The West helped the Libyans topple Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his regime. However, it did not complete the mission, did not provide them with what they need to build an alternative regime that would distance them from anarchy, insecurity, and instability, and did not pay any attention to the massive weapons arsenal distributed in all directions. For their part, Libya's neighbors are not eluding the responsibility when complaining about the spread of these weapons in the hands of groups that have targeted Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and its Sinai, as well as Mali, where France was forced to intervene and pursue the extremists groups that have threatened the country and its neighbors south of the Great Sahara, along with Paris' economic, security, and oil interests in them. Today, no one is arguing about the fact that the lack of security in Libya is maintaining the greater problem facing the ending of the transitional phase. In addition, no one is arguing about the fact that the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zaidan for a few hours by sides which he and the Libyans know, clearly reveals – without the need for any evidence – the absence of the judiciary, which was divided by the armed groups among themselves. The situation should have stopped at this level. But the developments that have accompanied and are still accompanying change in Egypt and Tunisia, cast their shadows over the domestic situation in Libya and added new elements to its crisis. Indeed, the Islamic powers headed by the Muslim Brotherhood felt they had to move and raise the challenge in the face of the government, to avoid facing the fate of the Egyptian MB or the threat which Ennahda in Tunisia is trying to deter. And naturally, the new conflict, which was inaugurated by Zaidan's kidnapping, then the calls made by the MB-affiliated Justice and Construction Party for his replacement and that of his government, features regional factors as it is the case in Egypt. It is thus clear that some Arab sides that supported the action of the military institution led by Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sissi - following the toppling of the MB and its president from power - are supporting Libyan forces opposed to the Islamists in Libya. In addition, they are offering assistance to their opponents, at the head of which is the Zentan population, which is why the kidnapping of the prime minister for a few hours fell in the context of the campaign that grew fiercer against him following his visit to Cairo and his meeting with its new leaders. These developments do not mean that the Islamists will achieve their goals. The events rather point to the difficulty of seeing the establishment of the new state and regime based on the constitutional declaration, the temporary constitution and its amendments. The elections held mid last year clearly showed that Libya's MB came in second place, without it showing any flexibility to convince the remaining Islamic powers to participate with it on common lists, and without it accepting the recognition of its natural size. This second place even came as a surprise to many who know that after forty years under the Jamahiriya rule, the group was completely wiped out. Victory was therefore secured by the National Forces Alliance that swept the seats in all the regions. But this is just one facet of the political scene, as the other more prominent one is related to the regional and tribal conflicts threatening to lead the country back to the pre-Gaddafi era, instead of the beginning of the transitional phase and the fall of the old regime. The best proof for that are the public declarations being made by the Colonel's fiercest oppositionists, regarding the fact that the situation in Libya "might push us to reminisce about the days of the Jamahiriya"! The latter might remember today the warnings issued by Gaddafi, saying that the toppling of his regime will cause the country's division. And they undoubtedly know that the difficult situation and the complications are due to what was planted by the hands of the deposed regime, which is why the Libyan predicament cannot be compared to its counterparts in Egypt or Tunisia. Indeed, the transitional Egyptian government is working hard – in the face of the MB – to implement the roadmap ratified by the military institution, amid acute divisions and polarization and security challenges which are no longer limited to Sinai and have affected the capital and the major cities. However, the presence of the army and the security bodies whose active and influential roles were never absent from the political game, constitutes a tool and a guarantee for the containment of the conflicts. In addition, there is the role of the institutions, the religious, legal, constitutional, and unionist structures, the parties, the lively civil forces and the media outlets seen on the political scene before and after the July 23 revolution, despite the restrictions imposed by this revolution. This is what facilitated the departure of Hosni Mubarak's regime at a cost that cannot be compared to the one seen in Libya where around 30,000 died, or what is currently happening in Syria. This is also what prevented and is still preventing the Egyptians' slide towards civil war despite the escalation of the crisis. The same could be said about Tunisia, considering that although its army was absent from the political game since independence, its state institutions, deeply-rooted powers, civil society and partisan and unionist forces