The wager in Egypt, even after the inauguration of the winning president in the elections (whether it is Mohammad Morsi or Ahmed Shafik) will continue to revolve around the possible entry of the January 25 revolution into a coma, or rather around the ability of the military council's decisions to subjugate the civilian powers, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was - until a few days ago - at the head of those who benefitted from the January 25 course. The “geologist" of the Israeli General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, said that what was being witnessed in Egypt and the Arab world was a “storm of tectonic proportions. It happens once every 100 years...This is not just a coup." Ashkenazi then recognized that the storm took the Hebrew state by surprise and tried to do justice to deposed President Hosni Mubarak on his last days by saying: “We can still remember Mubarak dragging Arafat to the table in Oslo and forcing him to sign!" Far away from the “moral" facet featured in the testimony of the former Israeli chief of staff, a question related for example to the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to resist the supreme military council while attempting to change the “earth's layers" would be unfair, at a time when the council is restraining it – along with the other parties – with its constitutional declarations. Indeed, since the disbandment of the People's Assembly (i.e. parliament), the military council has become in a state of confrontation with the MB, the Salafis, the revolution coalition and the other liberal powers, amid restlessness prevailing over the Constituent Assembly tasked with the drafting of the constitution and some within the Supreme Judicial Council. On the other hand, there are ongoing appeals gradually severing the rope of legitimacy which the military ought to be solely holding for the time being, without denying the accusations saying they were tightening that rope around the neck of the transitional path toward democracy. And while it is true that some among those who gathered on Tahrir Square two days ago called for the Field Marshal's execution, it is also true there are some among the Egyptians who are stressing the support by many powers of the Constitutional Declaration through which the military council regained control over the legislative authority. The latter are also expressing surprise toward the “duplicity" of the Muslim Brotherhood group, which was at the beginning of the revolution one of those that called for the limitation of the powers of the pharaoh-president, i.e. the supreme commander of the armed forces, before it made a turn in the Qandahar million-man march on the Square and asked the military to limit the prerogatives of the president of the republic. Even if Morsi's victory is announced today, he will be subjected to the paternal authority of the military council, until parliamentary elections are reorganized in about 3 or 4 months. Even then, there is no guarantee that the MB and its Salafi allies will get an absolute majority at the People's Assembly, without which they cannot easily achieve any change at the level of the layers of influence or the balance of powers. In that sense, those saying that the military showed political know-how exceeding that of the parties might not be mistaken, in light of their manipulation of the course of the transitional phase to distance the revolution's appetite from the influence and interests of the military institution. For its part, the MB practiced the same game and the tug of war proceeded to change the layers of the revolution and the decision centers throughout 18 months. What changed is that the military council now has thugs who are terrorizing the people and the parties, as it is believed by protesters on Tahrir Square who are calling for the liberation and protection of the legitimacy of the disbanded parliament. What also changed is that the arena of the conflict – which has become limited to the military and the MB – has been shaking for months, and that the identity of the side accused of hijacking the revolution was altered. Today, in case Ahmed Shafik were to insist on his victory, the council cannot annul the presidential elections for him. It is thus likely, as revealed by the statements and proposals of the military, that even if Morsi wins, they are reassured by the exclusion of the possibility of seeing the MB monopolizing the legislative and executive powers, at a time when they are doing their best to ratify or complete the new constitution prior to the new parliamentary elections. Consequently, they are reaping the fruits of the MB's slip, which dug a pit of aversion and fear among the Egyptians against it following the exposure of its attempts to tighten its grip around the state. But far away from the balance of powers and the Egyptians' yearning for the return of stability and the activation of the state institutions and the economic wheel being shattered by the protests and the turmoil, and regardless of the know-how of the military council, those who toppled Mubarak's regime will never consider practicing favoritism between the democracy of the military and the state of the Ikhwan, no matter how long the changing of the layers of the revolution were to take.
