Those rushing to head to the Geneva 2 conference will be greatly disappointed, whether or not it is held, as there is no point in organizing the international conference if there is no prior agreement over its results and over the unified interpretation of the clauses featured in the plan ratified by the superpowers during their first meeting last June. This agreement is still unavailable, which is why the date of the new conference has not yet been set and why the parties which will participate in it have not yet been determined. This is also why no clear definition has been made for the transitional government, its full prerogatives, and whether or not they will include the military and security issues, the position of President Bashar al-Assad, his role and that of the symbols of the regime, and who will represent the political and military opposition with its internal and external parties, one which is about to lose its cause due to its multiple leaders and division between various groups. The heated action in preparation for the international conference is blinded by questions which surround the facts, realities and circumstances that emerged following the superpowers' agreement over the Geneva Plan. Ever since the launching of his mission, Lakhdar Brahimi called for an international initiative in which the fighting Syrian parties would become involved voluntarily or despite their will, after he sensed the inability of the latter to sit around the dialogue table and seek a settlement. Since that time, a lot has changed, which further increased the difficulties and enhanced the conviction of the warring sides in their ability to settle the military situation each in its favor, no matter how long it takes. Moreover, the fronts expanded to all the regional powers, which rendered it somewhat of an illusion for American Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov to think that the transitional government is the beginning of the road towards the political settlement, or that the regime's selection of its Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem and the Americans' reliance on leader of the Free Syrian Army Salim Edriss as representatives to the launching of the implementation of the settlement is a major accomplishment. This is due to the fact that the settlement being designed by the two ministers seems quasi impossible. Indeed, in light of the country's division, the destruction, killing, slaughters and displacements, it is feared there is no longer any room for the emergence of a centralized government, let alone a centralized state. And amid this river of blood, spite and sectarian mobilization, it will not be easy to talk about the reunification of the army and the security bodies, while the peacekeeping forces being prepared by the United Nations will not be able to impose a ceasefire or ensure stability, regardless of their size. They might however manage to preserve the border of the new demographic map drawn up by the devastating war, one which brings back to mind the four mini-states whose border was demarcated by the French mandate during the 1920s. It is worth mentioning that the latter map is similar to the one towards which Iraq is heading, as its Sunnis are setting up their own province – after Kurdistan – far away from the “Shiite" central government. In other words, the Syrians might find themselves facing an inevitable fait accompli, which might push them, whether they like it or not, towards some sort of confederacy in a best case scenario. This is true, unless the country faces a situation similar to Somalia's a few years back, i.e. when fighting groups were scattered throughout the country and spreading destruction and terrorism in it. This is why wide factions within the opposition are rejecting any settlement before the altering of the balance of powers on the ground, considering that this would facilitate the negotiations over the changing of the regime, and not just the departure of its head. The latter factions know that Moscow is not interested in President Al-Assad's stay in power, as much as it is interested in the stay of the regime, and hence its insistence on excluding military and security affairs from the transitional government's prerogatives and its threats to surrender to Damascus an S300 missiles system to uphold its superiority. Consequently, the fighting groups are getting ready to hasten the confrontation in Damascus - which is prone to escalate in the few coming weeks – if they are provided with the necessary weapons, in order to undermine the regime's foundations, scatter the regular troops and impose their conditions on the settlement, at the head of which is the departure of the president and the group managing the war in preparation for a peaceful power transition. So far, nothing points to an imminent transformation in the American or European position towards the arming of the opposition, the imposition of a no-fly zone or the establishment of safe havens. Washington has not yet revealed any new policy in regard to Syria, and if there is a different plan, nothing points to the ways it will be implemented and the timing of the execution. Some however expect this to be seen at the beginning of autumn and following the staging of a series of events, namely the Geneva 2 conference, the expected summit between President Barack Obama