The Tripartite Saudi-Lebanese-Syrian Summit that convened in Beirut on Friday has considerable symbolism at the strategic level, in terms of the wide-scale Arab movement that is being witnessed by the region. This movement includes the visit by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to Beirut, amid the convening of this summit. One strategic dimension of the tripartite summit is that the leading patrons of the 1989 Taif Accord, Saudi Arabia and Syria, are cementing this agreement through their sponsorship of the situation in Lebanon, via this summit. The Taif Accord cemented domestic balances of power, in very precise terms, which have been shaken at times, and subject to non-implementation at others. These domestic political arrangements have also been subject to doubts at other times, as a result of the huge political crisis that shook Lebanon since 2004, prompting some groups to advocate an amendment to this formula. Perhaps this will aid the search for solutions to this crisis. However, none of these parties has put forward the demand in clear fashion, since such a move is not possible. The Doha Accord brought the political crisis, which became a military confrontation in May 2008, down from its apex to the level of dialogue among groups, using Taif as a reference for domestic political equilibrium. Whether or not the Summit deals with the issue of cementing Taif, the presence of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar Assad together, on Lebanese territory, amid a new political crisis, reminds us of this issue, by merely highlighting several incidents that preceded the summit. Syria has given Taif back its credit, through its new relationship with the Lebanese prime minister and its role in the country's political make-up and domestic balances of power, after years of ruptured relations between Damascus and this Lebanese constitutional position. Saudi Arabia has sponsored and encouraged a resumption of privileged relations between Lebanon and Syria, as a chief item in the Taif Accord, following years of cold relations and sharp rivalry between the two countries. This process has seen progress, when earlier bilateral agreements were consolidated, and new ones signed, during Prime Minister Saad Hariri's most recent visit to Damascus. There are many indications of the degree Saudi-Syrian insistence on the Taif Accord. One of the most obvious is the rapprochement between Riyadh and Damascus, which had Lebanese stability as one of its key planks. The Taif Accord is the document underpinning this stability, representing a “cure” for any domestic imbalance of power in Lebanon, since such a development will threaten this stability. However, the consolidation of Taif puts forward for its sponsors, and the Lebanese, who shoulder the utmost level of responsibility, serious challenges, which are related to completing the implementation of this agreement. A delay in implementing a number of its provisions was a factor in destabilization. The challenges here are medium- and long-term in nature, as Saudi-Syrian sponsorship remains an ongoing need. Riyadh and Damascus retained ties with an “allied” party or specific groups during the period of crisis in the two countries' relations, particularly in Lebanon. A new sponsorship for the process of consolidating Taif and re-launching a dynamic engagement requires each side to author a new model of relations with domestic parties. This in turn requires an expansion of the scope of these relations, as well as each side's allies accommodating themselves to the requirements of the new phase. However, Lebanese and their leaders are worried, as this tripartite summit convenes, more by the new crisis that has arisen against the backdrop of Hezbollah's campaign against the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the possibility that an indictment will accuse members of Hezbollah of being involved in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, than by their questions that are imposed by Saudi Arabia's consolidation of Taif. Their quest for answers about whether this crisis situation will lead to new domestic strife puts the question of whether the tripartite summit will re-task Syria, in a new form, with responsibility for the situation in Lebanon, but without a military presence this time, in a secondary position. The insistence by the Lebanese for reassurance about the possibility of avoiding an Israeli war is diverting them from asking about the position of Iran, whose president delayed his visit to Lebanon until after the Eid al-Fitr holiday, being secure in the belief that his country will be able to play a role that remains distant from the settlements that are being arranged at present. Some groups hope for nothing more than a consolidation of the Doha Accord, as a type of truce that provides a way out from the current crisis, related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Here, the role of Qatar joins that of Saudi Arabia and Syria. No one has clear, practical answers about what the summit can generate, with regard to Hezbollah's worries, and even the party itself has yet to offer a clear answer, in the form of something practical that can be implemented on the ground, with regard to the Special Tribunal.
