New York-The Lebanese opposition led by Hezbollah may have committed a major strategic mistake when it decided to escalate against Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and to bring down his government, in order to punish him for not submitting to its demand to reject the indictment expected to be issued very soon by the UN's Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Indeed, it has brought down the government in an effort to bring down the STL, but what it has done has led it to become internationally besieged by an absolute defense of the STL. The opposition purposely brought down the Hariri government in order to strike a blow both against him and against US President Barack Obama. Indeed, the timing shortly preceded their meeting at the White House last Wednesday, which led to upsetting Obama and awakening him to the necessity of deeply examining the consequences of his truce-based policy with both Syria and Iran, and its repercussions on Lebanon. In fact, the timing seemed as if adding insult to injury, because the Obama Administration was preparing to send its ambassador Robert Ford to Damascus, when the latter responded by embarrassing Obama. Nevertheless, Ford is now headed to Damascus carrying stern demands conveyed by the new ambassador from his President to President Bashar Al-Assad. Such demands most prominent include: first, clinging to the STL and the necessity of putting a stop to attempts to annul it or to reject its decisions; and second, the necessity for Syria to stop smuggling weapons to Hezbollah in violation of UN resolutions; in addition to the issue of nuclear cooperation between Syria, Iran and North Korea. Finally, perhaps one outcome of the strategic mistakes that have been committed is the fact that Syria and Hezbollah are forgoing an agreement in which Saad Hariri had announced his willingness to take measures that would distance his government from implementing the indictment, which Hezbollah circles claim will direct accusations of having carried out the assassination of Rafic Hariri against members of the party. Today, after diplomatic efforts have moved from a Saudi-Syrian framework to a Saudi-French-American framework, with perhaps the participation of Egypt or other influential countries, it has become necessary for all parties concerned to think of the backgrounds and the causes of mistaken decisions, because such a strategic mistake has been committed for other reasons, reasons that are of the utmost importance and priority. It has also become necessary to draft what is known as a “Plan B” for those concerned from among the sponsors of agreements in the government and in the opposition. Indeed, Syria and Hezbollah are clear in their insistence on undermining the credibility of the STL and preventing Lebanon from implementing its decisions. Similarly, they are both, along with Iran, extremely clear in their insistence on clinging to Hezbollah and its weapons, and refusing to have them placed on the National Dialogue Table as per the text of the Doha Agreement. Some believe that the strategy adopted by Syria and the Lebanese opposition is a smart one. Indeed, according to those who hold such an opinion, it preempts the indictments that will be issued by the STL by branding it an “Israeli and American” tribunal, with the aim of delegitimizing it and of convincing public opinion that it represents “a conspiracy against the resistance”. However, according to others, behaving with such an extent of panic exposes a fear that must have its reasons, both for Hezbollah and Syria. Indeed, Syria has resorted to warning of instability in Lebanon if justice takes its course at the STL, and Hezbollah has resorted to threatening with its weapons and with the street if indictments are issued against individuals or members affiliated with the party. Saad Hariri's mistake was that he trusted that both Syria and Hezbollah would be content with his willingness – he being the victim's son – to deprive the STL's decisions of the means of implementation and prevent cooperation with it on the part of the Lebanese government, but after the indictment is issued, because he has neither a part to play in it nor any power over it. Indeed, it became clear to him – after having offered what had been asked of or imposed on him in terms of concessions, when he politically cleared Syria in advance in his interview to Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, saying that false witnesses had misled him – later on that this had been the first of a series of steps to make him submit. He had assumed that, for his part, he was offering the utmost before the indictment and after it, and that this was what was required by “the other side” for cooperation to ensure the country's stability and prevent civil strife between Sunnis and Shiites. But he discovered that the strategy of “the other side” had from the beginning relied on charging him with the task of firing the finishing bullet against the STL before it issues any indictment. Then after using him and dwarfing him, it would have become an evident matter to get rid of him and remove him from office. This is why well informed sources close to Hariri have said “they want to complete the assassination of Rafic Hariri”; and they want “to commit the murder and be forgiven all at once while offering nothing on their