The selective implementation of the Taif Agreement in Lebanon led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and the ensuing major political crisis, tensions, and conflicts that included the assassination of other personalities and the recourse to the use of arms. Then the Doha agreement came to put an end to this crisis, and helped elect a new consensual president, and a government of national unity, in the hope that the new situation would pave the way for finalizing the implementation of the Taif Agreement, and strengthening the formula of political and sectarian coexistence. Both agreements received an Arab and international cover, and special sponsorship by Saudi Arabia and Syria. The cover and sponsorship were then renewed through the tripartite summit in Beirut and the visit by the Emir of Qatar to Lebanon, and before that, during the talks of King Abdullah in Sharm el-Sheikh and Damascus. It seems that renewing this cover has become crucial, when it loomed over the horizon that there is a possibility of returning to tension and internal strife. Herein lies the crux of the matter in the current Lebanese equation. One of the key provisions in the Doha agreement is to refrain from resorting to force to resolve internal differences. Today, with the tripartite summit's renewed commitment to civil peace and the protection of stability, the question arises again regarding the selective implementation of the Doha agreement. Despite the fact that the latter was signed for a provisional period, it has become a part of the equation for internal settlement. The threat that necessitated the visit of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and President Assad together to Beirut is a result of the selective implementation of the Doha agreement. Prior to the agreement, one of the parties to the conflict failed to abide by its provisions relating to political appeasement, and those that call for refraining from the threat or the use of arms. Superficially, it seems that the escalation is linked to the indictment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and the preemptive attack launched by Hezbollah against the STL, on the basis of the suspicion that it will accuse members of the party. However, a more profound examination shows that this escalation means that the state's management of the country's affairs, including the issue of the STL, must be based on the party's stances. Any contradiction with this will turn into a conspiracy against the resistance, and whoever fails to support the party in its disputes against the others becomes an adverse party, if not a collaborator with Israel. This is not to mention assuming a series of powers and jurisdictions that are exclusive to the state and forcing recognition of this. As a result, the scope of the state's responsibilities and official instruments have shrunk, while the party's seized ones have expanded. This ongoing process, which is violating the Taif and Doha agreements in that they are both solutions for an internal crisis and a way to manage stability, entails the threat of ‘demonizing' components within the country. This strikes is going deep into the roots of Lebanese political and sectarian pluralism, leading to only one political color ultimately prevailing. In the tripartite summit, all sides achieved what each saw as its goal, even if the final declaration focused on stability and civil peace as common concerns. However, the problem does not lie in the general Arab and international convictions regarding the need to rescue Lebanon from slipping back into violence. Instead, the problem is the insistence of the strongest faction on the ground, i.e. Hezbollah, on using all means possible when it feels it is under threat, and on the belief that revealing the perpetrators of political crimes in Lebanon, through the STL, is necessarily a conspiracy against the party. Based on what has been leaked to the Lebanese press regarding the Syrian-Saudi talks in Damascus, and the bilateral and trilateral talks in Beirut, Hezbollah did not provide any guarantees or answers regarding the extent of its commitment to all the provisions of the Doha agreement, and subsequently, the selective implementation of the latter remains a possibility. Yesterday, a tour of the southern Lebanese towns was arranged for the Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani who was accompanied by senior officials in the Lebanese state, in such a manner that everyone appeared to be the guests of Hezbollah in that region.
