On Wednesday, millions of Egyptians will choose the next president of the country. In the meantime, the war of rumors, fatwas and heated campaigns conveying alignments and the shuffling of cards is casting more light on the whims of the candidates and the inclinations of the voters. Moreover, it is increasing the concerns and puzzlement of wide factions of voters who have not yet made up their mind, and might remain confused until the last moment. On the other hand, these elections failed to advance ideological choices - like their counterparts in old Western democracies – pointing to specific social choices, i.e. ones prompting social groups to stand behind this or that candidate, although the Muslim Brotherhood group is bragging about the fact that its candidate is carrying a comprehensive program of governance. This election constitutes an important event, but might not be decisive in determining the course of the post-revolution stage. It would be difficult to predict who will be selected as the next president among the candidates, although there are some more likely to reach the second round. General Ahmed Shafik for example has clearly become the candidate of the “remnants" although this description is not to his liking, considering that his previous positions did not convince the people that he was ever against deposed President Hosni Mubarak and his administration. Further, although he did register objections, he was part of the old authority, and it is enough that he was the prime minister back when the Camels' Battle occurred and that he maintained many among the symbols of the former regime in his Cabinet. The man might not have been behind the aforementioned battle and might have been surprised by it like everyone else, but he is partly responsible. Indeed, was he not the head of the executive power, which issues order to all governmental apparatuses and institutions? During the past few days, he changed his rhetoric, while his clear positions through which he promised to establish “smooth relations" with the army – because he is the son of the institution – might attract some military figures who are publicly abstaining from supporting whichever candidate and stressing their neutrality at this level. In addition, the polls point to a wide-scale campaign supporting him in the rural areas that host steady bases for the former regime, or at best, factions that are not engaged in the action as much as the population in the big cities. Mr. Amr Moussa, for his part, is supported by a wide faction of Copts and some liberal forces. He did not hesitate to flirt with the military institution while pledging to consider some of its demands and concerns. However, he shares many voters in numerous locations with the military man Ahmed Shafik. Moreover, Hamdin Sabahi is starting to compete with him among the youth and within leftist, liberal and nationalistic forces, at a time when the former foreign minister presents himself as a secular candidate and does not conceal his warnings against seeing Egypt turning into a testing field for the Islamists. As to the Muslim Brotherhood, its “revolution" against Abdul Monem Abu al-Foutouh has appeased, although the same was not done by his former companion, Engineer Khayrat al-Shater. The group is probably anticipating the possible failure of its candidate Mohammed Morsi to reach the second round of the elections. But even Abu al-Foutouh who appeared to be moderate during the first days of his campaign – thus managing to attract numerous centrist powers – has started to lose some of them in favor of Sabahi. Indeed, he went too far in his speech in favor of the Salafis and some extremist Islamic powers, and consequently lost the moderate image he enjoyed at the beginning. Moreover, he exaggerated the adaptation of his rhetoric to that of his audience, amid questions surrounding his ability to achieve concord between extremist supporters and others belonging to the revolution youth and are calling for a civil state and secularism. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood remains the most capable side in managing the electoral battles, as it enjoys all the necessary tools and mechanism to mobilize the crowds throughout the country. Nonetheless, it is aware of the fact that the problem resides in its candidate who does not have the required charisma in comparison with his competitors, and consequently does not benefit from a guaranteed popularity. The group has a problem at the level of the political experience in which it has been engaged since the eruption of the revolution, and until the formation of the constituent assembly assigned to draw up a new constitution. It lies in the withdrawal of confidence in its ability to convince the crowds the way it did on the eve of the parliamentary elections. Indeed, it is no longer possible to lead the people to the ballot boxes, considering that the voters, and the general public, perceive the group with dubiousness and dissatisfaction. The Muslim Brotherhood has recanted many of its positions and changed many others. More importantly, its gravest mistake was its rush to control all the institutions, without taking into account sensitivities rising to the level of principles among the public. Indeed, is it logical to disregard the concerns of the Coptic Church? Can one go too far in defying the religious – even national – authority of Al-Azhar and in demanding the changing of the Al-Azhar law after attempts to interfere in the work of the judiciary? It is possible to proceed with a “hit and run" policy in the conflict with the military, without any regard for the status of the army within Egyptian society? The toppling of the constitutional committee that was formed by