At the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq provoked an international crisis, which was one of the most prominent repercussions of the collapse of the world order. And the wide international alliance led by the United States to oust Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait opened the door before the emergence of a new order heralded by President George Bush Sr.'s administration. As for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, it carried consequences on the image of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Soviet space in general, at a time when the Middle East remained unchanged. Indeed, the settlement launched from Madrid did not reach its happy endings, while the Arab world, its League and states failed to overcome the fissures that affected them following the invasion of Kuwait and take a step forward. And when George Bush Jr. arrived at the White House at the beginning of the third millennium, he seemed to be distancing himself from the affairs of the East, thus publically washing his hands of this issue and preparing for a stage of retreat and isolation. By doing so, he closed the door opened by his predecessor Bill Clinton before the Palestinian and Israeli delegations. However, the New York and Washington "invasions" pushed him towards wars, from whose effects and wounds President Barack Obama's administration is saying it still suffers until this day. At the beginning of this decade, a storm swept the Arab world, while it was and is still being said that it is the Arab spring that came two decades late. But it stopped in Syria, which – just like Iraq – now constitutes one of the most important predicaments facing the world order that is still feeling its way through, as though it were a catalyst for the new order. For his part, and since he arrived to the White House, President Obama has been stressing his insistence on the reestablishment of partnership with the major players and on international cooperation through the international institutions. And he reiterated more than once – after recognizing the failure to activate a settlement in the Middle East – that his priorities had shifted towards the Pacific. However, the Syrian crisis brought him back to the region to face the greatest challenge since he assumed power, while the dissociation policy he had adopted throughout two and a half years did not do him any good. Many regional and international circumstances have changed, from the Iraqi crisis whose chapters have not yet ended, to the Syrian one. Also, the world has never been more divided and no crisis has ever caused such polarization, thus becoming the object of daily debates in Western parliaments. Saying that it is a predicament or a challenge for the United States alone or that it constitutes a test for its credibility and ability to overcome it is inaccurate, considering it is also a test for the credibility of its opponents, especially Russia and Iran, and their ability to overcome and respond to this challenge. As for the reluctance that has so far characterized the position of Washington and its European partners, it is met with confusion and uncertainty in the opposite camp. But this was not the case before August 21, considering that the Syrian warring sides' upholding of the rules of war had spared the foreign players from intervening, despite this war's bloodiness and destructive effects. They did not mind waiting until the fighters grew tired and the circumstances for a political settlement were ripe, and none of them expressed a wish to directly intervene. However, the use of chemical weapons breached the latter rules and intervention became necessary, pushing all the players towards a poker table, around which deceit is the master of the game! The world waited a long time for a breakthrough at the level of the Syrian crisis to reach an acceptable political settlement, and both the regional and international players wagered on the balance of powers that did not stop tilting for two and a half years since the eruption of the confrontations. These players thus found themselves facing a real conundrum: How can each party confirm its credibility and its ability to overcome the challenge in a new balance of powers, resulting from an understanding over the elements of the required settlement to stop war? Is the dispute between the major players over the goals of Geneva 2 not also responsible for the postponement of this deferred meeting? Indeed, there is no agreement between them over the steps to stop war, or convergence over the headlines of the solution, at a time when it is clear they are unable to pressure the warring sides. This probably reveals a new map for the balance of international powers, whose calculations are not limited to military capabilities solely and affect the economy and the regional and international network of relations. Or at best, it conveys the lack of trust between them, and a divergence seen in regard to many files. The question has always revolved around the day that will follow the departure of President Bashar al-Assad's regime. But today, the question revolves around the day after the limited military strike against this regime, amid fears that those wagering on the activation of a settlement following the expected strike miscalculated the situation. During the past months, the opposition refused to head to the Geneva 2 conference before balance was secured on the theater of operations, after its loss of the city of Al-Qusayr and the retreat which affected it in Homs and