and President Vladimir Putin, the presidential elections in Iran, and more importantly the agreement with Moscow over a number of files. The issue extends beyond the controversy surrounding the American president's credibility, after he did not implement his threats when President Al-Assad violated the red line. What is definitely more important is how the United States can achieve its interests in this conflict, and define the means to secure that. Since the eruption of the crisis, Washington humored Moscow and recognized its interests in Syria and its role in the country. This falls in the context of the strategy announced by Barack Obama at the beginning of the last year of his first term. The American weight was directed towards the Pacific Ocean, without this diminishing his country's interest in the Middle East region. Hence, his excessive respect of the Russian position implies his reliance on the support of his own position in the confrontation with China and at the level of the Iranian nuclear file, in addition to the agreement over the future of the situation in Central Asia following the withdrawal from Afghanistan among other files. This is why all the efforts to push President Obama to change his position towards Syria have so far failed, as he will not undertake one step before the picture is clear in terms of the deal he wants to seal with Moscow, knowing that the latter has mastered the management of the game and the imposition of its conditions. While some of Syria's Friends are seriously getting ready to provide specific opposition groups with weapons or preparing a no-fly zone, Russia – which denied two weeks ago its intention to provide Syria with sophisticated weapons – has threatened during the last few days with an S300 missiles deal. By doing so, it is hitting many birds with one stone. It is exerting pressures to prevent the opposition's arming, the establishment of safe havens or the imposition of a no-fly zone, while at the same time warning Israel against proceeding with its raids. It is as though Russia is retaliating against all the sides, especially the moderate Islamists and Jihadists who turned Afghanistan into a fire beneath the feet of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and subsequently hastened its defeat. On the other hand, the considerations, facts, and developments on the Syrian domestic arena are not the only obstacles facing the success of Geneva 2. Indeed, there are also the regional players, on whom the Russian and American engineers cannot simply impose the settlement formula. In the face of Iran's and its Lebanese and Iraqi allies' involvement in the conflict on the field in defense of the regime, other Arab regional states are also getting implicated in the conflict. In addition, the Saudi, Jordanian, Qatari, Egyptian, Emirati and Turkish foreign ministers, defined during their urgent meeting at the beginning of last week in Abu Dhabi their countries' position towards the settlement, under the headline that there is no room for President Al-Assad and his regime in whichever settlement. This Arab-Turkish position not only opposes Russia's and Iran's stand, but also sends a clear message to the superpowers saying they can no longer enjoy absolute freedom in imposing their policies, positions, and agendas on the regional countries. In other words, the upcoming international conference will have to take these regional positions into account. The situation is not proceeding and will not proceed as it did during the days of the Cold War. And the cold war they are tackling today has difference conditions and circumstances. For its part, Israel is not distant from what is happening behind its northern border, and its raids came to confirm it is as concerned by the developments as everyone else. Syria has thus changed in Israel's view, and the regime which committed to total calm on its border since the Separation of Forces Agreement in 1974, now has its troops under the mercy of the Russians and the Iranians who are providing it with funds, equipment and men, not to mention the nightmare of the extremist groups. This means that the rules of the game in the Golan have changed, a thing which cannot be disregarded by the Hebrew state that cannot tolerate the dispatch of sophisticated Iranian weapons to Hezbollah, whether from its arsenal or from the Syrian one. Tel Aviv does not want to be involved in the war even if it prefers the stay of the regime, which is why it will settle for this level of intervention. Moreover, it does not want to be a partner in the determination of Al-Assad's fate and has sent clear messages to Damascus in this regard. Nonetheless, just like the superpowers, it does not want Syria's fall in the hands of Al-Nusra Front or its likes, and does not want the country to turn into a third advanced base for Iran in the region after Lebanon and Iraq! As for the talk issued by Damascus, Tehran, and Hezbollah about the opening of the Golan front, it is not heard in Israel and is not provoking any concerns or fears, considering that its implementation is as likely as that of the threat issued by Israeli Chief of Staff Benny Gantz against the violation of the northern border, considering it to be a red line. None of the latter is willing to engage in sideline wars or violate the old (1974) ceasefire agreement or the new one (2006).
