Three regional and international events will leave an impact on the Syrian crisis and the direction of the upcoming stage of the conflict, the closest of which being the Syrian People's Friends conference that will be held in Tunisia next Friday. This conference will then be followed by the Iranian parliamentary elections on March 2 and the Russian presidential elections on March 4. The Syrian National Council was invited to attend the Friends' conference, and Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem hoped to see the formation of a group from the opposition “enjoying real representation.” In parallel to this wish, senior American, French and British officials reiterated the rhetoric related to the “unification of the opposition” to facilitate the delivery of help to it. For his part, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen assured that the alliance will not intervene in Syria, “even in the event of a United Nations mandate to protect civilians,” rejecting the possibility of providing logistical support for proposed "humanitarian corridors" to ferry relief. These positions reveal that the Tunisia conference might not recognize the National Council as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, considering that such recognition would grant the Council the right to call for all sorts of interventions under the pretext of the protection of the civilians. This would generate a major confrontation, not inside the Security Council but outside of it, between the West which is calling on President Bashar al-Assad to step down and Russia and China among other states rejecting any military intervention to change regimes. These positions might be close to those of Moscow and Beijing. True, Russia granted the Syrian regime a “green light” to carry out a military settlement and pushed it to anticipate the date of the referendum over the new Constitution draft, but it certainly cannot afford to keep this light on. In the meantime, its diplomats' leaks are revealing that the deadline for the completion of this settlement has been surpassed, seeing that not only the regime's military machine failed to achieve its goals in Homs, Edlib and Daraa, but what is being and will be witnessed in the Damascus and Aleppo neighborhoods is heralding a wider engagement by the two cities in the action. This means that the settlement will be impossible and that the crisis will go on, which will not allow the staging of the referendum in light of the opposition's calls to boycott it after having rejected it. The question at this point is the following: Can Russia keep granting the regime a “license” to proceed with its military campaigns? Can it handle the accusations saying it is responsible for the shedding of Syrian blood for weeks and months? Why is it rushing – like Beijing – to meet with the Gulf Cooperation Council states? Is it just to explain its position or to reach some sort of understanding? Russia was in favor of the Arab League's first initiative that did not clearly call on Al-Assad to step down, and rather drew up a safe roadmap for change almost similar to was done in Yemen. In other words, it knew that his exit was inevitable, but did not conceive the exit of all of his regime's leaders with him. Numerous calculations and interests which were lengthily tackled were behind its obstinacy and the veto to which it resorted along with China. It was said that the two states wished to change the rules of the international game led by the United States, in order to prove they were actors that could no longer be disregarded. It was also said they feared seeing the spring reaching their border, at a time when the Islamic parties are marching toward the leading positions in the majority of the Arab world. Beyond that, they do not want the West to be the one determining the fate of the regimes that are not in favor of its policies, while Russia has not yet accepted the principle of the international community's interference to protect civilians against their regimes, thus breaching the national sovereignty of the states. Globalization, free trade and international cooperation to fight terrorism and prevent the proliferation of WMDs broke many of the barriers of this sovereignty. In 2005, the international organization ratified the principle of intervention to put an end to human rights violations, and there is no need to enumerate the interventions carried out by the United States and NATO under this headline in a way that fueled Moscow's and Beijing's fear of seeing this American and European intervention to change the regimes transforming into an indisputable international charter. Putin himself stated mid last year that Russia had no interests or investments to defend (in Syria)! Before him, President Dmitry Medvedev stated that Al-Assad's regime would have to leave if it were to fail to implement the “necessary reforms.” Nonetheless, they both insisted that “Russia will continue to stand against attempts to legitimize through the U.N. Security Council unilateral sanctions aimed at toppling various regimes.” Hence, Putin is showing unprecedented stringency in the face of those calling for Al-Assad's ousting. However, the elections are drawing near and the man is haunted by the demonstrations which opposed what they dubbed his party's falsification of the parliamentary elections at the end of last year, while not sufficiently comforted by the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church's reassurance that he was standing by his side two days ago. What he wants is for Washington and its partners not to turn the calls for the changing of regimes into a principle at the United Nations. Indeed, what if the