Is Morocco headed towards the formation of a national unity government to overcome the current crisis? The reason for this question is that the irregular status of Abdelilah Benkirane's government is likely to endure, unless a surprise occurs to bring the partners in the coalition back to the negotiations table. And after royal arbitration was excluded, since the governmental crisis is political and not constitutional, the parties concerned with the repercussions of the predicament did not show any flexibility to help contain the existing divide. At the very least, neither the leadership of the Istiqlal Party nor the prime minister is about to make the first step to meet half way. The structural elements of this crisis appear different than the ones seen in the countries of the so-called Arab spring, considering that the ballot boxes allowed the Islamic Justice and Development Party to head the government after it came first during the legislative elections held in the fall of 2011. In addition, the clash characterizing the conflict on the political arena has maintained the confrontation within the institutions. And while everyone was awaiting the escalation of the standoff between the majority and the opposition, the Istiqlal Party chose to threaten to abandon ship before it hit the high waves. It probably did not implement its decision, which would have meant the collapse of the governmental alliance, in order to preserve the minimum level of relations. Moreover, it would have been enough for it to announce its accession to the opposition and demand the withdrawal of confidence to topple Benkirane's government, but it did not do so, as it may not envisage the toppling of the government as much as it wishes to embarrass it and push it to reassess its political calculations. This means that what is required in the context of the arm-twisting policy is not to topple the government, but rather to show the limitedness of its performance considering that it failed to settle the internal broadcasting problems after more than a month. The long-term goal might be to demonstrate that the government led by the Justice and Development Party failed to settle the disputes of the majority, i.e. that the experience is flawed. And since it came via the ballot boxes, its continuation requires the existence of a supporting majority. The most important part in the statements of some opposition factions is that political concord could allow an exit from the tunnel. Indeed, on one hand there are greater challenges related to the Sahara conflict file around which both the opposition and the majority converge, while on the other, the requirements of economic and financial recovery in light of the mounting pressures of the International Monetary Fund require the instatement of concord. This is due to the fact that the greatest fear of the political partners is seeing some economic and social reforms pushing towards mayhem, in which case the government will not be the only one responsible. Hence, recipes for stability are being debated as a common concern for the loyalists and the opposition. The Istiqlal Party's decision to head to the Sahara to organize a crowded oratorical festival was not spontaneous. It featured messages pointing in one direction, i.e. to confirm the party's ongoing support to the governmental approach in dealing with the consensual file that is respected by all the sides, while criticizing at the same time the performance of the executive power in managing the economic and social problems. In that same sense, the opposition's talk about the suffocating crisis in the face of the IMF institutions was not distant from the callers for a more comprehensive national concord. In light of the current challenges, Benkirane's government cannot undertake painful reforms with a high social cost. Still, earning wide support from the opposition if a national unity government is formed could alleviate the burdens and constitute a safety raft for an experience whose poor performance has become obvious to all, just like the circumstances that imposed it against the backdrop of the action on the street. But what characterizes this Moroccan experience is that its calm and reformatory reference caused the least amount of damage possible. However, no matter how powerful the political reforms are in ratifying the necessary mechanisms for the separation of powers and the drafting of a constitution with a progressive content, they need to be accompanied by the remaining economic and social reforms that constitute a basis for the selection of the structures and for testing the capabilities. It is believed that walking through a mine field requires a modern compass to avoid slipping and putting one's foot on the explosive wounds. Hence, the Moroccans in the loyalist team and the opposition are coexisting with an unnatural situation. And although the government's rivals and opponents wish to topple it at the first turn, there is a feeling that the experience cannot tolerate any adventures, whether by letting the government launch what it dubs painful reforms alone, or by sustaining the anticipation that is negatively affecting the performance of the remaining partners among unionists, politicians, and businessmen. Can the national unity government recipe be implemented, or will the wide political map be able to tolerate the developments for a while, the soonest of which might be the return to the ballot boxes in case the concord efforts are obstructed? That is the pivotal question.
