President Muhammad Morsi wanted a unique blow. He had other options which would not place Egypt on the brink of the abyss, but he wanted to settle all the files at once instead of adopting other means, without any regard for the deepening of the division and the increase of polarization. He had an opportunity to continue negotiating and dialoguing with the forces opposed to the authority of the religious movement, and to reach a middle ground solution with those who withdrew from the Constituent Assembly tasked with the drafting of a new constitution for the country. However, he chose to launch a political battle in the face of the movements, parties and judiciary, which was never treated thus by any other regime. Even during the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the conflict with the judicial power did not exceed the ceiling of the ousting of a few judges. President Morsi used the international climate and the support earned by Cairo to arrange the truce agreement between Benjamin Netanyahu's government, Hamas and its sisters in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the need of those engaged in the fight and those behind them to discontinue the war, allowed the Muslim Brotherhood government to reap the benefits on the international, Palestinian and Egyptian levels. But this was not the only reason behind the rush to issue the Constitutional Declaration. Indeed, it was also provoked by the government's inability to deal with the social issues in the absence of any program, and with the mounting number of oppositionists – filling the streets everywhere – to hold the president accountable following his first 100 days in power and express their disappointment vis-à-vis all the promises he made. It was also caused by the major predicament that obstructed the work of the Constituent Assembly. All the latter factors forced the Muslim Brotherhood to open a battle on more than one front, in the hope of settling the conflict with a lethal blow, instead of waiting while its popularity is eroding. While making his declaration, President Morsi did not miss the opportunity to exploit the backing offered to him by the Salafis in the battle over the constitution. Moreover, he did not spare any effort to revive the support of the angry street, thus ordering the retrial of those responsible for the killing of the demonstrators during the revolution, and the toppling of General Prosecutor Judge Abdul Magid Mahmoud to whom were attributed the alleviated sentences issued against the symbols of the deposed regime and their aides. He also granted the Constituent Assembly two months to complete its work, and did not forget to wish the Syrian rebels victory over the “unjust regime." However, the political forces did not buy into these consolation prizes, and perceived the Constitutional Declaration as being a clear coup which reproduced a more dictatorial regime than the disbanded one. At this level, it was easy for these powers to compare what was featured in the Declaration to the content of the previous constitution to confirm their accusations and fears, thus reiterating the entire vocabulary used against the former regime, the religious parties and even the Guide's regime in the Iranian Islamic revolution! Hence, these popular forces did not hesitate to head to Tahrir Square where they were met by the opposition leaders, i.e. former presidential candidates Hamdin Sabahi and Amr Moussa, and the head of the Constitution Party Muhammad al-Baradei. On the other hand, the supporters of the MB and the Salafi movement gathered in front of the Al-Ittihadiya Presidential Palace, where President Morsi emerged to confirm his bias in their favor and confirm the group's determination to engage in the political battle against the opponents, the judiciary and the remnants. Clearly, the Islamic movement which joined the revolution about two years ago and granted it a momentum which cannot be denied, appeared on the day of the Constitutional Declaration more organized and widely spread. Still, this does not annul the symbolism of the presence on Tahrir Square. Moreover, this “abundance" shown by the religious movement does not annul the reality of what the opposition leaders – along with the Coptic Church – represent, not to mention the remaining remnants which might not be taken into account, had it not been for their ties with the military and security institutions. The latter were fiercely attacked by President Morsi, but do not constitute the headline of the battle triggered by the Declaration. Indeed, the group is well aware of the fact that it cannot annul all these opponents, regardless of its ability to mobilize and organize. It also knows that the balance of powers is almost even, as revealed by the figures of the last presidential elections, and that the parliamentary elections will not grant it the lead it is seeking. Since the eruption of the revolution, the group knew how to manage the empowerment policy it adopted without triggering war. President Morsi for his part was able to temporarily isolate the military institution and the security bodies which are nowadays watching from inside their barracks and their headquarters the course of the ongoing conflict between the various political powers and its possible outcome, without this meaning that they fully succumbed to the new authority or that the new regime can cancel them. Therefore, they might have chosen to postpone the issuance of a position, until the dust of the battle clears, which is why it was not surprising to see the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) proceeding with the empowerment policy through an attempt to isolate and weaken the opponents. The group is definitely avoiding civil war, no matter how limited it is, while the same goes for the opposition regardless of the extent of the clashes between the two crowds on this or that square. It is a battle to contain the sizes, or rather one to measure the sizes. Each side is thus trying to isolate the other, or push the other to recognize its strength and popularity, while aware of the fact that none of them can annul the other. It is a natural, long, strenuous and painful battle during an inevitable stage on the path towards the reformation of the state and the reshaping of society. Is this not the headline of the battle over the new constitution, which is generating a heated conflict over power? Each of the two sides nowadays sees itself unable to establish its sovereignty or popular credit in light of the current division, and consequently guarantee a victory in any upcoming parliamentary elections whose date will be set following the issuance of the new constitution. Hence, it is not odd that the MB is attempting – following the temporary neutralization of the military and security institutions – to enhance its role and presence on the bureaucratic level, considering that in any regime, this factor has an undeniable ability to manage and even influence any upcoming parliamentary elections. This is also why the fierce attack launched by President Morsi against the judicial institution to subjugate or liquidate it did not come as a surprise, considering that any regime will assign this institution to supervise any presidential, parliamentary or local elections. It is even likely that he will open another front with the media in order to subdue it and hold all the powers in his hands, including the fourth estate, and even mobilize his new judiciary and jurists to pursue many opponents, as he has done and is still doing with his opponent Ahmad Shafik and his remnants. It is too early to predict the outcome of the current battle. The MB is relying on the people's tiredness after around two years of instability, but also on the weakening of the opponents in a battle which might be prolonged, knowing it is the most apt to achieve mobilization and organization in the face of a crowd rushing to the squares spontaneously and without any partisan framework providing it with the elements of persistence on the street, as is the case with the partisans of the religious movement. Nonetheless, the time factor is not the only one determining the end of this open conflict on more than one front. And while it seems that the religious powers will eventually achieve victory on the street, the economic and social problems might be the most dangerous threat facing their project of monopolization and empowerment. Do they not recall what happened to the empowerment enjoyed by the former regime? What triggered the revolution was not only the yearning for freedom, for dignity and basic rights, but the plan to bequeath power which aimed at monopolizing the authority, and the corruption and theft that were seen. In addition, the people were instigated by destitution and economic distress. And while they temporarily remained silent vis-à-vis the empowerment policy practiced by the MB, they will not remain silent for long and will demand their daily bread that constitutes the real test. President Morsi seized the opportunity provided to him by the praise he earned from foreign powers due to his handling of the last Gaza war. However, he cannot disregard the positions and pressures exercised by these powers, after they have started to express their fears and concerns over the division sweeping the Egyptians' ranks, and over the empowerment policy. This was seen at a time when these powers have been reluctant to support the Syrian revolution, fearing Damascus' fall in the hands of the extremist Islamic powers and the empowerment policy they might practice should the regime collapse, thus annulling the role of all the other forces with their sectarian, ethnic and denominational minorities. So will Egypt's MB be able to achieve victory along the different fronts it opened at the same time?
