The agreement between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the Arab ministerial council over five points that will constitute the foundation of a draft resolution at the Security Council is a step on a long course. But what is important is for the two concerned sides, i.e. the Syrian regime and the opposition, to approve the agreement. Both of them were hoping otherwise and could thwart this agreement, while the mission of international-Arab envoy Kofi Annan might be undermined via a new wave of crushing violence. The agreement will give additional time - or rather ensure some sort of truce - which is needed by the foreign actors. But its most important aspect probably stems from the fact that the Syrian crisis has entered the stage of negotiations between the latter sides, regardless of the outcome of the military operations on the ground. Indeed, even if the regime is able to sustain its military successes and extend its stay in power, it will remain unable to impose calm and turn the clock backwards. It could inflict Homs' fate on Edlib and its countryside among other areas, but it will not be able to silence the security pits and end the hit and run operations, whether or not the opposition were to unite. Two imminent events will determine the course of the crisis. The first is the commemoration of the first anniversary of the action next Thursday. This occasion will signal the limits of the military victory achieved by the regime in Homs and other cities, and the extent of the street's ability to proceed in light of the balance of powers on the ground. The second will be the attempt deployed by the opposition – with most of its factions – to hold a meeting in Cairo which will precede the second meeting of Syria's Friends in Turkey, not necessarily to unite in one body, but to come up with a document featuring their common principles. If the action proves to be lively in those two events, the regime will be facing a more difficult stage ahead, thus prompting the international envoy to immediately seek a political solution. Kofi Annan - along with Moscow and Beijing which stressed the necessity of supporting him – knows that his mission is not limited to ending the violence and the facilitation of the delivery of the aid, despite the urgent character of this humanitarian issue. The other facet of his mission is to ensure dialogue to implement the Arab League initiative, which was adopted at the United Nations via an international resolution that assigned the former secretary general of the international organization to seek its application. All the latter actors know that when it is refusing dialogue with the regime, the Syrian opposition is responding to the pulse of the street, and is walking behind it, not ahead of it. This is due to the fact that it has so far failed to unify its ranks and put forward a command capable of controlling the mood of the street, and translate its sacrifices into efficient political steps. So far, the international-Arab envoy has not yet talked about a regime change, but rather about the necessity of launching dialogue, while well aware of the fact that the majority of the opposition forces domestically and abroad cannot accept a dialogue that will not lead to power transition. Moreover, there is no doubt that during his meeting with domestic oppositionists, he heard them calling for a peaceful change of the regime while insisting on the rejection of foreign intervention, considering that the opposition cannot stand in the face of the street. On the other hand, the regime is refusing to recognize those whom to which it is referring as being “gangs.” Will Annan change that equation? His mission is almost impossible, as it would be inevitable to come up with a solution enjoying credibility and earning the confidence of the two sides, especially that of the street. So, will he go back to the idea of the transitional stage? This would require him to convince the symbols of the regime that they have become part of the crisis and that they will have to step down following that stage, but also convince the opposition to give dialogue a chance, instead of militarization. Furthermore, it will require him to produce convincing foreign guarantees from both the regime's friends and enemies, as well as an international follow-up and sponsorship surrounding the implementation in a way similar to what happened in Yemen, while reassuring all the components of the Syrian people – with their majority and minorities – and all those concerned about their interests, that Syria's unity, stability and role will be protected.Kofi Annan's mission will be decisive at the level of determining the course of the crisis. Hence, his failure could hasten Syria's slide toward the unwanted on the domestic level and among the major players, considering that the repercussions of anarchy or civil war would eliminate everyone's calculations and interests. His mission might be a last opportunity to produce a settlement that would spare everyone from the hefty price and the slide toward the prohibited. And if the intentions of the heated Arab and international action are truthful and if the warring parties admit they cannot secure the desired settlement, Syria might not face this fateful option. After a whole year, it has become clear that the Syrian crisis is not just an internal or Arab file, and that it has become part of the negotiations of the regional and international actors and organically linked to several other files. Moreover, it would not be an exaggeration to say that among its most prominent results will be the drawing