The latest Syrian stances on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) deserve a closer look. The gist of what the Syrian leadership has announced, through back channels, is almost no different from the stances leaked to the public. The bottom line of these stances as reported by the newspaper Al-Safir, is that first, President Bashar al-Assad has told the Saudi side during the negotiations over the framework of a settlement in Lebanon the following: If you want Lebanon to remain strong, the indictment must be rejected and we must work together on preventing it from being issued. And second, al-Assad considered success in countering the indictment and the STL's implications for the situation in Lebanon, an achievement akin – in both significance and principle – to defeating the May 17 Agreement, which was signed between Lebanon and Israel in 1983 under former President Amin Gemayel, and which Damascus succeeded in reversing. Third, the Saudi-Syrian endeavor has almost reached a final settlement, but an announcement was delayed because King Abdullah fell ill and had to travel to New York for treatment. As per this settlement, Saad Hariri – the man entrusted with the legacy of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, whose assassination six years ago led to the creation of the STL to prosecute those involved – must agree to reject any indictment by the STL and to work on preventing it from being issued. Otherwise, Hariri will be placed in the same slot as collaborators, because the war on the STL's indictment is akin to a war on collaboration with Israel, as Damascus implicitly stated through its recent stances. And this is something that is new and indeed dangerous. It is a dangerous precedent because likening the STL to the 17 May Agreement is aimed at accusing anyone supporting the STL and justice of collaborating with the enemy and with Israel. Such a position has already been affirmed by Hezbollah, which declared anyone defending or cooperating with the STL (that was established by the UN Security Council after a request by the Lebanese government at the time) to be a traitor. Hezbollah has stamped the STL with the word ‘Israel', based on the assumption that the STL will indict members of Hezbollah. But this was aimed at promoting the claim that the goal of the STL is to eliminate the ‘resistance'. Nevertheless, this was the position of an armed faction not a state, until Syria adopted the new position. Damascus has not involved itself in a direct war against the STL like Hezbollah did, or like the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei did when he said two weeks earlier that any decision issued by the STL is considered by him to be null and void. The Syrian leadership has avoided stating such a statement directly, since this would pose some dangers to it as well. For this reason, it chose to leak the statement to this effect without stamping it with the name of any particular Syrian officials. However, this does not invalidate the seriousness of Syria's new stance and its deeper implications; the message is clear and its primary connotation involves Saad Hariri personally. After luring him – or perhaps after he allowed himself to be lured – through his famous statement to Al-Sharq Al-Awsat when he spoke about the false witnesses and exonerated Syria politically from the assassination of his father, he became in the point of view of the dominant policy in Damascus that ‘gift' which cannot stop giving. For this reason, Hariri is being asked to cave in further and implement specific measures specified for him by Damascus in coordination with Hezbollah and Tehran, in a game where roles are shuffled. First of all, he must also exonerate Hezbollah from any possible involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 of his companions. In practical terms, this means abolishing the STL at the hands of the victim's son and terminating the Lebanese state at the international level. This would be like hitting two birds with one stone, bearing in mind that the formula being proposed today is ‘the government in return for the STL' in the course of the so-called ‘settlement' proposed by Syria and Hezbollah. It is said that what is happening among Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, is an understanding over the major matters, while each of the three players are granted space to maneuver. But there are those who believe that such a view is grossly exaggerated, and that each of the two interlinked players – the Islamic Republic in Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon – coordinates and plays its cards with its eyes on Damascus. Syria remains an Arab country, and may fall under Arab pressure or temptations that do not suit Iran and its ally Hezbollah, and for this reason, Syria is always under scrutiny. The other equally important consideration is Syrian-American ties which Damascus wants to be strong, and which are given priority by Syria. Damascus's interpretation of the stances of Barack Obama's administration toward both Iran and Lebanon has made it conclude that the window is wide open in front of Damascus to play its cards with a new sense of dynamism in its relations with and through Lebanon, with major players such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Syrian talks regarding the Lebanese issue continue, while uncertainty surrounds their contents and the elements of a “settlement” which is supposed to have approached maturation. One source says that the goal of these talks is to reach an agreement for a new Lebanon, where solutions are not temporary or transient, and where stability is guaranteed. But this source also holds that Syria is stalling and buying time, while adopting the principle of ‘take and then demand more', and thus will give nothing to the Saudi side, whether in terms of the STL or the government. In other words, Syria is seeking to thwart both the STL and the government at the same time. Nothing that Saad Hairi will give will work, because the ‘rewards' given to him in return will be temporary and transient, while the issue of stability remains in the hands of Syria, Hezbollah and Iran, and Hariri their hostage. Where does talk of an impending Saudi-Syrian deal and settlement come from, then? And where does this optimism regarding a Saudi-Syrian deal that goes beyond temporary remedies and that guarantees stability in Lebanon come from too? Perhaps the promotion of the Saudi-Syrian deal and pretending that there are avenues open to agreement is an invention by both Syria and Hezbollah to convince people that the STL is over and that Saad Hariri will implement what the Saudi side will dictate to him. Perhaps Damascus is benefiting on many fronts from excessively raising expectations out of the Saudi-Syrian settlement, especially that the Saudi side is not challenging this. What matters should the Saudi-Syrian talks over the Lebanese issue succeed, is for the result not to be mere fleeting promises or a provisional government. It is imperative that Saad Hariri request guarantees to boost the government and its survival, and to request this in utmost clarity and transparency, while ensuring accountability in case any party backtracks from the fundamentals of the desired settlement. Promises are insufficient, and Saad Hariri must reconsider who needs what, at this juncture, starting with Lebanon and the future of the state, to him personally and Hezbollah, Iran and Syria after its last messages are clarified. Damascus is aware that it is impossible to abolish the STL unless a resolution by the Security Council is issued to this effect. Thus, Damascus knows that the maximum it can achieve is to distance Lebanon from the STL through measures that it wants Saad Hariri to take, such as suspending the funding of the STL, withdrawing judges and withholding judicial cooperation with the tribunal. But even if this happens, the STL will remain a sword that is drawn against various belligerents, and Damascus knows this. So what does Damascus really want, and from whom does it want it, given the fact that Damascus is known for its political acumen? Syria is acting in the utmost confidence and triumphalism. However, there is something disturbing and worrying Syria. It is important to understand it so that one may be able to negotiate with Syria instead of taking its orders. Damascus will not stop taking new stances in order to pressure its neighbor and accuse it of collaborating with Israel, if it dares uphold justice and the tribunal. It will not stop because its interpretation of the international scene, particularly in terms of U.S. stances, leads it to conclude that the present situation enables it to become more stringent. The Obama administration appears to Damascus and many others as though it is unconcerned with Syria first, Iran first or Lebanon first. Since the staple element of America's relations with Tehran and Damascus is ‘calm', these two capitals interpret this as an invitation to conclude a settlement that suits them in return for temporary stability in Lebanon. Both retaliate because they fear no retribution from the Obama administration. However, Damascus is keener on its relations with Washington than Tehran is, and this might explain its diverse stances. Hence, Washington must better clarify its positions with Damascus. Channels of communications are always open between Washington and Damascus. It is about time for the U.S. President to consider with his team scenarios for Lebanon in 2011, instead of leaving this issue aside, save for some statements made in passing here and there in the State Department. The Lebanese in their majority want calm and a settlement, and do not want a war waged on their land by proxy and at their expense. However, what their majority do not want either is for deals to be concluded today that take Lebanon to the somberness of yesterday, where political assassinations, bullying, violating the law and tyranny took place because impunity was always guaranteed, in each case.
