There is growing optimism about the improvement in inter-Arab relations, as a result of the initiative by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to participate in the opening of King Abdullah University in Jeddah last week, and his meeting with the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz. However, this optimism, which has arisen after the meeting of the two leaders, remains cautious, since there is little information that has been leaked about what happened during this meeting, and because of the negative memories of previous experiences, when many wagered on the Arab situation improving from the deterioration of the last four years to a minimum level of understanding and a reduction of the disputes in play. In fact, advancing inter-Arab relations to a new level requires considerable efforts. These are not limited to a meeting here and there, despite the importance of such meetings – this is a result of the breakthrough achieved by the Saudi monarch in his initiative to conduct a reconciliation and end Arab disputes at the end of 2008, during the Arab Summit in Kuwait; this was followed up during several meetings that took place during the quartet summit in Riyadh, and the ordinary Arab Summit in Doha in March. Around nine months after this initiative, it became clear that progress would require these considerable efforts, to clear up the atmosphere of inter-Arab relations. In the first place, these efforts are designed to see Arabs take responsibility for Arab issues, instead of seeing them on the negotiating table between the Americans and the Iranians, or bargaining chips in the hand of Iran in its confrontations with the west. It appears that eliminating these suspicions, which might achieve the goal of improving these relations, will not take place unless these inter-Arab ties experience a regaining of confidence. One of the most important indicators of the success of such a policy would be a return to the Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian coordination that governed the relations of Damascus with Riyadh and Cairo, and the Arab consensus, for decades, during the days of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Returning to this tripartite consensus of the previous era would be a jumping-off point for a different kind of inter-Arab dealing with the region's crises, and more importantly, vis-à-vis Israeli intransigence on the issue of the foundations of returning to peace negotiations over the Palestinian issue. The return of this tripartite coordination represents a need for Syria, one that was stymied by its strategic alliance with Iran in recent years, since Tehran has followed policies that contradict the security and national interests of the two other states in the tripartite alliance (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Syria has followed Iranian policies with no reservations and Damascus has resorted, as Iranian influence in the region has grown, along with its commitments to Iran, to achieving balance in its regional relations through its ties with the Turks, who have returned to playing the role that is needed by the western Europe and the Americans, in order to stave off the ramifications of its link to Iranian policies, due to the stance of the west vis-à-vis Turkey, on the one hand, and on the other, to reduce the impact of the Iranian influence on its role. The Turkish role works to limit Iranian momentum in the Arab and Islamic arenas, while there is also Ankara's ambition to make the west understand that the country represents an element of stability, extending from Europe to East Asia, through the Middle East. This regional situation is sufficient to indicate the extent to which contradictions have moved certain states in the direction of alliances and policies that require certain commitments that cannot easily be set aside. However, at the same time, this regional situation appears to presage some fundamental changes in some of its constituent elements. The region is now at a juncture, with the renewed launch of western-Iranian negotiations; if things move toward a settlement with Iran, then this settlement will be constructed at a time in which Syria has yet to exit its poor ties with the west, due to its slant toward Iran. If Iran moves toward confrontation, there will be ramifications and responsibilities for Damascus and all Arab states; logically, these consequences will be anticipated. In either case, Syria's interest dictates that it return to securing Arab political cover for its regional position and its interests. It also requires Egypt and Saudi Arabia to try to secure a formula that allows Arab states to absorb the consequences of any settlement, or any confrontation. It is a decisive moment, after a series of disappointing experiences. Will it be the beginning of successful experiences, in Lebanon and Palestine, where the outward indications point to success in benefiting from this very complex regional moment, in order to see a return to tripartite coordination?
