The forty minutes which Obama and Putin spent discussing the Syrian issue have led to reinforcing the indirect and undeclared American deputation of Russia to find a solution to the Syrian crisis that would preserve its interests and at the same time lead to the change sought after. Yet Moscow's options seem extremely limited in light of current circumstances. Indeed, Washington, and with it the Syrian opposition and the world, do not want any plan that would be limited to stopping the violence at the security level, but rather one that would go beyond it to a transitional political solution, while the Russians reject the notion that political change should be a precondition for stopping the violence. Yet due to the lack of desire of the Americans and their inability to intervene militarily for economic and electoral reasons, in addition to other reasons connected to Israel's fears of a “Sunni crescent" stretching from Turkey to Tunisia through Gaza, and to the unavailability of an international cover of legitimacy to begin with, Obama focused during the meeting on convincing Putin that it was Russia's responsibility to come up with a solution that would meet the demands of both sides. The Russian President also made sure not to appear to accept the Americans' deputation, because this would undermine his credibility as a reliable ally, but he made use of later meetings with European leaders, such as Britain's Cameron and France's Hollande, to leak the features of the purported solution, among them his not clinging to keeping Assad in power. Russia's main objection is based on the absence of guarantees with regard to its interests on the part of the forces that represent the alternative to the current Syrian leadership. Putin stressed during his talks what he considered to be the “failure" of the transitional periods in Libya and in Egypt, where violence and tension are still present, threatening to spread and keep the two countries prey to domestic struggles for a long time. Moreover, Assad, who completely rejects the idea of stepping down, yet realizes at the same time the size of the pressures Russia is being subjected to, sent his adviser Bouthaina Shaaban to Moscow on the eve of the Mexico meetings to remind Russia that its interests would be endangered if it were to abandon him, because the alternative, whoever it may be, will not forget its stances in support of the regime. This is why the Americans said that they know the Russians have received threats, and that they are sincere in saying that the purpose of sending warships to Syria's shores is to prepare to evacuate their troops and equipment in case such threats were to reach the stage of implementation. These factors place Moscow before a single solution to save what can be saved: a military coup. A group of officers, among them Alawite officers, would thus topple Assad and form a military council that would declare a complete stop to security operations, release those who have been detained and lead a transitional period that could stretch over two years and witness parliamentary elections and the drafting of a new constitution, and would end with the election of a president. This would give Moscow time to negotiate with emerging forces in Syria on Russia's strategic interests. Such a solution presumes that the different parties of the opposition would accept this military council's role in achieving national reconciliation, after the sectarian and confessional division the Assad regime has worked on kindling, and agree to stop all military activity, in light of their assertion that they have carried arms in order to defend themselves to begin with, and that they are committed to pluralism and to protecting the interests and the role of minorities. Yet the question remains: will the Syrian opposition fall for such Russian measures and accept them as a solution that would not uproot the regime? The answer will certainly be negative, in light of the complete international embargo imposed on Assad, his army's decreasing ability to settle the battle, and the spread of the unrest to segments of society that had so far remained “neutral", but the Americans, the Turks and others will perhaps take it upon themselves to convince it.
