There is no argument about saying that the decline in tension on the Lebanese scene is due to the atmosphere of rapprochement and openness, whether inter-Arab or regional-international, based on, until further notice, a policy of engaging in dialogue with Iran and Syria by the Barack Obama administration. There is also the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, which the Saudi side wants to use as a launching-point for encouraging Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation, as the Egyptians await practical moves by the Syrians that help unify Palestinian ranks, so that this reconciliation can take place. Without this atmosphere, it would not be possible for the prime minister of the new Lebanese Cabinet, the leader of the Future Movement, MP Saad al-Hariri, to visit Damascus after the formation of the government, as a sign of separating the issue of Lebanese-Syrian relations from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is investigating the assassination of al-Hariri's father, Rafiq al-Hariri, the former prime minister. Moreover, perhaps it would not have been certain that the younger al-Hariri would take on the responsibility of becoming prime minister in Lebanon. Perhaps it would not have been possible for MP Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, to take stances vis-à-vis Syria that had earlier reached the height of hostility, and closer to a point of no return. It would not have been possible for opposition figures, like Speaker Nabih Berri, to take the initiative of “shuffling the deck” between the majority and the opposition… And this does not refute the idea that there is a domestic dynamics that requires a change in political discourse, which is the decisive factor that is formed by the external political climate – despite the appropriateness of talking about this domestic dynamics. If not for last month's parliamentary election results, which saw the 14 March coalition victorious, the external climate itself would not have taken this accelerating direction, at the least vis-à-vis contacts between Saudi Arabia and Syria. The American and European openness to Syria would have moved much more slowly. If it were not for this election result, the secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, would not have felt the need to meet quickly with al-Hariri, and then also with Jumblatt. If it were not for the fears of growing Sunni-Shiite tension and strife (which regional powers, especially Saudi Arabia, are trying to extinguish), al-Hariri would not have arrived at a policy of trying to build bridges and being patient in forming a government of national unity. Walid Jumblatt, fearful of the rising Shiite-Druze sensitivities, would not have called for bringing together Future, Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and his PSP to clear the air on the Muslims' side, and expressed his longing for visiting Damascus, etc. However, this domestic political activity, which is prompting local leaders to take such initiatives, is also influenced by external factors. But even when these leaders take such domestic initiatives, the reason is their wager that the external climate will help implement such policies. If local leaders are able to adapt to this climate quickly, they might outstrip the transformations that are sometimes under way in the regional political equation, as in the case of Jumblatt, who precedes such changes and is blamed for going too far and too quickly. Other groups, especially the opposition, are late to take such steps and require a considerable amount of time to accommodate themselves to the changes. The inter-Arab reconciliation cancels out the idea of veto power within the Cabinet (for the opposition) since it is a formula that arose after the Saudi-Syrian dispute reached an unprecedented level. Damascus needed it, after withdrawing from Lebanon and seeing its “veto power” within Lebanon's political system and legislature reduced, as it confronted an Arab policy (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) that totally contradicted its own policy in Lebanon. With the reconciliation taking place, the one-third-plus-one vote in the Cabinet, i.e. the veto, loses the regional function for which it was created. With the American opening to Syria, Washington's reining in an Israeli war against Iran, and the Obama administration's policy of using negotiations and economic pressure (in the worst case scenario) with Iran, Hezbollah's combat function is also abolished, and becomes instead a defensive function, in the best case scenario. Hezbollah will require a different positioning in its relationship with local rivals. It will no longer need to exercise power via the arms it possesses, as an added strength that goes beyond its local political clout in the Lebanese political-sectarian equation. It will insist on its share of the government and in meeting the openness of the majority and in having good ties with the president of the Republic, Michel Suleiman. Perhaps Speaker Berri's statement at the beginning of the week that Lebanon's peace, unity and stability are the country's best faces of war with Israel,” is the most eloquent expression of the substitution of a political role for the combat function. There are many elements of accommodation with the external political climate by local players. One of the most important is the role of the president in Lebanon. If there is an external consensus on anything, before the inter-Arab reconciliation goes further, it is the central role of the president in recovering the role of the Lebanese political authorities. This is something that should be firmly cemented, as reconciliation develops.
