Today, Egypt stands before two critical turning points: the presidential elections whose first round will be held on May 23 and the suspended fate of the Constituent Assembly that is tasked with the drafting of the constitution. As to the Abassiya Square incidents and their repercussions, they have become part of the conflict between the parties and political and military powers to control the course of these two events. Nonetheless, there are two main sides carrying programs governed by an inevitable clash, based on the previous developments witnessed at the level of the Egyptian revolution since the beginning of the year. There is the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Islamic powers, at the head of which is the Muslim Brotherhood group. Indeed, ever since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, both teams have been moving to the beat of their own agendas which ignored and are still ignoring the other powers, starting with the youth who set the squares ablaze and the other powers representing minorities and movements that do not enjoy a popular size capable of influencing the course of events. They are even risking the country's fate, stability and security. Ever since the toppling of the head of the regime, the two powerful sides have been acting with realism and pragmatism. The Islamists and the Salafis thus rushed to ride the wave of the revolution which they had supplied with partisans who filled the squares and hastened the military's intervention. The latter for its part sided with Tahrir Square, contributed to the president's exit from the palace and drew up the roadmap for a transitional phase which is about to end. However, what followed the collapse of President Hosni Mubarak, his political group and his partisan leaders introduced great transformations at the level of the preliminary image seen on the squares. There is no need to go over the stages in which the two sides – i.e. the military and the Muslim Brotherhood – converged or diverged in drawing up the facets of the transitional phase in order to serve their interests, without any consideration for the others. But with the imminence of the date of the real and drastic transformation, it has become clear that the “marriage” between the two sides will not last. Indeed, in light of the dawning of the constitutional event and the selection of the president, the clash erupted, divorce was seen and the pragmatism which characterized their action at the beginning dissipated. The divorce occurred when the military toppled the Constituent Assembly which was formed by the People's Assembly with its Muslim Brotherhood majority, when the judiciary had its say in regard to some candidates and when some powers responded by approaching the lair of the armed forces. The army does not want anyone to come near its square. And while it is not yet convinced that it should relinquish some of its prerogatives, how can it allow the youth's turning of their revolution from Tahrir Square to the Defense Ministry's Square, in order to topple the historical role it has built for itself throughout years - from the days of Orabi's revolution to the July 23 revolution – and force it to return to the caserns? The two sides did not hesitate to use thuggery on the street and in politics. The army established truce with some Islamic sides to avoid direct confrontation with the youth on the Squares, and exploited the latter or some of them to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from proceeding with its attempt to impose control over all the state pillars and institutions. For their part, Islamic powers did not hesitate to support the military on several occasions, in order to undermine the action of the protesters on Tahrir Square among other places, even staging counterdemonstrations in the face of the youth. Hence, the Abassiya incident did not exit the context of the other incidents which preceded it, from the Camels' Battle to the Maspero and Muhammad Mahmoud Street events. And while the latter aimed – as some believed – to ensure the postponement of the parliamentary elections at the time, the Defense Ministry incidents might not exit the context of the attempts to postpone the presidential elections. The inevitability of the clash, in light of the confusion prevailing in the ranks of most of the sides, and especially the two strongest parties, is heralding difficult days ahead and the possible slide toward what is worse. True, the military council renewed its statements regarding the staging of the presidential elections on time, the surrender power and the return to the caserns. But what is also true is that what happened on Abassiya Square seems to be a step backward. Upon the eruption of the revolution, some expected the army to intervene and extinguish it. But the opposite happened, and it turned out at a later stage that the army's intervention aimed and still aims at containing the repercussions, just like the Islamic powers became engaged in the action after a period of reluctance, in order to reap the fruits and impose monopolization. So, will the current clash between the two programs herald the summoning of the scenes of the bloody conflict which swept the action in Libya and Yemen yesterday, and is nowadays sweeping Syria, but with a retroactive effect? The image of what happened on Abassiya Square is not that different from the image of the thugs in some Syrian cities and villages. The military forces that gave the revolutionaries with one hand, want to see the favor returned with the other. They want the revolution to stop at this point after the head of the regime was toppled, as there is no longer a need to proceed with