Lebanon's political players, and those outside the country who are immersed in the details of Lebanon's domestic situation, require a set period of time to facilitate Lebanon's transition to a new political phase. This new period will be based on an adaptation to the emerging regional situation, which could see reconciliations and deals to end disputes, and the logic of benefiting from the opportunities that are available. This has been stressed by the prime minister-designate, Saad al-Hariri, although the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, said that these opportunities might not last for long. Everyone acknowledges that this is a preset period of time and that this is an elastic phase that will be needed to form a new Lebanese Cabinet, even if it takes place under the slogan of the “Lebanonization” of the government formation process, and allows the Lebanese people to author their own settlements to their dispute over this complex political process. This process is subject to the ramifications of sharp disputes that the Lebanese have experienced in recent years, which reached their bloody apex during the civil strife of 7 May 2008, along with an advanced stage of sectarian sensitivity and contradictions. Regionally, if the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation is the new decisive element in the Arab and regional situation, these two regional powers have made considerable progress in accommodating themselves to the new regional situation, from the Obama administration's openness to Syria and Iran, to Israel's hard-line stance on the idea of a regional peace settlement, which requires that Riyadh and Damascus have a minimum degree of accord in order to confront Israeli intransigence vis-à-vis this scenario. However, what Damascus requires in order to accommodate itself to the emerging situation is to acknowledge that it can no longer return to its influential political role in Lebanon, although its reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and western openness to Syria are not in contradiction with taking its security interests and Lebanon's foreign policy into account. It appears that Syrian officials require a bit of time to abandon their aspiration to recover their direct influence in Lebanon, whether through Hezbollah, which exercised this influence on the behalf of Damascus after its exit from Lebanon, or through the influence that Syria wields via other tools, which were suited to the period of sharp conflict that took place in the last four years. Western and Arab openness to Syria is the price of Damascus' cooperation on various regional issues, such as Iraq, Palestine, Iran, and security cooperation to confront terror (which has taken advanced forms in recent weeks, during the successive meetings of international and regional intelligence agencies, in which Syria and Turkey have taken part). This cooperation also extends to the period of cooling-off and security stability in Lebanon. Through these acts, Syria benefits from its regional role and in the peace process, and gains support for its economy and stability. However, this does not mean that its aspirations to return to managing Lebanon's domestic affairs have been acknowledged. Arab and western countries would have been ready to discuss this as a de facto situation, had the allies of Damascus been victorious in the recent parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Syria has benefited in Lebanon, through the step-by-step policy in a climate of inter-Arab reconciliation and general openness to the region. We have seen this as the 14 March coalition began to change its tone toward Damascus, beginning in the pre-election period, and in Saad al-Hariri's readiness to visit Damascus, to discuss bilateral relations. This is considerably important for Syria's interests, not to mention de-coupling the issue of relations with Syria from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as part of the Taif Agreement's stipulations on privileged relations (between Lebanon and Syria). Another regional party that requires time to adapt to the new situation in Lebanon is Iran. If it is natural for Iran to grow anxious over any progress in a Saudi-Syrian rapprochement, at a time, in which Iran faces domestic confusion, then the source of this fear involves arrangements in Lebanon, at a time, in which Iran has taken on strategic interests, such as an offensive-defensive front that it has exploited in recent years. Tehran is determined to retain this bargaining chip, to be used when necessary, on the regional scene, whether in the course of negotiations, or a confrontation. However, Tehran and Hezbollah should get used not to consider the latter's weapons an element of strength that goes beyond the domestic scope of their influence on the Lebanese scene, in return for the acknowledgment by other Lebanese parties that the solution for the weapons issue is regional, and that it has been postponed for that reason.