opposition against his upcoming presidency were to escalate and demand change? But on the other hand, Putin is aware of the seriousness of the cover provided to the Syrian regime's military operations for an indefinite period of time. True, he is refusing to even discuss the president's ousting, but what is also true is that he has not forgotten that Al-Assad only visited Moscow following his exit from Lebanon after Rafik al-Hariri's assassination. He also recalls the fact that Al-Assad's was President Jacques Chirac's – and other European leaders' - spoiled friend, that he relinquished many Syrian principles to establish a quasi strategic alliance with Turkey after Iran and wasted numerous opportunities by refusing to recognize his oppositionists and eluding the adoption of the required reforms. But the question is: Will Russia alter its engagement in the Syrian crisis in light of the outcome of the Tunisia meeting and after overcoming the possible repercussions of Putin's return to Kremlin on March 4? Moscow is aware of the fact that the military settlement was unsuccessful, will not be successful and is even escalating the crisis. It also knows that it would be too late to return to the previous initiatives, that it would be difficult to accept the “no winner, no loser” formula and that it was no longer possible to convince the Syrians – after all the blood that was spilled – to accept Al-Assad's stay at the head of the authority. Therefore, what is required is a search for other alternatives that would constitute a middle ground solution to ensure a calm change. Russia wants to see the participation of all the components of Syrian society and all the sides in the opposition, and not just the National Council as the sole representative with its current formation that is mainly controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey behind it. It is also aware of the fact that the head of the regime can no longer stay in Damascus. As to the West which hid behind the League for much too long, it seems reassured by the Russian-Chinese veto which spares it from assuming its responsibilities and allows it to cast them toward the opposition! But are there no common points between the West and Russia in regard to the crisis, especially since Moscow never severed its contacts with the opposition and pushed the regime to recognize it through its mere acceptance of the principle of dialogue as per the calls of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov? This is especially true since there are common European-American-Russian questions being reiterated during the last few days in regard to the upcoming stage and the alternative for Al-Assad's regime. The answer at this level prompts the following question: Can Russia exercise pressures on Al-Assad after all it has done for him so far, i.e. humored his fear over a possible lethal military intervention similar to what happened in Libya and provided him with cover and protection? Can it not impose a formula based on which the president would relinquish his prerogatives to his deputy or to a transitional government of technocrats under the tutelage of a military council that does not include the leaders directly implicated in the oppression, in order to lead the change that would maintain the rights of all the components of society and Syria's unity to prevent it from slipping toward a wide-scale civil war? Would such a transitional solution not encourage the sect that is guarding the regime to relinquish the head of this regime instead of being led into a civil war whose repercussions it knows in advance and from which it knows it will not come out a winner? Will Syria's enemies accept this middle ground solution? They know that arming the opposition will increase the momentum of the popular action, protect it against the oppression and killing machine and alleviate the impact of the military campaign. Nonetheless, on the short run, it will not affect the existing balance of powers that is tilting in favor of the regime which is still maintaining a massive military machine in terms of its elements and equipment. Supplying the opposition with weapons would mean the extension of the crisis and the deepening of the social divide, which will eventually lead to what is worse than civil war, i.e. the establishment of closed zones for groups without any sectarian, denominational or even racial diversity and consequently the division of the country in a way that will undermine and threaten stability in the entire region. The final question remains related to Tehran's position, which might become clearer following the parliamentary elections on March 2. These elections will determine the size of the conflicting sides, primarily within the conservatives' ranks, considering that the reformatory movement abstained from running and will boycott the voting, thus causing a drop in the turnout. The elections will mark a test of strength, at a time when the Iranians have started to feel the repercussions of the sanctions. On the other hand, President Ahmadinejad's government which might come out weaker than before, has expressed its willingness to return to the dialogue table and discuss its nuclear files beneath the dust of the shows of power, from the Hormuz Strait to the Mediterranean Sea, the India, Thailand and Georgia arenas and the nuclear accomplishments. In light of the pain inflicted by the blockade, and what the internal conflict will generate in terms of dissent and cracks and the foreign siege, will it be ready to accept the discussion of an exit from the Syrian crisis, with which it could trade the sanctions instead of seeing the tradeoff conducted against the nuclear program?
