The loss of one parliamentary seat does not mean much in the majority and opposition equation in Morocco. But to the ruling Justice and Development Party, it represents a painful blow, considering that this is the first time it loses a political duel against its rival, Al-Istiqlal Party, which has pulled out from the government. In addition, the mobilization climate that accompanied by-elections over two seats grants the victory and defeat a greater dimension, exceeding the addition or subtraction of a number. Since the beginning, these by-elections clearly constituted some sort of training for upcoming electoral rounds, whether in the context of anticipated elections which might be imposed by the governmental predicament or the municipal and local elections that are deferred for an undetermined period. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane chose to personally support his party's candidate, as it was done by his rival, Secretary General of Al-Istiqlal Party Hamid Chabat. In the meantime, the Socialist Union and Al-Istiqlal recognized the fact that the presentation of their candidates marked a first step towards the creation of a new alliance, setting the confrontation with the government as its primary goal. This was a symbolic breakthrough. But it is measured by the climate which prevailed over the polls, namely the fact that the image of the reformatory government led by the Islamic party was somewhat scratched. Indeed, the oil price rise, no matter how partial and limited it is, creates the impression that the executive power is unable to reach alternative solutions to face the economic and financial crisis, while the governmental situation with its incomplete Cabinet is more preoccupied securing a parliamentary majority than seeking the implementation of the promised reforms. This has generated an impact whose repercussions cannot be underestimated, as it reflects an irregular case of democratic action and reveals true disgruntlement affecting all the facets of its performance. On the Istiqlal Party's end, it seems that its return to the opposition ranks has renewed its chances among the voters, at a time when this constituted an unexpected source of embarrassment for the ruling Justice and Development Party in the context of its wager on the voters' trust. And it has become certain that the political partners in the loyalist and opposition teams will think twice before calling for the organization of anticipated elections. At this level, the only party that won the wager without taking any risk is the Popular Movement, whose status inside the governmental coalition was unaffected as though it reaped the fruits of the others' work. For its part, the Socialist Union failed to win a seat like its ally the Istiqlal Party, and it probably wishes to achieve greater gains through the organization of a crowded demonstration against the government. Indeed, it is seeking a unionist, social and partisan support to form a front opposed to the executive power, hoping to benefit from the existing social disgruntlement. Hence, Abdelilah Benkirane's government is facing open fire from all sides, not the least of which being the difficulties obstructing the formation of the second version of the experience and the prevalence of the culture of protests against the decisions it has adopted. While the prime minister drew up the main headlines of the upcoming financial budget draft – to point to the continuation of his government – this does not annul the fact that internal and regional developments affected the image of an experience on which many were counting to set the bases for a new batch of structural reforms, under the headline it raised regarding "war on corruption." Hence, as much as the disputes over the management of the affairs between the partners in the coalition contributed to the presentation of a faulty and weak image, the developments in Egypt and Tunisia cast their shadows over the Moroccan scene, whether in terms of avoiding the repetition of the mistakes which led to these developments or the assessment of the Islamic movements' performance in power. The organization of by-elections that will not change anything at the level of the balance of powers between the political partners is yet another proof for the fact that the ballot boxes have started to haunt the political elite. This might be due to the shock caused by the November 2011 elections, back when the Justice and Development Party won by a large margin over the Istiqlal Party. It might also be due to the impact of the Arab spring winds. But more importantly, the elections held last Thursday will push all the partners to reconsider the current positions of influence, while it has become clear that the Istiqlal Party in particular only withdrew from the government to return through its wider door, in case the voters' choice were to tilt in its favor. For its part, the Justice and Development Party will not risk calling for anticipated elections, unless it is certain it will be in the lead. And just like Abdelilah Benkirane did not have any other choice but to pursue the Rally of Independents although he had never considered its existence prior to the governmental crisis, if he succeeds to himself at the premiership or continues to perform his tasks without any change, he will be forced to adopt an extended hand policy towards the others. Among the positive results of the transformations in Egypt and Tunisia is that they shed light on the necessity to ensure true plurality, including all the partisan sides, in the context of the respect of legitimate political action in which the parties do not rely on religious, ethnic, gender-based or linguistic references, but on programs and mechanisms that are viable and capable of evolving. It would be better for the government to suffer a crisis than to have the leading party become a headline for this crisis, knowing there are solutions that have not yet been tested along the road leading towards normalization with the idea of peaceful power transition, without disregarding the opposition's role.
