The Egyptians do not seem optimistic about Sheikh of Al-Azhar Dr. Ahmad al-Tayyib's initiative, which many expect will share the fate of all the foreign initiatives and efforts that kept Egypt in a rut. The man was always the target of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in its attempts to impose its control over all the country's institutions, which is why it rejected his call. In addition, the group still remembers him standing alongside the Coptic Pope, the representative of the Salvation Front, Dr. Muhammad Baradei, and the representatives of other forces, in the presence of Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sissi as he was announcing the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi and the establishment of a temporary administration for the country. This initiative is also expected to share the fate of the action undertaken by Al-Baradei, who is being targeted and accused by all sides of being a traitor and a collaborator! The prolongation of the crisis in the absence of any initiative – whether external or internal – to activate an understanding or the reconciliation for which all the sides are calling, does not serve the interests of both parties involved in the conflict. Indeed, the credit earned by the army's action and the status of the transitional government will erode if the authority and the Interior Ministry do not disperse the sit-ins on Rabi'a Adawiya and Renaissance squares among others. As for the support enjoyed by the MB and seen in the popular crowds that have rallied on the squares, it will also erode, considering that the people will not stay in the street endlessly in the absence of any possible settlement. At this level, it is unlikely that confrontations or violence are the alternative options or the guaranteed solution, for had this been the case, Hazem Beblawi's government and its security forces would not have hesitated to resort to them based on its decision in this regard. The existing division is deep and alarming, and is threatening with civil war if the prohibited clash were to occur or if one of the two parties resorts to the use of force. No one can guarantee that the standoff will end with a winner and a loser. No side will win the war, and Egypt will lose. The group, which built its local and international project 80 years ago, cannot accept the full loss of this project. This is due to the fact that its collapse will have massive repercussions on the future of the situation throughout the region, from Libya to Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and even Turkey which is presenting itself as an archetype but is following in the footsteps of the Egyptians and Tunisians. And it is feared that the MB opponents will commit the same mistakes as the group, when it acted as though the popular commissioning earned by President Mohamed Morsi spared it from any understandings or consultations with both its allies and rivals, at a time when the situation does not allow anyone to claim to monopolize the voice of all – or the majority of – the Egyptians. But this representation balance between the two sides of the conflict – regardless of its sizes – is not the only thing preventing confrontation. Indeed, the Islamic ranks are divided, just like the government whose politicians fear the use of force towards which some military and security powers are pushing. And far away from the internal divisions, it is not easy for the regional and international powers to stand by and watch as Egypt slides towards an open cycle of violence. Hence, the United States and the European Union, which have so far failed to achieve a breakthrough at the level of the crisis, are not about to give up, while the Arab states that are supporting the roadmap have no interest in seeing Egypt drowning in blood and nearing total collapse. This is due to the fact that they will not be spared by the consequences of such a collapse or of anarchy, at a time when they are facing major challenges linked to the declared conflict between most of the Gulf countries and the Islamic Republic, the possible collapse and dismantlement of Syria and the heavy shadow this will cast on Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Moreover, the region also seems divided, seeing how the African Union suspended Egypt's membership, while there can be no talk about a unified Arab position since the Arab and Gulf states are divided over what is happening. Tunisia condemned the coup of the military while about to face the same problem, whereas the Syrian regime welcomed the military's step. And at a time when Ankara voiced its condemnation, Tehran appeared confused, warning against civil war and foreign interference. The American administration for its part was expected to exercise its function vis-à-vis the group's leaders, in order to save the MB firstly, save Egypt secondly, and restore the entire Islamic project in the region thirdly, knowing that it is mainly relying on this project to establish a new regional order capable of containing the influence of the Islamic Republic and preventing the progress of the Chinese and Russians! However, Washington's confusion and excessive caution paralyzed its policies and decisions, not only towards the developments in Egypt but also towards many issues in the region. This was seen at the level of the Syrian crisis and the Iranian nuclear file, not to mention other international issues, from North Korea and the Pacific Ocean to Central Asia and others. This pushed President Vladimir Putin's administration to seize this opportunity – i.e. Washington's confusion and reluctance – to restore Russia's status, which was lost during the stage of political, security and economic