The ongoing standoff in Cairo over the Constituent Assembly drawing up the new constitution is not the first, and will not be the last. It started since the day Hosni Mubarak's regime collapsed. It was witnessed when the liberals and leftist powers started calling for what they dubbed “supra-constitutional principles” in anticipation of the elections, whose outcome a few months later confirmed the veracity of their concerns about the Islamists' control over the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. The Salafis' response to these powers was swift and decisive, and embarrassed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) into taking to the squares with them to proclaim that the Shariaa was stronger than any document, and was the sole source of legislation in Egypt, the “Islamic country.” The confrontation then evolved when Ali al-Silmi (the deputy prime minister in Issam Sharaf's government) proclaimed the “supra-constitutional principles document.” It was witnessed on another day when the military council established the so-called consultative council to poll its members over the ways to run the country's affairs. It was also witnessed at the level of the controversy which has not yet been settled, in regard to the status of the military institution, as well as its legal or supra-constitutional privileges in the new system or constitution. Throughout the past year, the MB leaders practiced an ambiguous and somewhat volatile policy. They thus hid behind the Salafis at times and humored the military on more than one occasion to the point of being accused of having collaborated with it to annihilate the revolution and its youth, divide the spoils and build new structures serving them and their interests. Moreover, their detractors did not hesitate to accuse them of adopting an enablement policy to avoid battles on more than one front and with more than one party. But today, with the imminence of two critical events, they will be forced to leave that gray area, have a clear say in regard to the new constitution and define their options vis-à-vis the next president of the republic. Both events will test the MB's transformation and the extent to which it is keeping pace with the values of our times and of modernity, in a way similar to the experience of its brothers in Tunisia and what the MB in Syria recently presented in its document a few days ago. Upon the eruption of the revolution in Egypt a little over a year ago, the Muslim Brotherhood was reluctant and even negotiated with some sides within the former regime while disregarding the positions of some among its youth. But soon enough, its elements invaded the squares and started to enjoy prevailing platforms in most gatherings and demonstrations. They established truce with the military council when truce was required, and while the revolutionary youth were raising their voices against the military, the MB leaders – and on more than one occasion - were reiterating that “the army and its unity should be upheld because it protected the revolution and responded to the calls of the people” and that the accusations of betrayal and concessions should stop. Moreover, they defended the army's role in ensuring the success of the revolution and instating stability. The military council for its part cooperated with them because it needed them in the face of the youth who – early on – called for the toppling of the military and the exclusion of all the symbols of the previous era from the government, the security institutions and the other sensitive administrations. Since the beginning, it was clear that the military-Muslim Brotherhood duo would monopolize the changes to come. Some powers even perceived this duo as being the one which prevented change and the achievement of the demands of the revolution. And recently, the settlement of the case of the civil society associations receiving aid from Washington revealed that dialogue between Washington and the MB was actually fruitful, thus allowing the emergence of a trio which some thought to be a way to contain the Islamists' possible extremism at the level of domestic and foreign policy. In reality, the United States never took its eyes off the course of the revolution in Egypt since its eruption. It was thus present through its contacts with the military institution and numerous groups on the squares, at the head of which is the Muslim Brotherhood. For its part, the MB calmly and masterfully played the game of foreign reassurance. Its leaders announced they did not want a president from within their ranks, that they will not nominate any candidate and will not support an Islamist. Nonetheless, they recanted their promises after they acquired a guaranteed majority inside the two councils, and went from defending Al-Ganzouri's government when the youth rose to demand its ousting to calling for its departure to form a new coalition government in which they would be the only ones appointing the ministers, without any regard for the military council overlooking the transitional phase. Today, they are forming the constitutional committee, while monopolizing – along with their Salafi partners – the selection of its members and consequently the determination of the shape of the constitution. The battle over the constitution, whose chapters unfolded throughout the past months, has not yet been settled, although the MB seems to have overcome its obstacles in the past. Still, the decisive battle is growing more imminent and the alignments clearer, and it will be fought