part”… What they want is to drive Saad Hariri out of office after he gives them everything, starting with politically clearing them of his father's murder, up to announcing measures to stop Lebanese funding of the STL and withdrawing the Lebanese judges from it, or refusing to cooperate with it and delegitimizing it before – not after – it issues the indictment. This picture became clear when Michel Aoun announced the demise of the “Saudi-Syrian Settlement”, after Damascus informed the Lebanese opposition of what it had heard from Saudi Arabia, signifying that Saad Hariri could not meet their demands “before” not “after” the STL's indictment. That was the day Hariri headed to Washington to meet with Obama, after having met in New York with each of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and before that with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The US stance on the STL has not changed since the US Administration finally realized the repercussions of its lack of concern for the issue, yet this week's developments have brought US concern to a new level, starting with Hillary Clinton and ending up with Barack Obama. Indeed, the White House stressed the importance of the STL's work for ending the era of impunity, and issued a statement asserting the following points: the resolve to achieve both stability and justice in Lebanon during the period of government change; stressing the necessity of all parties refraining from threatening with force or making use of force which would spark instability; clinging to Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and rejecting foreign interference in its affairs, while stressing the continuing long-term partnership between the United States and Lebanon; asserting the implementation of all Security Council resolutions concerned; announcing “united efforts” with France, Saudi Arabia and key international and regional parties, in order to “maintain calm in Lebanon and ensure that the work of the Tribunal continues unimpeded by third parties”. What the US Administration has also made clear is that Lebanon's sovereignty, stability and security are not subject to negotiations, and that there is no way for any deal to stop the STL from carrying out its mandate, because it has been charged with such a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter bound to Security Council resolutions. The US Administration has made it clear that it was not against the efforts exerted by the Saudis with the Syrians in order to build a positive relationship between Syria and Lebanon, based on mutual respect and on not interfering in each other's internal affairs. It also asserted that any efforts for settlement in Lebanon must include the participation of Lebanon's leaders. What the Barack Obama Administration should make sure of is for the level of US concern for the Lebanese issue not to decrease, as it is dangerous at this juncture. Indeed, this is not a phase of reckless adventures, but rather one of demanding that all those concerned respect Lebanese sovereignty and refrain from violating it in any way, shape or form. The Obama Administration should also seriously think of a “Plan B” in case its attempts with Syria were to fail to rein in escalation and stop the threats of bringing down stability if the STL is not brought down. Indeed, the Obama Administration holds numerous means of influence with Syria. It hastily and prematurely used the card of returning the US Ambassador to Damascus, thereby granting the latter one of its main demands. Nevertheless, today the Obama Administration must make use of the presence of the US Ambassador to convey a clear message regarding Lebanon, one that would put a stop to dreams and predictions of returning Syrian influence to it from the gateway of security, after Syria and Hezbollah succeed in doing away with its stability. Of course, Barack Obama must not leave sponsorship and management of these renewed efforts to his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy, who has set himself up in defense of Damascus, after having played the most major part in lifting isolation from Syria prematurely and for nothing in return. Indeed, he headed to his meeting with Obama to convince him of the necessity “to make US engagement with Syria greater in order to encourage it to take additional positive steps” in Lebanon, as well as to convince him to lift the ban on selling airplanes to Syria, as French sources told Al-Hayat. Indeed, Lebanon's fate must not be placed in the hands of Nicolas Sarkozy or of any other head of state alone. It is a matter of common responsibility because it is the victim of common interference of one kind or another, excess confidence or risk-taking. And whether the settlement falls or the government falls, everyone knows that bringing down the STL is not an option. If only General Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare would stop tinkering with people's nerves, and clearly state when he will present the indictment. Indeed, this is a strenuous phase for Lebanon, one that should not be tinkered with, because this might really bring down stability. It is a phase of reexamining what is in whose interest at this juncture, and what the “Plan B” is in case of surprises arising. All are mobilized, and yet the danger of a security breakdown does not seem imminent so far.
