The campaign being launched by the Syrian regime in Homs, Edlib and Daraa among other Syrian cities, does not herald the end of the action or the success of the military settlement in the face of its oppositionists. On the other hand, the armament of the opposition or the Free Army might not lead to the imminent end of the regime. And while the regime's political, military and diplomatic machine is still unified – with the feeling of empowerment that this cohesion generates – the division of the opposition in no way means that it is weak or about to break down, regardless of how much its unification seems to be a quasi impossible mission. The conflict is therefore open between the authority and those loyal to it, whether groups, apparatuses and symbols, and the people on the domestic arena who will determine the outcome of the crisis and have proven great and unfaltering determination regardless of the price throughout the countryside and the cities. And until this day, they have offered great sacrifices in terms of victims, detainees, displaced and refugees, destruction and desolation. The expression of the disappointment vis-à-vis the Syria's Friends Conference in Tunisia, the division of the opposition and the confused and impotent international stand in the face of the Russian and Chinese obstinacy, reflect the predicament endured by the action and the inability to stop the massacres, killings, displacement and starvation. However, it might not be adequate to blow this despair out of proportion or say that the world is standing idle. Indeed, since the beginning of the action, it was clear that foreign intervention at the level of the Syrian crisis will complicate the settlement and delay – if not completely topple – the aspired change. True, the Russian and Chinese veto constituted an umbrella for the regime, and the Western position in general - which was characterized by reluctance and volatility - gave more time for the regime to proceed with the military option. However, what is also true is that this intervention requires the adoption of a specific course and the respect of restraints, mechanisms and conditions which take time, and could carry repercussions and consequences which are not all desirable. The foreign positions during the last few days revealed two directions for the crisis: the escalation and expansion of the bloody infighting or an understanding over a settlement taking into account the minimum acceptable level serving the interests of all the sides. If no transformation affects the conflicting positions and is translated into an agreement over the mechanisms of the intervention and a solution that would reassure all the sides, dissipate their fears and respect their interests, the crisis will quickly head toward the undermining of the state and not just the toppling of the regime, and threaten to lead all the neighboring states toward anarchy. Today, the regime in Damascus cannot claim that it is present all along the border and that its institutions are operating regularly, considering that the situation on the ground reveals otherwise. In the meantime, the gradual absence of the state and then its collapse, is prompting some who are overly-pessimistic to wonder whether the acute and bloody domestic division – in light of the escalation of the regional and international duel on the Syrian arena – will lead to the repetition of the Somali or Afghan experience, or to the reconsideration of the region's map that has not known real stability in nine decades. There is another less bleak vision presenting a different reading into the events, ever since the Tunisia conference and until the dramatic events witnessed in Homs and other cities. The optimism featured in this vision is enhanced by the recent positions of the regional and international actors on the Syrian arena. Indeed, the international pressures are gradually escalating on the Syrian regime, as the United Nations and its various committees no longer have any preoccupations other than the Syrian crisis. As to Europe, its leaders are threatening President Bashar al-Assad with sanctions, accusing him of committing crimes against humanity. The same goes for Turkey, while in Washington, President Barack Obama recently joined his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in heralding that “Al-Assad's days have become numbered.” All these positions reveal the existence of an irrevocable decision to topple Al-Assad's regime. On the other hand, China, which is rejecting any foreign intervention and reiterating its insistence on dialogue, on a political solution and on the calls to stop the violence, is confirming its support in favor of international-Arab envoy Kofi Annan whom it knows is carrying the Arab League's initiative to change the regime. But this vision does not stop at the aforementioned international positions. The most important part of its reading is related to its expectations for the stage that will follow Vladimir Putin's return to Kremlin from the first round. Indeed, it expected to see the signs of a transformation in Russia's position, which might lead its diplomacy back to a centrist course. In this context, it pointed to the Russian leader's insistence on meeting with foreign media outlets three days prior to the presidential elections. Through that step, he probably wanted to address a specific