Power appears to be like a millstone. If anything touches it gently, it refines it, and if anything puts pressure on it, it tears it apart. The same applies to the experiences of the Islamists in the authority following the Arab spring. In Morocco for example, the ruling Justice and Development Party threatened to take to the streets to defend the project it is linking to the war on corruption and tyranny. But its opponents in the opposition, i.e. Al-Istiqlal Party and the Socialist Union, beat it to the mobilization of protests against the performance of the government it is leading, knowing it has not yet completed its two years in power. What further complicated the situation was that the collapse of the governmental alliance following the withdrawal of Al-Istiqlal Party's ministers was not accompanied by any preemptive alternative grabbed from the nearest shelf. In other words, Prime Minister Benkirane thought of everything but the possibility of failing to ensure his government's majority in parliament. And whether the withdrawal of Al-Istiqlal was well-studied or provoked developments which were never considered, the situation is similar to the predicament facing the Freedom and Justice rule in Egypt and Ennahda's in Tunisia, bearing in mind the difference affecting the handling of the problems and the existing crises. Deposed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi did not listen to the voices that urged him to launch dialogue and show openness, which caused him to face a fate he never even envisaged. For its part, Ennahda in Tunisia did not tend to the turmoil on the street and the disgruntlement provoked by the assassination of oppositionists, and was consequently forced to surrender to a roadmap agreement which stripped it of its initiating capacity. In reality, Benkirane disregarded a small request to introduce a governmental amendment, a step which snowballed into a larger heap of disputes at a time when the ally, Al-Istiqlal party - that was part of the ruling alliance – offered a gift on a golden platter to the opposition that was awaiting this opportunity. The Moroccan Justice and Development does not advocate coups, having heeded the lessons from the restrictions imposed on the Islamic movements and the adoption of the course of moderation and realism. But when it assumed the responsibility, it surrendered to wild feelings that can be oddly linked to the Arab spring which toppled numerous equations and forts. It probably shares, along with the other Islamic movements that rose to the forefront, the annulment of the rules of the conflict, especially since the success achieved by these movements in mobilizing the street and regulating the angry protests was not met by a similar success in the management of political, economic and social affairs, far from arrogance and monopolization. The hope of seeing wide changes was not accompanied by palpable actions, except for the preoccupation with consensual grounds for reform because the legacy was heavy. And the street did not show any mercy towards the oppositionists who offered massive sacrifices, whether those who were tortured in detention, were sent into exile or suffered oppression. Hence, it would have been better for the Moroccan Islamic party to heed the lessons of this interesting experience in time. But just like the remaining Islamic movements carried by the spring to the forefront, the party did not replace the discourse of criticism and complaints about harassments with another focusing on the rational handling of the issues at hand. The difference between democratic experiences stemming from the spout of plurality and based on the peaceful rotation of power based on electoral agendas and their counterparts that wore Islamic cloaks, is probably that the latter do not wish to succumb to punitive sentences, whether issued by the ballot boxes or the momentum on the street. In other words, they measure democracy by the extent of their undisputed monopolization of power and perceive the support they earned domestically and externally as being a blank check, although it is a mere contract that can be annulled by whichever party that deems itself harmed by its sustainment. The wish to induce change does not always push in the right direction and it is likely that the voters' alignment behind the Islamic movements embodied a wish to see such change, without setting any standards. And as long as the Islamic discourse in the opposition was convincing and enticing, being based on moral principles enjoying a special impact among the people, there was a natural inclination to test the last proposed prescription for the treatment. More importantly was the reproduction of the same discourse, but to check these movements' capabilities while at the head of the authority and what they could not achieve while on the brink of the abyss. The most wonderful thing about democracy is that it does not close the door and does not render the return to the opposition inevitable. It should just be practiced based on what is possible and what is impossible, along the path toward a transition that appears frail but reveals a wish to overcome the predicament.