the Muslim Brotherhood in concord with the Salafis is the biggest proof for the fact that the group is no longer able – the way it used to be on the eve of the People's Assembly elections – to rally people behind it, no questions asked. Moreover, it is no longer possible to conceal the acuteness of the dispute between it and the Salafis vis-à-vis the candidates and numerous other issues. On the other hand, the constitutional predicament has been and will continue to be the most heated file in Egypt, considering that the upcoming president will not know the extent of his prerogatives and the limits of his powers. This is something that should have been set up prior to the elections. At this level, the constitutional declaration issued by the military council at the end of April 2011 has not settled numerous points related to the prerogatives of the president and the government. It would have definitely been better for the Egyptians to choose their president while conscious of his rights and obligations in a clear constitutional text. At this level, the Muslim Brotherhood is aware of the fact that it has committed a grave mistake when it agreed last year with the military council to hold the presidential elections before the ratification of the new constitution. It also committed a second mistake when it rushed the formation of the constitutional assembly that was toppled by the judiciary, after political and religious forces, at the head of which are Al-Azhar and the Church, rallied to undermine its credibility. If the contacts do not succeed to form another assembly approved by most of the powers, the military council might resort to the proclamation of a complementary constitution, despite its denial of such an intention. Such a step, over which the legal opinions diverge, might pave the way before the battle on the next constitution and mark the most heated file in the hands of the elected president who will definitely have an important role to play in determining the prerogatives of the constitutional legislative, executive and judicial institutions, in addition to the future role and position of the military institution. Certainly, the army's surrender of power to the next president will not be a simple and mechanical process. This is yet another heated file closely linked to the constitution file. Indeed, the military institution's concerns will not be appeased and will continue to provoke instability at the level of the dubious relations between the authorities, until a political deal or a consensual solution is reached with all the forces. At this level, there is no need to predict the content of this solution. The army wants to ensure a safe exit, i.e. the surrender of power to its rightful owner, after it is granted immunity against any future accountability, prosecution or pursuit. It also wishes to maintain its economic role, which constituted throughout decades the main crane that enhanced its position on the country's political and economic map, and provided reassurance to the current elements and the retirees. In addition, the army wants to ensure a minimum level of autonomy for its budget from the state's budget, or at least distance it from public debate. It also wants a clear recognition of its status and role in determining the country's identity and the fateful decisions, and also the clarification of the relationship between the defense minister and the next president of the republic and the determination of the side which will control the armies' higher command. Beyond that, and in light of the conflict witnessed in Egypt since the eruption of the revolution, the army revealed that its main preoccupation was to keep Egypt a civil state at whichever price. True, most of its leaders still adopt the logic of the deposed regime, but throughout the last few months, the institution has proved to be an actor whose weight on the political arena cannot be disregarded. The army made errors, became confused, showed obstinacy then backed down, engaged in disputes and then in truce. It agreed with the Islamists and made deals with them, but never sealed a strategic alliance. It confronted the youth on the squares, but was and still is aware of the fact that eventually, they are its guarantee and it is theirs, in order to maintain the civil character and identity of the state. It knows they cannot stand by it in public in the face of the other powers threatening the identity of the state, to avoid being accused of betraying the revolution and its principles. Based on the aforementioned facts and information, the army cannot be simply asked to return to its caserns and tend to its known security and military role, just like the squares cannot be mobilized in uncalculated confrontations to force the military to surrender power without any guarantees. Those who staged demonstrations in the area surrounding the Defense Ministry a few weeks ago, condemned the military council and demanded its departure, should have realized that such an action will not lead to the desired results, as much as it will lead to clashes and anarchy. There is no solution except for the political consensual solution. As to the military's permanent concerns, they mean – as revealed by the events that have been and are still being witnessed in Egypt – that the remaining constitutional institutions will also not leave the circle of concerns, anticipation and instability. This is why it is possible to say that the battle to select the president is that of the army par excellence, and there will be no compromises, truce or deals at this level. This is a reality, even if what is prohibited and is feared and known by all were to occur, especially by those who want to monopolize everything.
