Between the boycotting of the opposition and the criticisms of the Istiqlal Party, Moroccan Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane finds himself amidst a confrontation, which he did not expect to be that fierce and concealed behind soft blows, not the least violence of which being the fact that he is now forced to offer concessions to preserve the normal performance of institutions. While he expected his recipe dubbed "reform in light of continuation" to earn wide support in favor of the performance of his Justice and Development Party inside the government, the situation escalated into a controversy surrounding the management of the Executive Power, which was not up to the expectations. Even more, a key partner in the governmental coalition believes that the situation reached the level of "threats and intimidation." The Istiqlal party clearly stated its beliefs in an official memo submitted to Moroccan Monarch King Mohammed VI. This does not only bind it to fully assume all of its responsibilities, towards its stated positions – whether in regard to its stay in the government or return to the opposition – but also classifies its disputes inside the government as being ones with an exclusionist character. This is the first time that crucial disputes emerge with the prime minister, who is accused by his opponents of practicing hegemony, at a time when he is responding by saying he is only exercising the prerogatives he was given by the constitution. Besides, while he assures by saying that whenever he opened a reform file, he was faced with criticisms, his opponents wonder whether or not economic, partisan and syndicate leaders are all mistaken, attributing that to the obstruction of dialogue with the unions, businessmen, opposition factions and even partners inside the Executive power. What happened to a governmental experience that generated great hopes which soon dissipated? Was the lack of experience of an opposition Islamic party, which found itself at the heart of this experience, a factor that broke the camel's back? Or were the accumulated problems too much to handle within a short period of time? In any case, the governmental experience in Morocco, which wanted to be an exception in dealing with the action that erupted on the beat of the Arab Spring, is no longer subject to that logic. Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are showing obstinacy in conflicts to strengthen their position, in an authority that does not take the other opinion into account. In the same manner, the Moroccan governmental experience was affected by this general climate, with the only difference that the Moroccans wish to see dialogue within the institutions, in order to settle their disputes instead of transferring them to the street. But in the end, the outcome seems to be the same, whether it is less or more acute. And when the Moroccan Istiqlal Party requests royal arbitration to settle its conflicts with the prime minister, it is showing a rational behavior before resorting to the other options it holds in its hand. On the other hand, when the official authorities received the party's critical memo, they did not do so in the context of arbitration, but rather to preemptively listen to the details of a crisis, which might go from being a partisan one to being a governmental and political one. This behavior leaves the door half open before the prime minister, if he wants to bridge the gap and preserve the current governmental coalition or relinquish any possible cooperation with the Istiqlal partner. At that point, the decision to respect the constitution will be open to many possibilities. The way of handling the governmental crisis that has become out of control goes in line with the search for a solution, which does not weaken any side. Indeed, the manifestation of the disputes has exhausted the limits of statements and mudslinging, and the only thing left to do is for each party to decide, which way it wants to head. Hence, whoever wishes to clear the air and bridge the gap will deploy all possible efforts to reach that result – whether it is partial or full . Also, whoever wishes to topple the government and replace some of its components will not lack the pressure tools to achieve that goal. There is always someone lurking the mistakes and seizing the opportunities, while oppositions exist to act as shadow governments awaiting the start buzzer. The Istiqlal Party and the prime minister have equal chances, based on the extent of the wishes and goals. While the Party has not announced its accession to the opposition, despite all the reservations its expressed over the government's performance – and especially its prime minister's which it deems responsible for the current dead-end – Abdelilah Benkirane considered that the governmental coalition and the relationship with the legislative institution were proceeding normally. It is normal that he does not want to enhance the severance of the ties by polling the positions of other possible partners in case Al-Istiqlal wishes to pull out, at a time when the opposition factions anticipated the situation by stressing their stay within the opposition. The issue is about a precedent at the level of the balances of powers and estimates, which might be due to the fact that the opposition – or some of the parties in it – does not wish to repeat the experience of the Istiqlal Party, unless there is drastic change in the government's vision and management approach. In the meantime, its reliance on a transformation in the voters' inclinations might be pushing it to wager on the upcoming developments. In both cases, the government's status – whether it recovers from the crisis or is left with scars – will not be similar to that which was seen when it first started. What contributed to this change is that the wagers of the Arab spring were not up to the street's expectations, consequently causing it to boil once again. Still, this is the first time that a party resorts to the announcement of its withdrawal, while other parties are eager to participate, knowing that the same goes to the positions of the opposition that wants the exhaustion of the current experience, especially in light of the burnout it is suffering. So far, the closest option is the return to the negotiations in the context of the governmental coalition, although this does not annul the remaining possibilities and the fact that everything is linked to the local and regional possibilities.