message to the West, especially in regard to the position toward the Syrian crisis. He was reassured about his internal situation, as the polls conducted on the eve of the elections revealed he will win by around 60%. And whether he hits that number or a little less, he seemed as though he was dealing with a confirmed return to Kremlin. During his interview, Putin repeated what he had said mid last year regarding the fact that Russia did not enjoy any special relations with Damascus, while abstaining from expressing any support in favor of Al-Assad and assuring that his country's economic interests with Syria did not amount to the size of those interests with Britain or any other country in Europe. He then stressed that Moscow's position was a matter of principle in the face of a possible civil war, reiterating the calls upon the regime and the opposition to instate a ceasefire and engage in dialogue. Nonetheless, the importance of this position stems from the fact that it coincided with talk about a Russian-Gulf meeting which was postponed, maybe until after the presidential elections. This is a meeting on which Russia greatly relies, especially since – as usual – it did not issue any position or reaction toward what it heard in terms of harsh Gulf criticisms ever since it used the veto at the Security Council against a resolution condemning the Syrian regime. Indeed, it is not concealing its wish to appease the relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council and to see a settlement the Yemeni style. On the other hand, it is certainly not reassured about those within the Gulf who are reminding it about its Soviet experience in Afghanistan with the Mujahedeen, while nowadays, it is hearing similar calls for Jihad emerging from Al-Anbar, the Lebanese and Libyan cities of Tripoli and Amman. It knows that the civil war against which it is warning will not spare its interests or bases in Syria, along with the interests of the others. So, in the face of the Syrian predicament, could all the sides be led toward an Afghan solution, although none of them has yet recovered from the Afghanistan symptoms? Close and similar American and Russian positions can also be detected, from the refusal to arm the opposition, the fear over the dismantlement of the state, the insistence on a political solution and the non-reassurance toward the next stage and the possible alternative. American Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman conveyed this rapprochement a few days ago when he said that “their analysis (i.e. that of the Russians) is not that different from ours!” This might not be enough to say there is coordination between Washington and Moscow. However, this rapprochement affecting the positions could be translated into an agreement over a settlement that would spare the region from chaos, while the recent developments might lead toward such a settlement. Indeed, the opposition is scattered on the political level and was further confused by what happened in Baba Amr and what other cities and towns are facing, and the regime has become the hostage of a security solution without any horizon or foreseen end. In light of this predicament and the inability of the two sides to resolve the situation in their favor - at least in the near future – it would be easy to push them toward an agreement. At this level, does Putin not seem to be the most apt to convince the regime in Damascus to engage in the required settlement following the services it offered to Damascus in terms of “weapons” in Tartous and in New York? Indeed, he will not find it difficult to create an alternative through a military or civil formation, he the expert who knows a lot about the heritage of the KGB. Moreover, Washington is the most apt to convince the oppositionists who are nowadays feeling despair and disappointment toward the entire international community. If this reading into the American and Russian positions is valid, Western and Russian circles that followed the last days of the elections held on Sunday are expecting to see the signs of change affecting Putin's positions. This change could be reflected in the formation of his new government in Moscow, as it might not include Sergei Lavrov who is close to the military nationalist wing, and might see the rise of Vitali Churkin or whoever has a similar experience as him at the level of international diplomacy. Indeed, the leader who is returning to Kremlin needs to communicate with his opponents on the domestic arena and a new method that would appease the anger of the middle class, which clearly expressed its wish to see the establishment of a state of the law and the ending of corruption. Moreover, he needs to reach an understanding with his various detractors in the Duma Council where he does not enjoy the sufficient majority, in order to pass the major projects and constitutional amendments. As to Putin's need to tend to his interests with Europe and America, it undoubtedly comes ahead of his need to hold on to a regime which will inevitably collapse, and will force him to gradually relinquish his Soviet and popular rhetoric. If this change is seen in Moscow, it would mean that the second Friends' Conference in Turkey within a few days might carry developments at the level of the Friends' positions and in the ranks of the Syrian opposition and its national council.
