The Security Council was expected to unanimously adopt a resolution for the dispatch of international observers to Syria, in a way conveying another facet of the consensus with which Kofi Annan is armed. It was too soon to announce the failure of his mission, as none of those who stood behind it - whether on the regional or the international level - had any interest in rushing to proclaim its death. Hence, the political and diplomatic option has not yet been exhausted, and should not be at such an early stage, regardless of the daily violations of the ceasefire and acts of violence. This is due to the fact that none of the actors has any alternative to handle the crisis, and they have all agreed that this was a last opportunity and that its non-seizure would provoke a definite slide toward civil war, the possible collapse of the state and the undermining of stability throughout the region. None of them has the means to push the regime to fall, just like the regime, those loyal to it and those who support it, have no means of ending the action and afflicting it with crushing defeat. What is required is for no one to sever the course of negotiations, regardless of the obstacles and no matter how difficult the political solution may seem. These negotiations over the Syrian crisis are accompanied by parallel talks over the Iranian nuclear file, which also ended in a way that is unlike the previous stages of dialogue. At this level, Michael Mann, the spokesman for EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton, described the Istanbul talks as being “totally different” than the previous ones held 15 months ago, adding: “The principles for future talks seem to be there” and “all countries have expressed interest in having bilateral meetings.” Therefore, the negotiations are needed by all the sides involved in the Syrian and Iranian files, whether international or regional ones. Neither the United States nor its allies stopped stressing the importance of a diplomatic solution with Tehran and Damascus in parallel to the sanctions. And neither Russia nor its allies stopped deterring what they dubbed a Western attack against the Iranian and Syrian regimes, while insisting on international law and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Nonetheless, the Russians know that their reliance on what they consider to be international charters might not be beneficial for long in halting the wave of change sweeping the Arab world, and consequently the uprising in Syria. Moreover, it will not be able to deter the attempts deployed by America and the European states to merge these developments with their political, economic and military interests. And while the Western states seem to be more pragmatic, Russia looks like it does not wish to part from the Soviet political principles and policy instruments in the face of what it dubs the lack of morals in the Western policies - as per the statements of Putin and Russian officials on several occasions - in the hope that this old diplomacy will restore what they had lost since the end of the Cold War. It is clear, through the Istanbul talks, that the interest in upholding diplomacy is not limited to America and its partners, and that Iran also needs to stay engaged in dialogue so that once the circumstances are favorable in the future, its opponents do not move towards a confrontation which no one wants until now. This is why Tehran returned to the dialogue table after a long period of absence and obstinacy. This is also why it joined the international consensus over Kofi Annan's mission. Now, all that is left for the Syrian regime to do is to cooperate with this consensus, regardless of the intentions and their truthfulness, by committing to the content of this international-Arab mission. As to the opposition, it also has no other option but to cooperate with international will, without the need to raise the voice and engage in further disputes over the issue of international intervention in a way similar to what happened in Libya, bearing in mind that foreign intervention is not on the table, neither on NATO's end nor on Turkey's. The mission of the international-Arab envoy was created to survive until the facts and the circumstances surrounding all the files of the region, and not just the Syrian crisis, change. Washington does not have a solution, and neither does Moscow, which is why everyone is making sure not to push toward the failure of the mission. Russia can convince President Bashar al-Assad to meet the minimum level of conditions for the deployment of international observers and then the launching of a political process which will definitely last a long time. This should be conducted until the outcome of the renewed dialogue between Iran and the six states over its nuclear file is clear - along with the outcome of the presidential race in the United States and France - but also until Vladimir Putin who has returned to Kremlin draws the facets of his new government, of his strategy and his list of priorities in light of numerous developments, both current and upcoming. Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government also needs to take its breath after the collapse of all the bases of the diplomacy it had built throughout a decade, just as it needs to arrange its internal house. The Syrian crisis has overcome the models produced by the Arab spring from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Consequently, the horizons for a solution seem blocked and the results of the uprising open to the unknown. In the meantime, the current balance of powers will be sustained unless a major surprise occurs. In other words, those staging the uprising will uphold their unfaltering determination despite the thousands of victims, detainees and refugees domestically and abroad, and the regime will uphold its security option and its refusal to recognize the crisis as long as its opponents abroad are not even considering a military intervention, and could not even open one gap in the Russian wall. Moreover, these opponents might even be reassured by what was accomplished by the uprising so far, as the Syrian situation which is drowning in anarchy has hindered Damascus' roles in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq and has started to constitute a burden to the close ally Iran which is struggling to maintain the existing balance of powers in the open confrontation with the United States. The Syrian crisis might produce a solution that is completely different and seems to be quasi-impossible in light of the blood that was shed, the destruction and the divisions which affected the relationship between the regime and its men on one hand, and the greater part of the Syrians on the other. Still, the most difficult is yet to come following the current truce or the discontinuation of the military activities, i.e. the engagement in dialogue or the search for a political solution eventually allowing the instatement of what could constitute a “no winner, no loser” formula. At this level as well, some do not except progress except through the increase of the level of Annan's mission, by assigning him for example to sponsor a solution that is not imposed by the regime or drawn up by the opposition. By doing so, he would be exercising some kind of a tutelage or guardianship established by the Security Council, in order to introduce the required reforms that will eventually lead to the desired change, provided that they take into account the interests of all the Syrian sectarian, denominational and ethnic components and allocate the positions based on the model of the Lebanese or Iraqi quotas system. And while the superpowers and especially Russia wish to maintain their interests in their last toehold in the Middle East, they have no other option but to push toward this international tutelage, in order to come up with a solution guaranteeing these interests by guaranteeing those of the powers which have stood alongside the regime until this day. As to the search for a solution with which the president would leave following a transitional phase - while maintaining the existing structure of the regime - this recipe will not work as much as it might push toward the establishment of a North Korea in the Middle East, in conjunction with troubles and turmoil preventing any stability in the country, in its neighboring countries and in the Middle East. A close reading into what happened in Syria until this day proves that the conflict and the escalation of the defiance until the end, will lead to options which no one even wants to consider. Some Syrians are rejecting the talk about the country's possible slide toward an open and destructive civil war, although its signs can be detected in what is happening today. Others are being obstinate in refusing to recognize reality and the changes it necessitates, thus emulating the regime's talk about a conspiracy to redraft the map of the region and change the borders drawn by the British-French Sykes-Picot agreement, knowing that in case the existing balance of powers domestically and abroad were to falter, civil war could break the Iranian arc extending from Tehran to Beirut, going through Baghdad and Damascus. This would allow the emergence of a Sunni dam between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in the face of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, civil war could enhance this arc if Syria's map is redrawn and if the coastal line is reconnected from Latakia to Banias, Tartous and Homs, which is also connected to Lebanon and its Bekaa and links the capitals of the Syrian North and South to its internal East. If this is done, the dam will be caught between two claws. Is this something desired by the regime of President Al-Assad and its men who are “facing a foreign conspiracy” to destroy the country? Or is this desired by the opponents of the regime who are rejecting the logic of domestic infighting and division?
