The chances of success of the Geneva plan ratified last June will be better than those of the international conference which Washington and Moscow recently agreed to hold. Indeed, this conference might be stillborn and will likely bury the plan with it this time around. Since the beginning, it was never expected that Washington and Moscow will agree over its staging this swiftly, after all the stalemate, stalling, and maneuvering which prevented the implementation of what was agreed on in Geneva I. They were in no rush despite all the tragedies, calamities massacres, genocides, displacement and destruction witnessed in the Syrian war. The American administration even appeared to be the first to initiate it in order to achieve more than one goal, the first being to spare President Barack Obama from the adoption of a pivotal decision in regard to the Syrian crisis following all the commotion raised about President Bashar al-Assad's regime's breaching of the red line through the limited use of chemical weapons. The second goal was to alleviate the pressures which had started to be exerted by powers on the American domestic arena and abroad, pushing towards intervention and the provision of efficient weapons to the opposition groups. But the American administration's rush to the Geneva II conference, with all that accompanied it in terms of talk about concessions offered to Russia, were not the only motive. Russia leaped at the opportunity due to a joint American-Russian wish to stall, as though the ongoing dialogue between the two sides over many files has not yet ripened and requires more time. But the explosive Syrian file recently witnessed developments heralding the alteration of the rules of the game which have been prevailing for two years. This motivated a quick action to rebuild some of the red lines breached by the parties fighting on the internal scene and by the regional actors. Among the motives behind Washington's and Moscow's concerns – in addition to the file of the chemical weapons, the possible repetition of their use, and their possible transfer to extremist groups if what is said about their use by armed groups is true – is the growing rise and deployment of extremist movements, at the head of which is Al-Nusra Front, the launching of sectarian cleansing operations in many areas and the massacres, slaughters and war crimes being seen – the most dangerous of which is what is happening in Al-Qusayr and Homs. Sooner or later, these acts will provoke similar massacres in other parts of the country, ones that will not spare minorities and components which those calling for a political solution claim to be trying to protect, while making sure that Syria is not dismantled, divided and ‘Somalized' in way that will fuel the sectarian conflict in the region. But the most dangerous motive probably remains Israel's involvement in the war on the field, through a series of raids which not only targeted positions in Syria, but also the requirements of Iran's and Hezbollah's involvement through military equipment, missiles and sophisticated weapons. But the involvement did not stop at this level, as Tehran announced it will form a Syrian Hezbollah after Damascus announced the opening of the Golan Front before the resistance, while the Lebanese Hezbollah welcomed this step and expressed willingness to provide all forms of support to this front. And as though all these motives were not enough to push towards a conference that would draw up the new rules of the game, Iraq implicated itself in the war, an implication whose first signs are not limited to the political crisis in which the parties involved are dancing to the beat of what is happening behind the southern border, and whose last signs will not be the arrival of forces and militias to the combat arenas in Damascus among other cities, or the Iraqi troops' bombing of the Yarobiya border checkpoint that is controlled by the Free Syrian Army. As for the last developments/motives, they are probably the last explosions which hit the Turkish Reyhanli town and shook Ankara and Istanbul, thus pushing Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to warn against testing his country's capabilities. And whether this incident is part of the conflict in regard to the Kurdish cause or among the repercussions of what is seen on the Syrian arena, the link between the two goes a long way back, since Abdullah Ocalan lived in Syria or the Bekaa during the days of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. If it is proved that the Syrian intelligence apparatuses had any party in the explosions – as revealed by the preliminary investigations – Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government will find itself forced to reconsider the rules which governed its policy towards Syria. The first step at this level would be to exit the stage of empty speeches and threats and launch a decisive action to prevent the reflection of the Syrian developments on its soil, in light of the opposition shown by a wide faction among its citizens towards the Syrian refugee camps and the help and facilities offered by the government to the opposition formations. In light of this active regional presence at the level of the Syrian war, in addition to the presence of groups from various origins and with various programs fighting the regime, the danger is no longer threatening the Syrian state, institutions and components solely, but also the interests of the international actors and their role in drawing