During the Istanbul Conference, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces came a long way along the road leading towards the reorganization of its ranks, or rather the restoration of some balance among its components, i.e. between the Islamic powers and the so-called Democratic Bloc which includes secularists, liberals, independent figures and military elements, but also between the regional and international powers standing behind its various sides. What is left for it to do is to overcome the more difficult half. Indeed, in mid-June and during meetings which will be held in Cairo in principle, it will have to choose 29 members, 15 of whom representing the Free Army formations and 14 representing the domestic revolutionary action, so that the coalition eventually includes 114 representatives of wide factions of politicians abroad and fighters and activists on the internal scene. After that, it will have to elect its new command and president in light of the expanded formation. But the most difficult challenge facing the Coalition will be the selection of the members of its delegation to the international conference in Geneva, while agreeing over the main headlines of the negotiations paper, i.e. over a unified and common position. And as it happened in Istanbul, many influential states will have to attend with all their pressure tools, considering that what was recently achieved in the Turkish city would not have been possible without the great efforts deployed by the American, European, Arab and Turkish friends, and what accompanied them in terms of the stick and carrot policy, warnings and threats. The acting president of the Coalition, Georges Sabra, announced that the opposition will not participate in Geneva 2 if what he dubbed "Iran's and Hezbollah's invasion" of Al-Quseir and other Syrian territories is not stopped. In other words, the opposition will not attend in light of the "victories" achieved by the regime and its allies on the ground. This position does not require clarifications, but rather a translation on the ground. Naturally, Britain and France which succeeded in pushing the European Union to lift the ban imposed on the dispatch of weapons to the Syrian opposition, are not ready to see their wishes respected before the staging of the Geneva Conference, at a time when no other party is willing to intervene to change the balance of powers on the ground or tilt the balance in favor of the opposition. Hence, some Arab states might export weapons to the Free Army groups following the European lifting of the ban. In other words, the states and sides wishing to breach the agreements preventing them from delivering imported weapons to a third party can now do so, or else, the opposition military forces on the internal scene will have to change the existing balance on the ground with all available means. If this is not done, the regime and whoever will represent it in Geneva will insist on what was expressed by President Bashar al-Assad during his last televised interview, thus undermining the idea of a "transitional government enjoying full prerogatives." This will eventually be enhanced by the recent changes on the field, which might be imposed by the regime in Quseir and elsewhere. The opposition cannot participate in the Geneva conference in light of what could be considered a "defeat" in Quseir or the Homs province in general. It has already succumbed, and is still succumbing, to massive pressures exerted by the American administration to head towards the negotiations table. Washington facilitated the achievement of a clear victory by Russian diplomacy when it recanted its previous interpretation of the Geneva plan ratified in June of last year and disregarded anything related to President Al-Assad's role during the transitional phase. However, the opposition sees itself forced to humor these positions due to its need for political and military support, but also to confirm its wish to ensure a settlement which the coming days will reveal the regime does not want. In other words, it does not want to lose its Arab and Western friends who are insisting on a political settlement, knowing that it cannot accept any solution that does not feature the peaceful transition of power and the hastening of the departure of the head and main symbols of the regime. Nevertheless, the concession offered by Washington to Moscow means the stay of Al-Assad until the end of his term, if we were to take into account the duration of the negotiations. The opposition is not the only one with reservations over the last American positions. Indeed, the British and the French (in addition to other regional powers) which are humoring Washington and abstaining from dispatching weapons to the opposition for the time being, are insisting on an agreement between the main sponsors of the international conference over all the elements of the settlement before heading to Geneva. This will likely necessitate its postponement until after the summit between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama, on the sideline of the G8 summit in Ireland on June 17 and 18. For its part, the Coalition does not trust Russia's stand and its ability to convince the regime to accept what might be reached by the conference. Still, it is humoring Washington in testing Russia's policy, knowing that this might be the last test in the event of the failure of Geneva 2. In reality, there are massive wagers over the fact that the American administration will have to change its position towards the Syrian crisis, after it abstained from getting involved in it for more than two years for numerous reasons that have become known. Among these reasons is the outcome of the Arab spring in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, where the spring resulted in regimes seeking the reproduction of the experience of the deposed tyrannical authorities, but also the rise of extremist powers threatening America's interests and those of its allies in the region. There was also a wish to boost Russia's ego and recognize its interests in the region, in the hope that this would lead to cooperation in numerous other files, including the Iranian nuclear file, the pullout from Afghanistan, the conflict with China in Southeast Asia and others. Many believe that President Obama depleted all the means and pretexts which pushed him to show patience and try to gain time, in the hope of avoiding any implication in the Syrian crisis. Among the reasons behind his wish to see a political settlement was his fear over Syria's slide towards anarchy and division, and the spread of this plague throughout the region in a way threatening its stability, security and America's interests in it. But the developments of this crisis have already started to threaten the states of the region and American national security, thus making it difficult for his administration to simply stand by and watch the transformation of the Levant into another Somalia. For his part, his Secretary of State John Kerry was calling for patience until after the Iranian presidential elections. But the picture in Tehran has become clear and there is no need to wait for two more weeks, i.e. the date on which these elections – that do not herald any change at the level of the Islamic Republic's policy – will be held. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is engaged in the war in Syria on the military and political levels, directly and through its allies in Beirut and Baghdad. It is engaged in an existential war, in which there is no room for truces or settlements excluding President Al-Assad and the leaders of his regime, or for any independent decision not only excluding Damascus, but Moscow as well. Iran has succeeded where others have failed. Indeed, throughout many years, it managed to build local political and military powers, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Asaeb Ahl al-Haq and Hezbollah Brigades among other Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. It also contributed to the creation of the Syrian National Defense Forces, knowing that all the aforementioned power are today involved in the Syrian war one way or another. So far, the United States has benefited from the Syrian arena's depletion of Al-Assad's regime and its forces, Iran and its allies, and the extremist Sunni powers headed by Al-Qaeda. But this depletion has started to move to other arenas. Lebanon, which had started to regain its ability to manage its political game far away from Damascus' tutelage during the last few years, has gone back to confirming its insistence on this tutelage, even if under different forms and with different tools. Hence, there will be no parliamentary elections and no government. In Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki's government contributed to the suspension of political life until further notice, whereas the political situation in Jordan does not require any explanations, while having to deal with the security and social threats generated by the massive flow of refugees. In Turkey, which did not slide towards the rising flames on its southern border, Istanbul – one of its largest cities – is being swept by protests threatening Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, one of Washington's greatest allies in the region. In light of these developments, which not only threaten the region's stability but also herald a shift in the balance of powers, the existing alliances and the traditional networks of interests in it, wide circles expect the imminent involvement of President Obama's administration in the Syrian crisis, noting the efforts deployed by Secretary of State Kerry and his Ambassador to Damascus Robert Ford to restructure the Syrian opposition Coalition, and grant the Free Army under the command of Salim Edriss a large representation share (Washington asked that it be given 25 seats, but it only got 15). So will the new structure of the Coalition, after it is completed with its politicians and military elements, provide reassurance to secure an efficient American action which had been missing for two years? Is the opposition required to present to its friends, and especially the United States, a model that is different than the one seen in Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli, in order to end the suffering of the Syrians and help Washington change its mind about a crisis that has become a first point on the international and regional agendas? Will this change be hastened by the events recently and currently seen in Istanbul? Or will the Syrians have to suffer another year of crushing wars before the launching of the political solution and the transitional phase, which remains extremely foggy?
