The meetings of Iranian President Hassan Rohani with his French counterpart François Hollande and with British Prime Minister David Cameron, on the sidelines of United Nations General Assembly meetings, in addition to Obama's speech, have spread a climate of optimism among political and diplomatic circles concerned with Middle East issues, as well as criticism, reaching the extent of accusing the US President of weakness, by some of Obama's allies. So has Iran changed or has the West? It is true that the Iranian President, any Iranian President, has his own opinion and influence on his country's foreign policy. Yet he remains a mere organ implementing the plans and directives of the Supreme Leader. The logical conclusion is that Khamenei is not unconnected to the diplomatic movement being led by Rohani, and that the change started at the top of the power structure in Tehran. The reasons for it are different from what is being publicized about Iran turning to moderation, as if such a change had taken place without preambles, or as if the new President had suddenly moved his country from the "Axis of Evil" to the "Axis of Good", drawing inspiration from the supernatural to draft his policies. The truth is that Iran, which has waged the war in the Levant in full force, realized that the United States and its allies having backed down on a military assault against Syria represents a turning point in the policy of this axis. This was made clear by Obama in his speech at the UN General Assembly, when he stressed the importance of political solutions, in collaboration with Russia and the Security Council, and pointed to the possibility of reaching a settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue without resorting to force. He also pointed to putting an end to the fighting in Syria through dialogue with those this issue concerns. The Iranians have answered the American speech with a similar one. Thus, Rohani declared that his country did not seek to obtain nuclear weapons, the latter being prohibited by Islam, and stressed the fact that such energy would be used for peaceful purposes. The only explanation for such flexibility in the discourse of both the United States and Iran is that the two countries have reached the conviction that a military solution in Syria is no longer possible. Each of the two has their own reasons, which could meet at a specific point. Washington, which has backed down on a military strike against Damascus, considers Syria to have become so weak that it no longer poses a threat to anyone. It no longer represents a strong fortified center for the Axis of Defiance, but has rather become a burden for it, in addition to the fact that it will not regain stability for many long years. Moreover, it would be possible to reach a settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue, in exchange for lifting sanctions on Tehran, in a shared effort with Russia. On the other hand, Iran has reached the conclusion that it could keep its influence in the region and play an even greater role there, if it reconciles with the West without submitting to its dictates. This is especially true after the West has backed down on such a policy, abandoned its plans to change the regime in Tehran, and expressed its desire to restore relations with it under different conditions. The negative reaction to Obama's speech, in the United States and among its allies, was only natural. Domestically, the far-right considered that the President had abandoned Washington's commitments for nothing in return, declared his defeat before even waging the war and allowed Iran to spread its influence wherever it wishes. He has also been considered to have abandoned his support of Israel, which was shocked by the stances he has taken, with Netanyahu feeling deceived by "his own people". As for the US's other allies, especially Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere, they held a conference in Istanbul and another in Pakistan to examine the situation and lay out new plans, the latter not being devoid of resorting to violence in order to confront international and Middle Eastern changes. Yet all of these stances and indications are only beginning to emerge and will require a long time to be implemented. They are in fact no more than a new organizational model for managing the crisis in the region, a model based on American and Iranian changes, and on reshaping relations between allies.
