The call of American Secretary of State John Kerry to the Syrian opposition and President Bashar Al-Assad for sitting around the dialogue table and forming a transitional government in accordance with the framework ratified in Geneva mid-last year, provoked a wave of questions and interpretations. Indeed, why did Washington not try to save six months of war if this is its position since the beginning? Why was such a call issued after two years of killing and destruction, at a time when President Barack Obama's previous administration kept urging Al-Assad to step down? Did Kerry turn against the stand adopted by his predecessor Hillary Clinton? Did he disregard Britain's and France's positions after it appeared – for a long time – that Washington assigned London to manage this file, especially while it was preoccupied with the presidential elections? The call of Secretary of State Kerry shocked the leaders of the Syrian opposition. And the spirits may yet have to be appeased, although American officials insisted that Washington has not changed its mind and that the dialogue which the secretary of state summoned aimed to establish a transitional government to handle all the executive prerogatives until Al-Assad's regime collapses. This was seen despite the fact that Paris and London announced their determination to arm the Free Syrian Army, whether the European Union lifts its ban or continues to oppose the exportation of weapons to the opponents of the regime in Damascus. There might be exaggeration in saying that the new American position constitutes a drastic turn, or that Washington has finally succumbed to Moscow's conditions and interpretation of the Geneva statement that was ratified by the P5 states, some Arab countries and Turkey last June. Indeed, reality reveals otherwise and one look at the recent developments can shed light on the backdrop and the circumstances. Kerry's position was the result of his tour in the region and his talks with those directly connected with the Syrian crisis, from Turkey to the Gulf states. The American secretary felt – just like some Arabs during the recent meeting of the Arab League ministerial council in Cairo – that there is a race between the announcement of such a position, and the determination of Arab countries on granting Syria's seat at the League to the opposition Coalition. Each side was thus trying to block the way before the other. True, the council rejected Syria's return to it and decided to grant its seat to the opposition, but the implementation of this decision remained linked to the formation by the Coalition of an executive body or the promised temporary government. Clearly, this condition was linked to the fact that the international community, or rather the Security Council, might not recognize such a step without the establishment of an executive body enjoying the minimum level of legitimacy and international recognition, in order to occupy the seat of the current “legitimacy authority". This might also reflect on the decisions of the League itself, considering that it is bound by international law regardless of its position towards the Syrian regime. This stand somewhat converges with that of parties in the opposition that are still against the formation of a temporary government, not due to the dispute over the names of the candidates who will occupy its premiership and the remaining posts in it, but because they believe that this step will completely undermine the formation of a transitional government, based on the Geneva plan. In other words, it will eliminate the idea of the political solution on which the international community is still insisting, in order to end the war and pave the way before a peaceful transition of power and the emergence of a new regime. Moreover, some do not like the idea of seeing the Coalition turning into some sort of a legislative body, at a time when the decision will reside in the hands of the temporary government, as this will lead the opposition forces back to square one and to the stage that preceded the establishment of the National Council and what followed. Hence, forces in the opposition fear the Coalition's division if the meetings which will be held today and tomorrow in Turkey, result in the formation of a temporary government that is rushed by some to occupy Syria's seat during next week's Arab summit in Doha. This might even lead to the resignation of head of the Coalition Sheikh Moaz al-Khatib, who still believes in the necessity of giving the Geneva plan a chance, especially after Britain's and France's decision to provide the Free Army with weapons capable of inducing drastic change on the ground and forcing President Al-Assad to change his position. It is no secret that the latter opposition forces converge with France's and Britain's positions, which are not contrary to the United States' position or the circumstances that pushed Amman to change its opinion if the reports saying that Jordan is delivering weapons across the border or training Free Army fighters with American help are true. Indeed, these four states have become aware of the alarming progress of the extremist groups – regardless of their names – and the imposition of their control on many regions. They are also aware of the seriousness of seeing Iran achieving victory, after it placed all its weight in the Syrian war and mobilized its allies. At this level, the dispatch of weapons and equipment by Tehran and Nouri al-Maliki's government to Damascus, and the extent of Hezbollah's implication on the field in the fighting and training of militias by the thousands to defend the regime are known to all. This has even reached the point where reports are talking about Baghdad's funding of some Russian arms deals! And although such reports lack accuracy due to the difficulty for the State of Law Coalition's government to pass such decisions in a country where there is still a minimum level of institutional action, it reveals nonetheless the acuteness of the sectarian conflict from which Baghdad is no longer spared. Unlike the majority of the EU states, Washington welcomed Paris's and London's decision to arm the Free Army despite Kerry's last position and Moscow's opposition and warnings. This means that the arming process will be well-studied, in order to achieve the goals of these capitals, which are still refusing to interfere the way they had done in Libya, and which do not agree with some Arab countries that are convinced that the Syrian regime cannot engage in any settlement and that the desired change will only be achieved coercively and by force. These three capitals still expect the altering of the balance of power on the ground strengthening the Free Army and compensating for what it lacked in the face of the extremist powers. They hope to turn it into a real opponent for the regime's troops, thus enhancing its ability to confront anarchy in the areas under its control to get the people to rally around it. Consequently, this will encourage some powers that are still supportive of the regime, especially the Alawites, to join those seeking a settlement similar to the Lebanese Taef, to end the bloodshed and maintain their rights and shares in the new regime. Such a settlement would also preserve the remaining institutions which could – with Arab and international support – spare Syria from division, Somalization or Afghanization. This is due to the fact that in light of the current circumstances, it would be impossible for the Alawites to approve any settlement, at a time when the extremist oppositionists are threatening them with doom and destruction, and when the regime was able to link the sect's and some minorities' fate and future to its own. The American position, between its convergence with Moscow on one hand and its support of Paris and London on the other, might provide one last opportunity for a political solution that does not seem imminent. In fact, the decision to arm the opposition will push Iran and Russia to provide further support to Al-Assad's regime, which will launch a heated arming race and cause the escalation of the confrontations. In other words, a lot of blood will be shed before all the fighting parties realize that none of them will come out victorious from this war. For its part, the American administration and its European partners might realize a bit late that it will be impossible to reach a settlement with Al-Assad's regime, as long as Iran has not sealed a deal with the superpowers over its nuclear file and other issues related to its role in the Gulf and the Levant. Will the Coalition overcome today's “temporary government" test in Turkey, thus maintaining its remaining unity? Or will it deepen the disputes and undermine in advance the elements of strength which could be secured by the decision to arm the Free Army? Will the Arab summit in Doha result in changes at the level of the League's work, to expand the arena of confrontation inside and over Syria? And finally, will we see the political solution on which President Obama and his secretary of state are insisting, before the region slides into a wide-scale sectarian war that will end with the neighbors' distribution of Syria before its division?
