The dispute over the advisory council is both an old and renewed one. It is another facet of the dispute over the supra-constitutional principles document, i.e. a battle surrounding the new constitution, which will determine the country's identity and upcoming system, as well as the role and prerogatives of the constitutional institutions. With the issuance of the results of the first round of the elections, it was natural for the military council to feel that a parliament led by the Muslim Brotherhood - which secured wide popular legitimacy for its representation - will constitute a definite challenge for the authority and prerogatives granted to its generals as soon as they stood alongside the revolution and forced the head of the regime to step down early. Ever since the popular referendum over the constitutional declaration in March, going through the crises that affected the relations between the armed forces and the youth on Tahrir Square, the MB acted based on the fact that all these developments were mere details and that the elections will constitute the turning point. The main concern was to overcome the transitional phase in a peaceful way, in order to reach the parliament dome with a majority secured by the people and allow it to have the last say at the level of the decision-making process. The MB leaders thus established a truce with the military council for a long time, indulged it and defended it in more than one standoff with Tahrir Square, to the point of being accused by the youth on the square of having made a deal with it at the expense of the revolution. They did so although they felt – just like the majority of the forces and parties – that the council did not conceal its wish to maintain wide powers surpassing the constitutional parliamentary and executive institutions, as well as a financial autonomy that would distance its budget from any parliamentary debates. It also did not conceal its attempts to have the last say at the level of any law related to the military institution. Hence, the advisory council is another chapter in the great battle over the constitution. The military council tilted in the direction of the wind and turned the page of the supra-constitutional principles document. But this was only the beginning, as it turned out to be merely postponing the battle and will grow more determined to resume it with the imminent end of the elections and parliament's launching of the discussions to select the 100-member committee that will draw up a new constitutional for the country. This will be a fateful and critical challenge facing the military institution's position and influence, and will constitute a referendum over its role in running the country's political, economic, military and security affairs for over half a century. Its sensitivity will escalate with the dawning of the presidential elections in June, considering that the military ought to return to their caserns after surrendering power to civilians. Consequently, the military council's rush to establish an advisory council to help it manage the country's affairs during the transitional phase did not come in response to the youth who stayed on the squares to demand the return of the armed forces to the caserns and the formation of a government of civilians to complete the stage. This step was a clear response to the outcome of the first round of the elections, or rather an attempt to preempt the expected final results of these polls, if not to reject them. This is what one of the members of the military council meant when he said that “the next parliament is unrepresentative of the people!” So, in light of this situation, would it come as a surprise to see some oppositionists perceive this step as being a measure similar to the ones adopted by the deposed regime against its opponents? The MB responded through a campaign launched by Mahmoud Ghazlan, the group's spokesman, who accused the military council of trying to impose its tutelage over the people. There may be numerous remarks over the elections, namely the fact that they did not rise up to the level of the experiences of old democracies, that financial capabilities were made available to Islamic powers which used religious slogans in the competition - thus eliminating any parity between these powers and the liberals, leftists and nationalists among others - and that groups were led to the ballot boxes without knowing in whose favor they were voting. Still, the first round somewhat determined the real size of the competing parties, and it was proven that the Islamists are widely present in society. This raised the fears of the forces of modernity and liberalism among other factions, and prompted reservations by the military. And the question is: Why did the military wait all those months before launching a battle that had been warned against by the liberals, some of whom called for the postponement of the elections to allow the new youth forces to organize their ranks and secure a minimum level of equal opportunities with the traditional parties? It was clear since the March referendum that the MB crowds were the most supportive and organized and enjoyed the most capabilities. This was confirmed by the elections during the first round. Before wagering on the outcome of this chapter in the conflict, some are asking: Can the members of the advisory council truly impact the decisions and political steps of the military council? They know that the battle is over the army's role in drawing up the outline of the upcoming regime, regardless of the winner in the elections. So, will some of them for example accept the task of ensuring a role for this army or turn into a false witness – so as not to say a mere tool – in the face of the armed forces' opponents? Can the clash erupt? The MB spokesman assured that they had no intention of clashing with the army, while being aware of the difficulty of achieving victory over the military institution. Indeed, this is not a mere group of men such as the one toppled by the January 25 revolution. The army is a key component of the modern Egyptian state, from the days of Mohammed Ali until now. It is one of the pillars of Egyptian economy, as hundreds of thousands work in projects, factories and farms managed by military commanders. Only yesterday – by coincidence! – the army lent the government a billion dollars! Moreover, since the beginning of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood's seniors were very careful when dealing with the military institution at whose hands they suffered throughout half a century, unlike their more enthusiastic and less experienced youth. But if the MB leaders do not wish to clash with the military, could the latter retreat as they have done before in battles over the articles governing the constitution, the change in Sharaf's government, the replacement of this government and the standards to select the members of the committee which will be assigned to draw up the new constitution? Or will the military try to monopolize the MB and lead them toward confrontation while using some of their opponents against them? Could they wage two battles on two fronts at the same time? Al-Ganzouri, whose government is still being rejected by the youth who are proceeding with their sit-in on the square, reminded them that the state could disperse their sit-in but did not want to! As for his interior minister, he keeps threatening to activate the Emergency Law! But what if all the powers that toppled Mubarak were to return to the squares with their million-man protests? Will the battle remain limited between the military and a partisan faction? Will the ruling council be allowed to reproduce the old regime with new faces? The revolutionary forces know that their divisions and disputes over the identity of the state, i.e. whether it should be a civil or a religious one, and over the constitution and whether it should be drawn up before or after the elections, allowed the military council to share power with them, and even try to monopolize it, either by humoring the MB or by attempting to please the liberal, nationalist or leftist powers. And when the youth launched their second revolution prior the elections, the council did not hesitate to fight with them over Tahrir Square. Consequently, the Interior Ministry forces did not settle for replicating the oppression they carried out during the days of the deposed regime, and even established an arena opposed to Tahrir Square to root in favor of the military! In light of this turmoil, good intentions are not enough to distance the ghost of conflict. And while the balance of powers is forcing all the sides to show insightfulness before taking any risks, what may be required is the revision of the events witnessed throughout the past months, with all their mistakes and wagers. More importantly, the Egyptians must recognize certain facts that cannot be disregarded. They must recognize the role of the military in the success of the revolution and the institution's historical role in the system of governance. They must also acknowledge the influence of the Islamic parties and the expansion of their popularity regardless of the explanations and the reasons - most of which are far from the truth - considering that the elections are an accomplishment for the Egyptian people apart from the results. For its part, the majority, regardless of its allegiance, must recognize that the constitution is one thing and governance is another. The constitution is a consensual document that should take into account all the components of society. Hence, no one can carry out monopolization at the level of drawing up the new regime, its constitution and the identity of the country, which is why the advisory council - as well as any faction no matter how small it is - is entitled to have its say and present the recommendations it believes would serve the constitution. The shortest way toward a new tyranny, and toward anarchy and clashes in Egypt, would be to maneuver around the outcome of the elections or to see the majority disregard the necessity of reaching concord and balance at the level of the fateful issues.