up the future of the country. This is why the United States and Russia rushed to call for an international conference, in order to revive the clauses of the Geneva Plan which was ratified by the major states, the Arab League and Turkey a year ago, but also revive the mission of Lakhdar Brahimi, which did not add anything to that of his predecessor Kofi Annan until the day he resigned. The two superpowers naturally want to play a key role in the management of the Syrian crisis and in finding a political settlement tailored to suit the future they want for this country, in order to guarantee their interests in it and in the Levant in general. However, the wishes of the two superpowers are one thing, and their ability to achieve them is a completely different one. And had they enjoyed total freedom of action at this level, there would have been no need for an international conference, but rather for a bilateral agreement to impose the settlement they desire. However, reality is otherwise. Before talking about the main role of the conflicting Syrian forces and the growing role of the regional powers, it is enough to take a look at the confusion prevailing over the positions of the Americans and the Russians after they reached an agreement to stage the international conference, in regard to their vision of the transitional government and President Al-Assad's role during the transitional phase, as well as in regard to the states and powers invited to participate in the Geneva II conference, and the role and future of the army and the security institutions. The wishes of the superpowers are one thing, and reality on the Syrian ground is a completely different one. Indeed, there are no guarantees that the Russians will be able – or even want - to convince President Al-Assad and his entourage to stay away from the transitional government, or convince him to step down. Moreover, they do not wish to adopt an approach that would allow foreign intervention in a situation which they insist should be up to the people of the country. As for the Americans, they cannot make the opposition engage in dialogue with the regime, knowing that only a few would listen to or trust them. They have placed Al-Nusra Front on the list of terrorist organizations and have been stalling and maneuvering for the past two years to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's prevalence over the opposition formations, from the National Council to the existing coalition. In addition, they have resisted and are still resisting the provision of the Free Army or those to whom they refer as the opposition groups with the weapons they need to face the regime's machine and land, air and naval arsenal. This is why the oppositionists' voices rose to demand the changing of the balance of powers before sitting around the negotiations table, a change without which the pressures on the Coalition to accept dialogue and its American - before its Russian - conditions will tear up what is left of this organizational structure and increase the suffering of the opposition. In the meantime, the latter has started to feel there is a cosmic conspiracy against it and not against the regime – as the regime is claiming – and that this conspiracy is preventing the desired change. In addition to the scattering of the opposition and the limits of the pressures that can be exerted by the Russians and Americans on their allies in Syria, there are regional powers, from Iran to Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. These states have become part of the ongoing war and each of them has its own reasons and its own crucial goals which it cannot easily relinquish, regardless of the pressures of the major actors. Indeed, these states have strategic and vital interests that are negatively or positively affected by the country's future and the identity of its next regime, and none of them can listen to the American or Russian wishes without discussions. Would Jordan remain silent towards the arrival of more refugees? Will Turkey settle for the issuance of threats as it did following the downing of its warplane about a year ago, or will it join the pressure groups urging President Obama to arm the opposition or establish safe zones for it? Will Iran allow the end of a regime, with which all that it build throughout the last three decades along the Mediterranean shores and on Israel's border could end? Would the Hebrew state allow the deployment of Al-Qaeda in the Golan or the acquisition by Al-Assad's regime of an arsenal of strategic weapons? Will Hezbollah agree to risk all the gains it secured in Lebanon on the political and military levels? And will Nouri al-Maliki's government stand by and watch the rise of the Sunnis in Syria and its repercussions on the Sunni arena in Iraq? In light of this complex map and fateful questions, it is almost impossible for the international conference to ensure the implementation of the Geneva Plan. Had this implementation been so easy, it would not have remained in the drawers of the United Nations. The regional and international conflict over Syria blocked the horizon before a military settlement in favor of the regime or its oppositionists, and caused the stalemate which affected all the efforts to secure a political settlement that seems to be outdated. So will the pressures exerted on President Obama – whether before or after the Geneva conference – push him to change the rules of the game as he threatened, after all the sides violated the red lines?