have been preventing the collapse of the entire entity. And this is the greatest challenge facing Ennahda movement and preventing its monopolization of political life. On the other hand, Colonel Gaddafi's regime stripped Libya – which had only been unified for two decades – of its institutions and constitutional and legal structures, thus causing it to become without a constitution, a civil society, parties and commissions. More dangerously, he established military and security institutions tailored to his family and relatives - in the total absence of an army or security forces - under the slogan of "power belongs to the people" and is practiced directly through "conferences"! Consequently, it was natural for the country to drown in anarchy after he was killed. At this level, it was not enough for the competent figures sent by Gaddafi into exile to try and gather the remains of the state and prevent the adoption of a quotas formula that would divide power and its spoils between the militias and the tribal and regional forces. Indeed, the political isolation law came to make things worse and restrict many returnees among the exiled or those who forcibly served in the Jamahiriya's administrations, under a dictatorship that left no choice to anyone. This is the law in favor of which the Islamists, the leaders of the countless militias, the tribes and parties rooted for, in the hope of moving a few steps forward and imposing their control on the next regime. The national transitional council deployed efforts, followed by the National Congress (the temporary parliament) which issued a decision to integrate the armed organizations that fought Gaddafi's regime in the state institutions. Hence, militias became part of the Libya Shield Brigade, operating underneath the cloak of the national army. But instead of integrating it, they became a parallel army funded by the state's Treasury but not taking orders from it, rather directly from their emirs. Other forces also entered the security room of the Interior Ministry and took orders from their leaders instead of the minister, not to mention the massive numbers introduced into these two apparatuses and exceeding by far the number of elements who practically fought the former regime. But the most dangerous thing about these militias is that they became responsible for the security of the capital Tripoli, while some assumed the command of cities and regions based on tribal, regional or partisan endorsement, in addition to the spread of extremist elements from the supporters of Al-Qaeda and the Combat Front. But authority was not only divided on the ground, and some of the latter groups started to directly divide the oil revenues among themselves. Hence, what the country produces is one thing, and the oil revenues it gets are a completely different thing! In parallel to the absence of an official military and security decision, the Americans' arrest of Abu Anas al-Liby, the detention of the prime minister, the ongoing security deterioration since the fall of the regime, the repeated attacks against the Western missions and the friction lines that exist between the militias, are all confirming the total absence of the judiciary. So what is left of the image and sovereignty of the central state, as its judiciary, security and oil revenues are being contested, disputed and shared, and in light of the wide-spread corruption to please this or that side? And what is left of its sovereignty and unity in light of the calls for federalism emerging from the East and the South? So far, the Libyans have failed to form the committee which will be tasked to redraft the constitution in preparation for parliamentary elections that would place the cornerstone of a new regime. As for the National Congress, whose pillars were shaken by the isolation law, it cannot elude its responsibility for the deterioration of the situation. And it is no secret that the Islamic powers in it are seeking – using their militias – to achieve what they could not secure through the ballot boxes. In light of such critical circumstances, it would be better for the Libyans to limit their conflicts to the political game and its domestic rules, far away from what is happening in Egypt and Tunisia among others. And instead of directing their spears towards the government and launching a battle to confirm the size of this or that political power, why do they not head to the temporary parliament and elect the committee which will draft a new constitution for the country, as long as everyone agreed over the distribution map of its elements? Why engage in battles that will deepen the division and the schism and threaten the country's unity, instead of rushing to exit the transitional phase then head towards elections that would determine the size of each party? And if this is not possible, why do the Libyans - who chose the flag of the United Kingdom of Libya at the beginning of the revolution - not go back to their old constitution which was toppled by Gaddafi in his 1969 coup, i.e. to "Libya, as a democratic, federal, independent and sovereign state," until the spirits are appeased and the circumstances are ripe for the drafting of a new constitution? As for the inclination to shatter whatever is left of the state's image, it will not lead to federalism or to the formation of three independent provinces, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan - or the barren regions – as much as it will open the door before civil wars and conflicts that will not spare the neighbors on the land and maritime border!