this course! Naturally, the spokesmen for the military council were not mistaken when they said that the confusion during the transitional phase was due to disputes between the political forces. Indeed, these disputes do not require any evidence and were the reason behind the stalling which affected the achievement of the demands and slogans of the revolution, but also behind numerous lethal incidents. But those spokesmen, who distanced the army from any responsibility each and every time, are neglecting the truth. Either the military council is responsible for the people's lives, security and stability, or it is not up to the task and should leave. At this level, the tune of the “remnants of the regime” is no longer a marketable product. For a long time, the council hid behind the police and the intelligence services. Now, it is trying to hide behind the thugs that have been attacking the demonstrators in front of the military elements who rose to defend the lair when the protesters grew close to or tried to approach the Defense Ministry. Is it not the responsibility of the military to protect the people and deter any attacks against them? Who can believe that the council does not hold a great share of responsibility, at a time when its elements were watching the assailers using all sorts of weapons to oppress the demonstrators? The military council failed to manage the parliamentary elections and used force in the face of the protesters and oppositionists on more than one occasion. It is as though it did not draw the lessons from the experience of Mubarak's toppling? Did it not exert pressures to get rid of the man before the situation escalated? The Abassiya events and its repercussions will not extinguish the revolution as much as they might lead it toward a new stage, in case all the political powers which came together during the first days of the action manage to regain their unity, far away from their personal agendas which have allowed and are still allowing their interests to prevail over those of the country, and have facilitated and are still facilitating the military's exploitation of the contradictions. At this level, the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the Islamists, i.e. the other strong party. The latter have confirmed their inefficiency at the People's Assembly, and it would be useless for them to justify their failure by the suspension of the sessions in protest against the sustainment of Al-Ganzouri's government which was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood at a time when youth forces opposed its presence. In the meantime, it is clear that the group is concerned about the retreat of the chances of its candidate Muhammad Morsi who did not earn the support of Salafi and other Islamic powers, while the Egyptian street has started to express its fears over the arrival of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate to the presidency. Hence, the group has lost a major part of the support it had previously earned, especially during the parliamentary elections, due to its rash policies that aim at achieving control, monopolization and enablement. It is known that the majority of the Egyptian people do not belong to parties, i.e. are not ideologically-committed, in order for them to be led behind a specific candidate. And when the Muslim Brotherhood accuses the Council of failing to manage the country's affairs, it must recall its role at this level. Until a few days ago, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders were in permanent coordination with the Council to manage the stage, which is why it would be useless for them to elude the responsibility since they are acting like the Council when it tries to acquit the army from what happened on Al-Abassiya Square among other previous incidents. As to the Salafis and the youth powers which joined their action, they made a mistake when they headed to the Defense Ministry at this point in time. Indeed, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail's supporters could have expressed their anger and positions on any other square, far away from defiance and provocations, just like the military could have responded to those who dared approach its lair in various ways, without pushing the thugs to discipline them through killing. All the revolutionary forces at the head of which are the Salafis accepted the role of the military council in managing the transitional phase ever since Mubarak's departure. Moreover, Abu Ismail's supporters were among the first to defend the military council on several occasions. Therefore, they should have avoided risking the fate of the country and the revolution just because their candidate was prevented from running in the presidential elections. The latter forgot about their actions to defend the council in the face of the youth on Tahrir Square. They are acting like the Muslim Brotherhood, which reached agreements with the army during numerous stages to block the way before the revolutionary youth, and has recently starting blaming its failures on the stay of Ganzouri's government in power. The repetition of the Al-Abassiya Square incident to stress the idea of security collapse, might prompt wide factions to demand the extension of the transitional phase and the stay of the military under the pretext of providing security and restoring stability. And while this serves the military's interest, do the Islamists not share those interests in light of their confusion, their failure and the retreat of their chances on the eve of the elections, in parallel to their inability to allow the passage of their desired goals via the Constituent Assembly which never saw the light?
