the provision of guarantees by the concerned sides that President Al-Assad will not play any role during the transitional phase, that they should try to lift the blockade imposed on two and a half million civilians besieged in Eastern Ghouta, Al-Maadamiya, Al-Hajar al-Aswad and the Old Town of Homs, and open safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Secretary of State John Kerry confessed to his partners during the Friends meeting in London that he acted rashly and did not consult with them or inform them about what was going on between him and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. But is this confession enough, after he insisted that Washington's position towards the Syrian regime has not changed and that President Al-Assad will not play any role in Geneva 2 and the transitional phase? The opposition delegation saw positive signs in this position that was featured in the closing statement. But can a believer be stung from the same hole twice? The chemical deal was not the opposition's first experience with the American policy. Indeed, for the last two and a half years, Obama's administration has been promising to arm the Free Army to undermine the existing balance of powers, then showing reluctance under various pretexts. And there is no doubt that the scattering of the opposition forces facilitated its reliance on legitimate fears of seeing whichever qualitative weapons falling in the hands of extremist powers, fighting the moderate or secular factions to impose their control on the ground. These fears are undoubtedly realistic, but the latter administration is disregarding the fact that it is partly responsible for the current status of the Coalition on the political and military levels. This is due to the fact that it neither acted from the beginning to prevent Russia from arming the regime or to prevent the interference of Iran and Hezbollah among others, nor did it respond with similar armament to the regime's opponents. While America is still complaining about or using the pretext of the opposition's dispersion and the growing influence of the extremists, this opposition realizes that the reluctance, doubts and indifference shown by Obama's administration and its Western partners were the reasons that led the Syrian crisis to such division and complexity. So, is it enough for the latter to call for a political settlement that would preserve the rights and freedoms of all the components, at a time when the theater of operations does not reveal the likeliness of such a settlement? The two conflicting sides are still waging war till the end and each of them is receiving irregular support and backup from this or that side. And while the settlement currently appears to be an illusion to those calling for a political solution whose roadmap was drawn by Geneva 1, the fighting factions on the ground are drawing a different map for Syria's future. Hence, the Kurds – whose main forces should have sent representatives to join the Coalition – have not yet stepped forward, and are presently focusing on the protection of their regions and trying to turn them into provinces similar to Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, they are fighting the supporters of Al-Qaeda, whether the ISIL or An-Nusra Front among others, at a time when the latter forces are trying to establish their Emirate by proclaiming an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. As for the Free Army and the other brigades supposed to be operating under the banner of the so-called Supreme Military Council headed by General Salim Edriss, their chief of staff summarized their situation by saying: There is no coordination, no command, no funding, no real armament, and consequently no actual efficiency! In short, the Western and especially the American position towards the Syrian crisis do not rise to the level of a clear strategy, knowing that had this not been the case, we would not have witnessed such confusion, ambiguity and surprises. At the same time, each side involved in the conflict has a clear and defined plan: The regime does not recognize the opposition and is acting based on the belief that its opponents are mere armed terrorist gangs, while hoping to remain in power as though Syria is still the one inherited by the son from his father. And there is no need to go over the position of its sect, whose fate and future it managed to link to its own, pushing the leaders of this sect and those of the other minorities to express reservations over any conference in which the president – whom they perceive as the only guarantor for their rights, even their presence in the country – is not represented. At this level, some extremist factions were able to deepen their fears and transform them into fierce defenders of the regime. On the other hand, and since day one, the opposition has been fighting to topple the regime and all its political, military and security structures, and trying to recuperate what it believes is a legitimate authority that belongs to it or to the largest demographic bloc, i.e. the Sunni sect. If what interests Obama's administration from Geneva 2 and the appeasement in Lebanon is to continue capitalizing on the chemical deal at the level of a series of Russian and Iranian files, while war is expanding and flowing across the border, then the chances of success of this conference – if it is held – will be null!
