Egypt could not be an exception. The political and military powers thus showed stubbornness and confusion, stumbled and fought each other for a long time, before they reached the obstacle, or multiple obstacles, which hindered the Arab spring. In Tunisia, the Islamists were able to control power and the institutions, but in partnership with forces with which they should not converge on the ideological level, and in confrontation – which is not heralding happy endings - with Salafi and more fundamentalist forces. In Libya, the construction of the new regime and its institutions was halted by tribal, regional and political competition and open conflicts. As to the “Yemeni solution," it did not settle for overcoming the revolutionary youth and might not stop at the level of the distribution of the positions between the same powers which were running the country, i.e. the regime and the traditional opposition forces. Indeed, it might signal the distribution of the country itself, between a Southern movement that has not yet appeased and a Houthi rebellion in the North which has not yet taken its breath from its repetitive wars. This is the same solution that some international powers wish to adopt in Syria, although it has already been preceded by the events in the country where a special model was drawn up via mobile massacres and scorched earth policies, which are not only threatening with sectarian division, but also threatening the state's entity and unity. The decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt brought the revolution back to square one. The judiciary annulled the membership of one third of the People's Assembly members, i.e. completely toppled the assembly by cancelling the results of the parliamentary elections, and consequently toppled the Constituent Assembly whose members had only been chosen two days ago. Consequently, the legislative powers were restored to the military council, at a time when the judiciary deemed that the political isolation law was unconstitutional and kept General Ahmed Shafik in the presidential race in the face of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi. This is an exposed conflict between the revolutionary forces and their opponents among the forces of the deposed regime, and the result of the confrontations, haggling, maneuvers and treasons between the companions on the squares during the last 15 months. The preliminary outcome of these judicial rulings clearly points to the fact that the transitional phase - which should have ended on June 30 - will be extended until the staging of new parliamentary elections. In other words, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will continue to control the legislative and executive powers, while the surrender of the authority to civilians will be suspended and prolonged until the council arranges the shape of the new institutions that will determine the identity of the country and the upcoming regime. Moreover, the council rushed to annul the “second formation" of the Constituent Assembly tasked with the drafting of the constitution, in preparation for a formation of its own. If the Islamic powers are able to lead their candidate Muhammad Morsi to the presidency, the army will be able to determine his prerogatives through the aforementioned Assembly formation. Ever since the issuance of the Constitutional Declaration which remained incomplete in March, the constitution has been the main object of dispute. But the military council will not have to issue a complementary declaration as it was reiterated for weeks, considering that the Constituent Assembly will handle that, which will reopen the doors of the conflict and reshuffle the cards. Indeed, the map of alliances and relationships between the various powers will not be similar to the one that existed during the revolution and all the events which followed it, along the path to reconstruct the various institutions. Regardless of what is said about its autonomy, the judicial ruling placed the military in the face of the Islamic powers that lost a lot of their credit during the previous events and no longer enjoy the same rallying that was seen on the day of the referendum over the constitutional declaration and during the parliamentary elections. A quick reading into the results of the first round of the presidential elections, confirms the extent of the damage which affected the Islamic powers, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. In the referendum that was opposed by the revolutionary youth and liberal, secular and leftist movements, these powers secured more than 60% of the votes, and more than 70% during the parliamentary elections. However, the first round of the elections to choose an Egyptian president revealed that the candidates of the Islamists combined did not get more than 35% of the votes, knowing that the percentage of participation did not exceed 50% of the number of registered voters. This leads to the conclusion that the actual electoral size of the Islamic powers does not exceed one quarter of the voters, and that there is a new map of powers which surfaced in the last few months, including General Shafik who reached the second round despite the claims made by the Islamists and other revolutionary forces about him being among the symbols of the former regime. Consequently, the existing polarization has turned into some sort of acute division between the Islamists and the man who dubs himself “the son of the military institution," without being able to deny the fact that he was the last prime minister under President Hosni Mubarak's rule. Certainly, the first round witnessed the toppling of the consensual or centrist candidates who achieved results that could have allowed one candidate representing them to reach the second round, had they agreed to support any such candidate, and Hamdin Sabahi, Amr Mussa and others subsequently exited the race. The Islamists lost the credit they enjoyed at the beginning, i.e. during the referendum over the Constitutional Declaration through which the junta is currently governing and in the presidential elections. And while there are many reasons for this loss, the Brotherhood cannot blame anyone but itself, considering that it is the one mostly responsible for this situation. It is hoped at this level that the decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court will constitute a wakeup call or an opportunity for them to reassess their performance since the eruption of the revolution and until this day. They cannot disregard the fact that the policy of empowerment, control and dominance constituted the basis of their behavior since day one, and there is no need to remind them about the long journeys between the squares to the headquarters of the military council. Moreover, they showed arrogance and did not recognize the importance of political cooperation with the other forces, at least those that detonated the first spark of the revolution. They could have maneuvered to overcome the transitional phase in concord with their partners on the squares and not with the military council, while even their Salafi opponents were disgruntled by their haughtiness and their disregarding of their presence and strength. Beyond that, the Brotherhood leaders who broke all their initial promises, failed to see that the toppling of the first Constituent Assembly to draft the constitution was a clear message, saying they will not be allowed to control all the foundations of the state, neither now nor in the future. They did not realize that governance is one thing and the constitution is a completely different thing. The constitution is a document on which all the popular components should agree and that should take the interests of these components into account. Therefore, it cannot be monopolized by one power or movement, just like no faction can monopolize the drafting of the shape of the new regime, its constitution and the country's identity. At this level, we are not pointing to their opposition of the military's wish to maintain some – or many – of the prerogatives they acquired throughout history, since Arabi's revolution, until the 1958 revolution and the toppling of President Mubarak which was hastened by the military institution. Egypt's return to square one, i.e. to the staging of new parliamentary elections and maybe even the formation of a new Constituent Assembly to look into the next constitution under military rule, has reduced the glow of the presidential elections. Numerous Egyptian forces believe that the Brotherhood will not get in the next elections what it earned in the previous ones, and that this process might lead it back to its real size that was clearly seen in the first round of the presidential elections, that is if Ahmed Shafik does not win the second round. And even if the general were to fail, the military council can deprive his Islamic opponent from any important presidential prerogatives, whether through the current Constituent Assembly team, or through another, in case the military decide it should be toppled like the previous one via the judiciary.
