The Arab train of change, from the East to the West, is going through minefields and entering more than one tunnel. Right now, it looks besieged between two arcs, being drawn in all directions by a series of players and local, regional and international interests, considerations and calculations. On one hand, this train is besieged by what is happening in Libya, while at the same time it is affected by what is happening in some Gulf states – from the Sultanate of Oman to Kuwait, Yemen and Bahrain – not to forget Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Therefore, the map of change will not be spared from the outcome of the conflict between the regime in Tripoli and its opponents, as well as the conflict among those hoping to earn a favorable position in the “new Libya.” This conflict is casting its shadows over the two ends of the arc, i.e. Tunisia in the West and Egypt in the East, and will definitely multiply the challenges facing these two revolutions along the path to get rid of the remaining structures of Ben Ali's and Mubarak's regimes. Moreover, the map in the Gulf and the Levant will not be spared from the outcome of the permanent and renewed confrontation between Iran and its neighbors on one hand, and between it and the international community on the other. And finally, it will not be spared from the calculations of the settlement of the Palestinian issue, as well as Israel's concerns and security. In light of what is happening in Libya, it is clear that Gaddafi will leave sooner or later. Indeed, the National Transitional Council – with its political, popular and military facets – is no longer his only rival, as his rivals now include all the Arabs, Americans and Europeans who convened in London last week, and the “international contact group” whose goal is to eventually topple Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. After all that happened during these last few weeks, it would be impossible for the international community to strike a “deal” to turn the clock backwards. However, if the Colonel is able to stand fast in the face of this international bloc, it would mean a resonating defeat for many leaders, at the head of whom is French President Nicolas Sarkozy and American President Barack Obama who was and still is very hesitant to push the Europeans and some Arabs to engage in the confrontation and assume this task, its costs and repercussions. If Gaddafi is able to find a way to keep his regime afloat, even if at the expense of the Libyan “map,” he will present a model for regimes and powers that are still refusing to respond to their people's demands, even if this were to lead to the reviewing of the national maps of many states. True, the Tunisians and Egyptians proved – through their social and historic cohesion – that they are immune against the changing of the maps, secession and division. But what is also true is that this “model” might revive the attempts of some of the remnants of the old regimes to stage counterrevolutions that would turn the clock backward. Moreover, it might push some sides involved in the revolution or military and security powers that joined the squares of the youth, to try to monopolize the authority and the rule without any regard for the positions or objections of the international community. Did the Egyptian youth not stage a “one-million-people action to save the revolution” on Friday? This is at the level of the “African arc.” At the level of the “Levantine arc” however, the situation is much more complicated in the Peninsula and from there up to Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The map of change in this area is linked to the map of the entire Middle East, at the head of which is the fate of the settlement, Israel's position and security, and the security of the Gulf and its oil wells which constitute the main artery for the major industrial states. In other words, it is linked to the struggle with Iran, and the size and limits of its role. Consequently, change will not be produced by the rising young powers without any regard for the past which is burdened with the factors of the conflict over the region. At this point, the abundance of the wealth imposes an abundance of interests and the assembly of numerous major players from all corners of the world. The reasons behind the conflict are old, and keep dissipating then coming back. Today however, we are in the presence of an exposed and open “battle” in Bahrain and Kuwait, as neither the GCC members, the Americans and the Europeans, nor the Islamic Republic, are concealing their positions in the media and on the field. Moreover, nothing is giving the impression that the confrontation will stop, considering it is currently escalating. Manama, has barricaded itself on the security level through the support of its “brothers” in the Gulf. In the meantime, it is no longer its priority to seek dialogue or mediations, rather the consecration of security as it was stated by Foreign Minister Sheikh Khaled Bin Ahmad al-Khalifa, as well as by more than one political and security official in Manama. It is as though the response to some of the demands of the people is no longer a mere local decision, since the people of the region have started to have a say at this level after the action exceeded the borders of the island. And while the confrontation in Bahrain retreated from the main squares to the marginal neighborhoods, the confrontation in Kuwait seems to be ablaze following the criminal court's issuance of a death sentence against the elements of the “Iranian espionage network” – which brought back to mind the troubles endured by the Kuwaitis following the eruption of the “Islamic