The Syrian crisis has taken a decisive turn both politically and militarily. The fighters are gaining ground, military positions and air bases, threatening to besiege Damascus, and receiving some qualitative weapons. As for the regime, it is upholding its violence to ensure its superiority and maintain a safe corridor with the western coast. It is now in a defensive position, which is why it has started to mobilize its prohibited weapons. The opposition coalition for its part is discussing while in Cairo the formation of a temporary government to manage the liberated areas in the north, east and south. In the meantime, the United States and Russia are deploying extensive diplomatic efforts to seek a political solution that would come faster than the military settlement in the capital, in the hope of imposing a transitional stage that would reduce the losses which might result from a sudden collapse and wide-scale anarchy. Since the eruption of the revolution, they have not stopped showing interest in the fate of the religious and ethnic minorities in the country, while warning against the repercussions of the state's collapse – along with its army, security and institutions - on the domestic arena, its unity, on the neighbors and beyond, in light of an acute regional and international standoff that is causing the escalation of the crisis. There are many developments that pushed Washington and Moscow to come together once again to discuss a joint mechanism to approach the crisis. At this level, the Syrian regime's mobilization of its chemical weapons – despite this act's seriousness – is not the only development provoking fear in the two capitals and throughout the international community. Indeed, this was preceded by NATO's approval of the deployment of Patriot missiles along Turkey's southern border, which is a decision whose adoption was delayed until after President Barack Obama and his administration were liberated from the burden of the presidential campaign. This initiative by NATO revived the heat inside Kremlin and enhanced President Vladimir Putin's fears over the West's missiles, as they are approaching Russia's southern border. And since that step, he has not stopped reiterating that he fiercely opposed the deployment of the missile shield's radars in Turkey, without excluding a military intervention that might be imposed by the Syrian regime's resorting to prohibited weapons if it feels the battle over the capital is about to be settled. Washington and Moscow both have other reasons to resume their contacts after a period of stalemate, and these reasons are related to their regional interests. Hence, they had to reconnect after they were relieved from their presidential battles, at a time when other joint factors hastened the meeting held between American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on Thursday in Dublin, and then the one held by their aides in Geneva on Sunday, after two months of stalling. The most prominent among these factors is probably the military dynamism of the fighters who are threatening with Damascus' fall, thus provoking further fears and confusion over a possible surprise that might topple all the calculations and expectations. At this level, US Ambassador to Damascus Robert Ford was not the last one to caution that the more violence continues in Syria, the more the extremists will benefit from the situation! Naturally, it would be too soon to say that Moscow has drastically changed its position or has given up on offering political and military support to the regime. However, it is not concealing its feeling that it might lose Syria, amid information talking about preparations in the Tartous base to face the day of collapse and its possible repercussions on the Russian military elements and their families, some of whom are said to have anticipated their departure. This is why it resumed the discussions with Washington over the ways to impose a transitional phase which might leave some room for some officials in the regime among those who were not involved in the fighting, and maybe even allow the participation of some of the symbols of the domestic opposition which neither Moscow nor Tehran were able to impose as an alternative or main partner for the opposition abroad, one which was represented by the National Council and then the current Coalition. This would probably help it guarantee some of its inherited interests since the days of the Soviets in the country, particularly the Tartous base which is its only one in the region. Moreover, it might be able to reach an agreement with the American administration, allowing them both to practice concomitant pressures on the two sides of the conflict, in order to lead them towards a political solution that would encourage the figures surrounding President Bashar al-Assad to abandon him. The only side remaining is Iran, which might suffer a great loss unless it shows serious willingness to engage in dialogue with Washington in regard to its nuclear file and the other regional issues, under a low ceiling of ambitions, demands and conditions. Moscow knows that the Syrian opposition, with its various parties, cannot accept dialogue with the regime, and it knows that the regime has a similar position vis-à-vis the opposition. Still, it is relying on an understanding with Washington, which has not yet announced its recognition of the wide opposition coalition as it was done by Paris, London and other European countries, in addition to the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Therefore, such an understanding prior to the Marrakech meeting – during which the American administration is expected to recognize the coalition – might send positive signals pointing to Russia's willingness to head to the Security Council and adopt a resolution pushing towards the instatement of a transitional phase, provided that the opposition shows, with a push and pressures by the American administration, a similar willingness to engage in dialogue and impose this stage. This would be done based on the Geneva formula which was ratified by the superpowers last June, and most of the articles of which are no longer valid in light of the developments which affected the crisis during the last five months. Russia naturally knows that what activated the American position towards the crisis is the post Bashar al-Assad stage and who will govern Damascus. Washington and its allies – and certainly Moscow – do not want to see a resounding fall of the state and the military and security institutions that would cause massacres and wide-scale retaliation, and during which power will neither go to the Free Syrian Army nor to the opposition coalition. Indeed, the domestic arena will belong to the extremist armed groups and all their factions, which will not lead towards the instatement of the Somali model as it is being warned by United Nations-Arab Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi who participated in the Dublin meeting, but to a unique Syrian model with the characteristics of the Somali, Lebanese, Iraqi, Libyan and Malian models! In addition, numerous Western circles believe that any understanding reached between Washington and Moscow to impose a transitional phase might encourage many among the supporters of the regime, whether the political or military ones, to distance themselves from and turn against it, thus hastening its isolation and collapse. In this context, disgruntlement prevails in the ranks of the Alawite sect, and especially the symbols who served in the Al-Assad Sr. administration, who now fear for the fate of the entire sect in case the regime were to collapse. At the beginning of the crisis, some of them had expressed their dissatisfaction with the military solution adopted by President Bashar al-Assad and his close circle, but the apparatuses leading the combat units had a louder voice, aware of the fact that they will be the first victims of any agreement over a transitional phase to ensure a power transition. Moreover, the extremism shown by some sides in the opposition and the perpetration of sectarian retaliation operations by extremist fighting units, extinguished the voices of the latter detractors. The question at this level is the following: will the unification of the opposition's military units following the establishment of the political coalition, help those rejecting the regime's choices inside and outside the sect and are still rallied around it, carry out a coup that would topple the president in case they feel that the end is near and is threatening to turn them all into victims? President Al-Assad might not dare use chemical weapons because he would be sentencing himself to death. In the meantime, the international community, which is insisting on a transitional phase that would guarantee the post-Assad stage, prevent the unleashing of the extremists and the hard-line groups as it happened following the American invasion of Iraq, and spare the country from massacres and retaliatory actions, will not stand idle in the face of anarchy and sectarian wars. President Al-Assad might not stay in Syria in case the fighters tighten the siege around him. So will he take a risk and show arrogance after he saw what happened to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and what has happened and is still happening to President Hosni Mubarak? Will the stifled opposition in his wide circle and within his sect, and those fearful over the extremism of some parties in the opposition, wait until the extremists reach the palace's gates? Does the opposition not feel responsible for helping the latter detractors and providing them with all the necessary guarantees to push them to leave the regime? At this point, the talk would no longer surround Syria's division and the threatening of its unity, while the talk about a coup would become possible to save what could be salvaged from the Syrian national fabric.