by the Islamists while headed by the Muslim Brotherhood on more than one front and axis. They will have to engage in confrontation with the foreign arena with which they will have to deal in regard to several issues, namely international relations, the economy, the aid and other matters. Nowadays, they are calling for a new coalition government representing all the parties and forces present in the newly-elected People's Assembly. And as much as they wish to defy the military council, they want to show the domestic and foreign scenes that they are not monopolizing power, although they have won a clear majority in the People's Assembly and Shura Council and although the majority is obviously theirs in the constitutional committee. Domestically, their confrontation will not be limited to the leftist powers, the liberals or the youth on the squares no matter how hard they try to reassure their partners in the country, considering they might not persist in the face of the Salafis and their outbidding after they assured early on and since the fall of the regime that the Shariaa was the only reference for the constitution. Indeed, they will also have to face the military and centrist religious powers, at the head of which is Al-Azhar. They have played the electoral game with the military in the face of the youth on the squares in the context of restoring stability and extinguishing the actions, while benefitting from the great turnout to the ballot boxes. This turnout sent a clear message saying that the people who rebelled against the former regime cannot be led back to the cocoon and subjected to an authoritarian or military regime. Hence, the question on the table today is the following: Can the military council, which offered one concession after the other whenever the youth took to Tahrir Square, stand in the face of the MB, or will it - when the time comes - try to enhance the pillars of its partnership in managing the country's affairs at the level of domestic and foreign policy? The army wanted and still wants a new regime or constitution distancing its budget from any public parliamentary debate and maintaining its upper hand over any legislation related to the military institution. But the Islamists rejected that direction, while it is clear that the current parliament, based on its legislative role, constitutes a big challenge for its authority. The MB announced that the new government should be chosen by parliament, but the army reminded it that this was part of the prerogatives of the presidency currently controlled by the military council based on the old constitution that is still in force. In the meantime, the MB prefers a parliamentary and not a presidential system. Therefore, the standoff is not yet over and is prone to escalate. Another battle will be waged by the sheikhs of the MB with the sheikhs of Al-Azhar, no matter how long it takes or remains laying beneath the ashes. Al-Azhar, which distanced itself from the MB throughout the revolution, has finally joined the detractors of the formation of the constitutional committee. More importantly, it issued two documents, one mid last year and one at the beginning of the current year, i.e. at the peak of the confrontations over the constitution. The first tackled the principles and foundations that will constitute the governing intellectual framework for the sound method to follow, based on “Al-Azhar's leading role in drawing up correct and centrist Islamic thought” and the fact that it constitutes “a beacon guiding the way and resorted to when defining the relationship between the state and religion and clarifying the foundations of the lawful policy that should be pursued, in accordance with its accumulated experience and scientific and cultural history.” This is based on several dimensions, i.e. “the theological dimension by reviving and renewing religious sciences; the historical dimension by leading national action toward freedom and independence; the civilization dimension by reviving the various sciences; the practical dimension by leading the action and shaping opinion leaders; the combining dimension between science, leadership, renaissance and culture in the Arab nation and the Islamic world.” As to the second document, it tackled basic freedoms, i.e. the freedom of belief, of opinion and expression, of scientific research and literary and artistic creation. The message behind these two documents is that Al-Azhar is the only reference, not only in regard to religious affairs, but also in regard to national and even Arab and Islamic affairs in general, while calling for a “civil, constitutional, democratic and modern Egyptian state.” So, can the MB compete with it over its religious position? Or can it ignore and neutralize this position? If it manages to do so, it may be able to present itself as the sole reference of legislation and governance as long as the MB groups have started to come to power from Morocco to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and other location, at which point the Arab and Islamic world will be heading toward what could be dubbed an “Islamic internationalism.” Is this what they want, or do they truly believe that governance is one thing and the constitution is another, that the constitution is a consensual document that should take into account all the sectarian, denominational, racial and cultural components of society and can therefore not be monopolized by whichever side drawing up the facets of the new regime, its constitution and the identity of the country?