Revolution” in the 1980s – and the campaign against the “Iranian media” represented by Al-Kawthar, Al-Anwar and Al-Alam channels. In that same context, Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad Salem al-Sabah also announced a decision to oust diplomats in the Iranian mission to Kuwait after having confirmed their ties with the network, accusing Tehran of having “weaved the conspiracy.” For its part, Tehran has not stopped condemning – on the official and media levels - what it referred to as being the “interference” of the GCC member states in Bahraini affairs, the most recent position being that of Minister of Defense General Ahmad Wahidi who said that this type of interference “increased the tensions and jeopardized the region's security and stability,” warning against the region's transformation into a “pit of confrontation and hostility.” But all these positions did not prevent the GCC states from going far in defending the security and stability of their system, thus prompting the Arab League to provide an Arab cover for Security Council resolution 1973, while the United States and the European countries immediately provided a similar “legitimacy” to the deployment of troops from the Arab Peninsula Shield in Bahrain. It was some sort of a tradeoff: one cover in exchange for another, revealing that the West will not allow anything to undermine the Gulf region. In the meantime, Iran is persistently and pointlessly trying to promote what cannot be promoted in terms of victory claims and talk about the fact that the action in the Arab world was inspired by its revolution! Iran is well aware that the action towards which it is trying to push in some neighboring countries to change the equation and the balance of powers in the region, is hitting an elevated wall that cannot be overcome. Indeed, the main players in the Gulf will not allow such a change in the Peninsula, at least not before seeing the desired or expected change on the Iranian scene itself. This is due to the fact that change in Tehran will reshuffle the cards on more than one arena, i.e. in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq which is today finding itself – more than ever before - close to the positions of the Islamic Republic at the level of the sectarian alignment toward which the region is sliding. As for what is happening at the level of the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi triangle, it is not far from what is happening in the Gulf. The conflict between Iran and its opponents extends from Afghanistan to the Middle East and parts of Africa, and it is clear that in both actions – the Gulf and Levantine ones – the “rejectionist” sides are closely monitoring the direction of the storm on more than one arena, considering that the results will force them to reconsider their calculations and positions as they will not be spared from the changes seen in the different locations. Indeed, Syria's preoccupation with its domestic developments is confusing the Islamic Republic, just as it is confusing Hezbollah and the Palestinian movements operating under Hamas's banner. The events in Syria – which expressed its understanding toward the “legitimate” Gulf intervention in Bahrain despite the interests it shares with Iran – point to the fact that the inclination during this stage is to consecrate the fait accompli. And although the American and European pressures on Damascus seemed to have escalated, the GCC states responded to President Al-Assad's “gesture” toward Bahrain with an even better one. In the meantime, the Western circles made sure to differentiate between what was happening in Syria and what was happening in Libya, excluded any intervention similar to the one seen in the latter, but also differentiated between the developments in Tripoli and what happened and is still happening in Manama. Many believed that the Syrian president's relief during his last speech was due to the international and regional “understanding” of the importance of maintaining stability in this region, which is already facing the threat of the settlement's obstructed horizon. This is due to the fact that Syria's slide toward a state similar to the Yemeni or Libyan one, will lead the neighboring countries into a Tsunami that will not spare anything. At this level, the same could be said about Jordan. However, one must beware of disproportionate relief, considering that the “tradeoffs,” understandings and regional and international interferences in the Arab actions, does not mean that the results wanted by the players are guaranteed. The angry Arab squares were not mobilized by those engaged in understandings or tradeoffs, considering that the latter were forced toward these squares by a need to protect their interests, positions and some of their principles, hence the duplicity in dealing with each square based on different, and sometimes completely opposite standards. This is what is being done with the United States and Europe, but also by Iran and the moderate and “rejectionist” Arab countries. Therefore, we must not downplay the importance of the role of the Arab streets in drawing up the map of change, and while the Tunisian and Egyptian archetypes maintained the unity of the entity, the fact that other regimes and their oppositionists are stressing the necessity of deterring strife and upholding national unity reveals the frailty of these countries and the unity of their components, just as it reveals the possible slide of the warring sides toward Libyan or Yemeni models among others. Will we face the redrafting of new maps following the failure of those drawn up by British and French colonialism at the beginning of last century?