anarchy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This also pushed towards the resumption of the talk about a cold war that would end the unilateral leadership of the world. This reality does not imply the authorization of international intervention because the Egyptians are stuck in a rut. An internal initiative, whether by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar or any other power, would be much better than any initiative led by the American administration or the European Union. Is it not enough to see what the recent American and European actions caused in terms of the deepening of division and schism and the escalation of the positions? In addition, internationalization is met with excessive sensitivity by all the Egyptians, which might lead towards further polarization and confusion, without providing efficient and permanent solutions. The best example for that is the outcome of internationalization in Libya and Yemen, and its current results in Syria where the killing machine is ongoing and where the gap is widening between the sectarian, denominational and ethnic components of the Syrian people, on the altar of the regional conflicts and the cold war that has started to surface between the United States and Russia. Fearing the use of force should encourage the search for a solution that would save face for all sides. The first step at this level might be the recognition by both parties of facts that cannot be disregarded, starting by discontinuing the escalatory political discourse of both camps and ending the retaliation operations being carried out by the security forces or MB elements. This would be done in preparation for the search for common grounds, which would lead toward dialogue to reach real reconciliation, while drawing the lessons from the mistakes of the near and distant past, but also those of the present. There is no doubt that the release of the detainees from the MB and the other Islamic movements should act as a prelude for such a dialogue. The MB should announce in advance that the return to the near past has become a thing of the past and its opponents that the exclusion of the Islamic forces – at the head of which is the MB – would be impossible to achieve, and that any attempt to impose it by force would be a risky venture that will eliminate everything in Egypt. This is the only way to go back to a political game that is open to all, far away from any isolation, exclusion or the overpowering of a minority by a majority. Sparing Egypt from the threat of internationalization starts with the recanting of the past mistakes that are numerous, and of which neither side of the conflict needs to be reminded. President Morsi and his group thought that duality in the management of the country's affairs was over when the president dismissed about a year ago six senior commanders of the military council, at the head of whom was Minister of Defense Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi and Chief of Staff General Sami Annan. They were unaware of the fact that throughout sixty years – if not more – the military institution remained the main partner in the management of the country's political and economic affairs, and that the toppling of its council which managed the country following the departure of President Hosni Mubarak had no impact on the army's ability to regain control over power, whether directly or through rotation as it has been happening since the 1952 revolution. Moreover, they did not pay any attention to the partners in the January 25 revolution - or rather those who triggered it - and were unconcerned by their fears and those of the minorities vis-à-vis the alteration of the state's identity, whether via the constitutional draft or the administrative measures undertaken in accordance with the MB enablement policy. They also did not heed the calls to change the government that failed to handle the people's economic and social affairs, while the Guidance Bureau was indifferent towards the extent of popular disgruntlement during the second revolution on June 30. But all these fatal mistakes that made the MB lose wide segments of its important popular base, which had tilted the balance in its favor since the eruption of the January 25 revolution, do not annul its remaining and influential presence. And there is no doubt that the military council, the Salvation Front, and the Rebel Movement among many other opponents, failed to estimate the size of the MB reaction despite all the measures adopted by the state's security and judicial bodies, from the detention of the president to the arrest of a number of MB and Islamic leaders, the closing of some of their media outlets, the prevention of leaders from traveling, the pursuit of others, and the transfer of others before justice. This rendered the talk about the ability to exclude the Islamic forces, at the head of which is the Muslim Brotherhood, almost impossible. In order to launch reconciliation, the two sides must mutually recognize each other by turning the page of the past. As for the MB's insistence on the reinstatement of Morsi as president, it is far from reality, while the decision to exclude the group is not an easy option. So, will the two sides meet inside a new Cabinet where everyone would be represented, to rush the implementation of the roadmap after drawing the lessons from the mistakes of the past? In order to exit the rut and avoid the ghost of internationalization, the two sides must stop claiming to represent the majority of the Egyptian people – regardless of the size and validity of this representation – and recognize the outcome of the second revolution, just as they all did with the first revolution, with the help of the military on January 25 and on June 30!
