The Justice and Development Party (JDP) of Morocco has become so preoccupied with its battles with others that it has forgotten itself, although its political experience was rather characterized by realism and moderation. Indeed, and without anyone requesting it from the JDP, it had not run in full force in previous legislative elections, in order not to raise concerns. However, when the JDP took office by leading a four party-government coalition, its allies, led by the Istiqlal Party, complained that the JDP came to dominate the executive branch, in violation of the norms of harmony, solidarity, and dialogue. When criticisms as such are issued by opposition forces, this would be nothing more than usual sparring between the opposition and the majority. But when they are issued by an ally within the government, then this carries several implications. For instance, the influence of the JDP in the opposition did not translate into better practices after it took power. It will therefore be difficult for the JDP, having failed to win over an ally within its government, to demonstrate the worth of its experience which many outside the Islamist movement had counted on. Yet the eruption of a crisis at the government's headquarters is better than a conflagration in the street. In this issue in particular, Morocco remains the exception in managing the dynamics of its political disputes. While transitional experiences in the countries of the so-called Arab Spring stalled, with disputes now returning to the streets together with tension and strife, Morocco has so far been able to restrict the drawbacks of its experience in a partisan framework that has not yet led to calls for early elections. However, the constitution gives party leaders a greater margin for initiative. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane could have heeded warnings by his ally the Istiqlal Party, by carrying out a cabinet reshuffle or fulfilling the obligations towards workers, and not gambling by raising consumer prices. Furthermore, Benkirane's threats about the need for harmony in his government embarrassed his ally, which was forced to take a decision to withdraw from the coalition – but has not yet followed through. The Istiqlal Party's message was clear: The party's ministers, before being members of the government, have to comply with the decisions of the party. For this reason, the party deliberately resolved to withdraw through a decision of the party's National Council, to avoid having the move portrayed as though being the result of pressure by its secretary general Hamid Chabat. The party went further and called for royal arbitration that would remove the prime minister's powers in accepting or rejecting the resignation of ministers. But because the National Council's decision did not require the party to return to the opposition upon the resignation, the government remains in limbo. Neither will the government be able to benefit from Istiqlal's desired withdrawal to continue operating in encouraging conditions, nor will it be able to rid itself of the “mischief" of the Istiqlal party, which received encouraging signs welcoming it in the ranks of the opposition. All this makes it all the more likely that the crisis will be resolved by way of putting the internal house in order. Indeed, one important development in this regard may be the stance of opposition factions which refused to participate in the government of Benkirane, albeit the opposition has yet to have a uniform position on the issue. It would be wise to wait and see how the dispute will progress. Indeed, the opposition is not prepared for early elections, particularly since the recent by-elections came in favor of the existing majority. However, resolving the crisis will not be without losses. Because it will be difficult for Istiqlal and the JDP to return to forced coexistence, it is more likely that a cabinet reshuffle will take place, in a manner that would satisfy the demands of the former to achieve some kind of political gain, and the latter by helping the prime minister save face in reining in a crisis that has nearly gotten out of control. Interestingly in this regard, the party that has benefited most from Benkirane's government is the Progress and Socialism party, which made an about turn in cozying up to the Islamists, its erstwhile opponents. The Progress and Socialism Party has replaced the JDP in promoting a discourse that favors continuity, in the event of early elections. And it seems that Istiqlal, which did not spare the former communist party from its heavy shelling, wants to insinuate that an accord at the expense of the Progress and Socialism party would be less costly. So will the prime minister adopt this direction, or will he choose to defend the ally he has left with all his force and acumen?
