Three no's were raised by American President Barack Obama during his speech at the inauguration of the United Nations General Assembly: No chemical weapons will remain in Syria, no coexistence with an Iranian atomic bomb, and no to the revival of President Bashar al-Assad's legitimacy by Russian-Iranian support. As for his decisive yes in the speech, it was closer to a threat saying that the president – who has already embarked on his second term and is not wagering on a third one – is willing to order the American troops to move in defense of the United States' interests in the region. Obama thus appeared to be addressing a message to his frenemy in the Syrian chemical disarmament agreement, i.e. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who did not spare any tool or language lately (the mobilization of the fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and the public campaigns against the Americans) to inform Washington that Kremlin will not hesitate to engage in a cold war on the international scene and a heated one in the Middle East, in defense of its allies and influence. And with the stick brandished by the American president to make Putin understand that the veto weapon at the Security Council (to prevent it from dealing with the Syrian war) will not shackle Washington's hands if its interests are at stake, the first day of the National Assembly was that of the olive branch waved by Iranian President Hassan Rohani to open a new page and dialogue with the White House. The new president eluded the defiance of his predecessor Mahmud Ahmadinejad, extended his hand to openness and dialogue, and condemned in televised statements the Jewish genocide at the hand of the Nazis. These were messages addressed to America and the West in general, saying that the time has come for some sort of a fair deal in regard to the Iranian nuclear file. However, Obama did not offer Rohani the "gift" of a meeting which he had hoped to hold to inaugurate the negotiations stage. At this level, the Iranian justification for not organizing the surprise summit by saying it was due to the lack of time, and Tehran's rejection of non-official consultations proposed by the American side in New York, reveal the new president's disappointment, especially since Obama met with his Lebanese counterpart Michel Suleiman to praise his courage and determination to preserve Lebanon's unity and stability. And while one could say that Suleiman got what no other Lebanese president did, as the resident of the White House praised his exceptional leadership in light of the repercussions of the Syrian war and the flow of refugees, Obama gave enough signals about his determination to test Rohani. Clearly, there is a wide difference between the file of the support offered to Lebanon and the insistence on the sustainment of the sanctions against Iran, and regardless of the Israeli skepticism towards the "deceitful" character of the olive branch carried by Rohani to New York, Obama – while talking about different relations with Tehran – is certainly waiting for the serious test around the negotiations table in the context of the P5+1. So far, the only decisive point of convergence is probably the wish of the two sides to draw up a roadmap with a clear timetable. Naturally, they share a mutual lack of trust and Tehran will not settle for Obama's verbal reassurances regarding the fact that Washington is not trying to change the Iranian regime and is not using the nuclear issue as a pretext. And while it would not take much effort to see that the American president differentiated in his speech between the Iranian file and the legitimacy of the Syrian president which he deemed to be fictive, Rohani has no illusions about his country's ability to resist the sword of sanctions for additional years. But is Obama's recognition of the Iranian people's right to acquire peaceful nuclear energy not exactly what Rohani – and Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei from behind him – wants? Hence, there is a return to square one and the price wanted by Iran to reassure Washington and Israel about the fact that it does not pose a threat to anyone. By seeking a framework for the negotiations and erasing Ahmadinejad's legacy in regard to the holocaust and the "wiping out" of the Hebrew state, the new president probably inaugurated the normalization of dialogue with the West, in order to place the ministerial meeting in New York on a new "rational" track. Once again, Iran in 2013 is not the one that existed prior to the Arab spring revolutions, one of which – i.e. the one in Syria – weakened the body of rejectionism and shook the map of Tehran's regional alliances, rendering this card unable to protect the Iranian ambitions or extend the term of its nuclear program. While in New York, Rohani made a concession at the level of the holocaust and endorsed the dialogue approach that will soon be put to the test. For his part, Obama waved the normalization card which might appease Rohani's disappointment with Washington's coldness, or its reluctance to rush to the surprising summit. Whether it is a disappointment or half a disappointment, what is certain is that the inauguration of the General Assembly session and the first day in New York constituted a good beginning for Lebanon on the eve of the international meeting to support it, and a cold beginning for the new Iran whose guide assigned its president to erase what was planted by the first for around ten years, in order to protect the fort of the Revolutionary Guard, its nuclear program, and its allies across the border. Obama on the other hand might consider he responded to Putin, who can no longer tolerate "American exceptionalism" or the one-color veto, while his problem is that he is wagering on allies who make up lies and believe them.