other locations and cities. So, can those who will carry out the intervention to sanction Al-Assad and undermine his ability to use weapons of extermination guarantee that the Syrian president will succumb, especially if the strike grants his opponents some momentum to achieve progress on the ground? What pushes the optimists to expect he will not miss the opportunity this time around to seal a settlement which will eventually meet the opposition's conditions and calls for the regime's departure? Based on this war's developments, there is little hope of seeing the regime sitting around the negotiations table following the strike. And what if it absorbed it, as it did each Israeli strike, and continued to fight? Hence, the expected strike will not end the war in Syria as publically stated by Washington and its partners, thus giving priority to the political solution that might be activated by this limited and studied intervention. Nevertheless, this scenario remains the most optimistic, which is why some political circles in Washington said that Obama sought a congressional mandate due to fears surrounding the repercussions of the strike and its shift away from all the calculation and expectations. And by seeking domestic and European support, he is taking a preemptive step to find someone to share the responsibility for the repercussions of this intervention on the interests of the United States and its allies in the region, knowing that the latter repercussions – and the uncalculated dynamic it could provoke - might push him towards further intervention and engagement in war. Many believe that the strike is inevitable, considering that Washington cannot show leniency at the level of its credibility, the threatening of its national security and that of its allies and Syria's neighboring states, and towards its international responsibility. Moreover, it cannot retreat before Russia and Iran, as the world will perceive any such retreat as being a victory for them. But on the other hand, it cannot disregard the role which could be played by Damascus' allies, although it will not reach the point of direct confrontation between America and Russia, or between it and Iran, and will not led to a Third World War as threatened by the Syrian officials. Never in the history of the Cold War did the two giants engage in direct confrontation, and it would be impossible for them to do so today, seeing how the network of interests and relations between Washington and Moscow prevents such an adventure to protect the regime in Damascus. And clearly, the Russian officials assured since day one they will not intervene, just as it was done by Iranian officials who rejected the statements of their Syrian counterparts, who said that war on Damascus would necessarily mean war on the Islamic Republic. This is due to the fact that geography does not serve the Islamic Republic, which – regardless of its relationship with Iraq – cannot simply jump over the border to get implicated in a confrontation it does not want. Moreover, it is too wise to take any risks that might affect the Gulf waters and its oil, as this would trigger a war which it will not exit unscathed, no matter how much it overestimates its capabilities. But this does not mean that the allies will settle for wagering on the Western public and parliaments, and on the schism affecting the European Union and the American domestic arena. And while Russia may have special and different calculations that might not exceed the provision of the Syrian regime with additional weapons, Iran – which is hearing every day that the strike would constitute a clear message to it, if it were to exceed the red line at the level of its nuclear file – will have its own calculations and other ways to intervene. True, it will not confront the American missile power, but the extension of its arms from Iraq to Lebanon, going through numerous other locations, might not allow the military or political exploitation of the strike as easily as it is hoped by the Americans and their partners. Iran cooperated with the United States and provided it with facilitations – from which it benefited – during the Afghan and Iraqi wars. But Syria constitutes an essential element in its national security strategy, which is why those relying on the strike cannot wager on Tehran's idleness towards the possible undermining of the bridge that links it to Israel's border, and is helping it in Iraq whose provinces and cities are being targeted by booby-trapped cars on a daily basis! Hence, the striking of Syria would destroy this "crescent" is has worked so long to build. So how will it act through its arms which have been fighting alongside the regime for a long time? Will it risk in advance the future of the negotiations for which the new government led by President Hassan Rohani is preparing in regard to the nuclear file? There is a thin line between the hope of seeing the strike pushing all the sides in Syria towards a settlement, which would pave the way before the long-awaited great deal, and the fear of seeing it lead to further infighting between Al-Assad's regime and its opponents. The continuation of war does not only reassure those who want the depletion of Syria's capabilities and the Shiite and Sunni extremist powers blacklisted by the West, but also spares those rushing towards the gas reserves in the Mediterranean Sea from being preoccupied with the burdens of reaching an understanding with Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, which are preoccupied with the ongoing war.