up of the facets of the regional order which has started to take shape with the Arab spring and has become in the same basket as the other major files, from the rocket shield in Europe to the settlement of the frozen Palestinian cause, the Iranian nuclear program, and the fight over Central Asia – with its gas, oil and the future of its regimes – and the Pacific Ocean with its rising powers, which are in turn defining the shape of the international order. Ever since the staging of the Syria's Friends conference in Tunisia, the American and Western political rhetoric in general witnessed change. To some, it appeared to be identical to the Russian position toward the Syrian crisis, especially at the level of the rejection of the armament of the opposition and the insistence on a political diplomatic solution. True, this rhetoric never stopped calling for Al-Assad's departure, but its pressures on Damascus and its political support to the opposition changed the regional rules of engagement between the so-called American project and rejectionist project. The Western circles which tried throughout years to separate Damascus from Tehran – but to no avail – believed that Syria's weakening or the toppling of its regime would be an alternative for the war option on the Islamic Republic, as it would sever many Iranian arms in the region. Today, one year after the eruption of the crisis, these circles can be somewhat reassured about the goals they achieved, namely the fact that Damascus is not and will never go back to the way it was before the action. And whether the regime's term expires shortly or in a while, it will be preoccupied with its survival and will consequently stop being a source of help for Iran.Furthermore, the key to the Syrian file is now in Moscow's hands after it remained a card in Tehran's hands during this past decade. This reassures Washington when dealing with Kremlin, which might insist on discussing a series of files and on conducting compromises over them, but without trading one file here with another there. Indeed, it is not only concerned about the expansion of NATO and its shields and the loss of its last position and interests in the Middle East, but also about the region's slide into a sectarian conflict and the fate of the minorities. This is due to the fact that - as it was stated by Lavrov in Cairo yesterday - the destructive effects of what is witnessed in the region affect Russia as well, while international law must be protected instead of a specific regime! These are the times for negotiations. This is wanted by America, Russia, China, Europe and Turkey and needed by the American administration and Nicolas Sarkozy's administration which are preoccupied with the presidential elections, after Guide Ali Khamenei settled the conflict in Tehran within the conservatives' ranks through the weakening of Ahmadinejad, and after Vladimir Putin settled the battle of his successful return to Kremlin. These are the times for negotiations after Khamenei welcomed President Barack Obama's exclusion of the military option to settle the nuclear file and Iran agreed with the P5+1 to hold a new round of talks in Istanbul next month. In the meantime, and as per Lavrov's announcement, the Quartet Committee will meet today or tomorrow in the hope of activating the Palestinian-Israeli talks.The Arab-Russian agreement opens the negotiations door and its five points which were announced by Lavrov and Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem will constitute a draft resolution at the Security Council, as it was stated by the Arab League secretary general. The Arab and Russian sides thus met half way, considering that the League did not call on President Bashar al-Assad to step down as it had done in its second initiative at the beginning of the year, while once again, the Russian brandished the first initiative that was announced at the end of last year and drew up a roadmap for peaceful change the Yemeni way. Moreover, he assured he supported Annan's mission, while knowing – although he did not say it – that its reference will be the UN resolution that adopted the second initiative. Moreover, he accepted the formula to end the violence, regardless of its source, instead of continuing to adopt the regime's slogan about the armed gangs.And while Sheikh Hamad confirmed Kofi Annan's references, i.e. the UN General Assembly resolution issued on February 16, the Arab action plan issued on November 2 and the Arab League decisions issued on January 22 and February 12, the Russian minister settled for expressing his hope in seeing Annan's mission leading to the launching of dialogue without anticipating the results - which might lead to the stay of the regime for a while or its swift departure – and called for the use of influence among the infighting parties. He then lengthily tackled his country's position and attributed its use of the veto to the fact that the draft resolution which had collapsed was not given a chance, tackling the Tunisia conference without mentioning that its boycotting was due to Moscow's fear of seeing Syria's Friends acting outside the context of the United Nations! But some details of this transformation that affected the Arab and Russian positions was not clearly announced, which will allow the “devils” laying in the explanations and the details to emerge once the time comes to implement what might be reached by the international-Arab envoy. So, will Annan manage to tame those devils? And will the major players exercise their influence on the infighting parties to hasten the solution and tend to other affairs?
