There is no direct relation between what is happening in Egypt and the government crisis in Morocco. But the policy that does not peek beyond the border and measure the pulse of faraway places, cannot act preemptively to deal with what is coming. It so happens that the impeachment of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has exposed the flaws in the Islamists' administration of the transitional period that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring. Although the government crisis in Morocco predates the uprising of a large segment of the Egyptian street, the restlessness vis-à-vis the record of the Islamists in power would have culminated in overwhelming protests anyway. In the Moroccan case, the government, though it has lost its majoritarian legitimacy, has not lost the ability to address the predicament in a political framework, where the arbiter can still be the constitution of July 2011. While the heated debate in the Egyptian street over the notion of legitimacy and over how to manage the phase after the regime lost the confidence of the populace, the Moroccans opted to infer the legal-political verdict on the matter from within their constitution, and settled on searching for ways to secure a majority and if not, call for early elections. Most extrapolations would lead us to realize that the current partisan map would not see any significant change, at least according to the indications one can find in the results of previous by-elections. As a result, the tendency now is to manage the relationship among the components of the potential majority that may be put together after the withdrawal of al-Istiqlal Party from the government, as the only path forward. When the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) declares that it does not mind collaborating with any political partner, including its bitter opponents, the JDP is doing nothing other than putting into practice the ABCs of the first lesson drawn from the Egyptian experience. But in truth, this would have been out of the question had the Islamist party not found itself in a bend, faced with the ineluctable choice of choosing between the bad and the worse. Yet the measure will be whether the JDP will go beyond its stance to be willing to make the whole experience a success, and overcome the many partisan antagonisms in place. In that, intractable crises offer the best opportunity to rethink and readjust those positions that can be developed, and to refrain from caving to impasses. In the end, the Moroccan prime minister is not required to secure a parliamentary majority at any price, but even by only suggesting that he will not exclude any party as possibly joining his government, when the conditions for this are met, this means that he went a long way in his efforts to reach out to others. The Arab Spring had restored some sparkle to Islamist parties or groups, and the JDP benefited from that momentum that propelled it to the forefront, even though it had not taken to the streets, and kept its distance with the protest movement of February 20. Indeed, the JDP may be on course to assimilate the flaws in the experiences of its counterparts, the other Islamist parties. Particularly so when the transformations unfolding in Morocco have been characterized by greater flexibility and sensitivity to the sentiments in the angry street. Consequently, the formula that has led to the previous exception, through the implementation of reforms while maintaining the state and its stability, can be repeated by resolving the current government crisis early on. The JDP realizes that an adventure in this regard, even if it is a calculated, pragmatic one, would make a dent in its image, should it wave its red lines in all directions. Some of its opponents, who are being asked to rescue the coalition government from collapse, know that the crisis alone has prompted the JDP to forget the past, understanding that half a loss is better than the collapse of the government atop everyone. But the question is now no longer about what the ruling party will do to secure a parliamentary majority that would allow it to serve throughout the parliament's term, but what the opposition will do to address the problem. Perhaps the best answer lies in the rapprochement between the two main [opposition] parties, al-Istiqlal and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, regardless of whether it culminates in forging a new alliance or reviving mutual coordination. Indeed, one of the upshots of the government crisis is that it has breathed new life into the opposition alliance. Therefore, the question of whether to join the government or the opposition may have a magical effect on creating political poles that will attempt to impose themselves by de facto force.
