The Egyptian events are being echoed in two different experiences in Tunisia and Morocco. And while the Tunisian street is busy carrying out an action aiming to topple the government of Ennahda and its partners in the troika, the Moroccans are adjusting to a half-bearded government, and whenever it is about to collapse, it is rescued by partisan lifebuoys. Because the Egyptian crisis is the product of its time at the level of its reasons, backdrops and repercussions, the recognition by some Islamic movements in the North African states of the non-existence of any ties or affiliation with the fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood constituted a noticeable development. Indeed, when the authority fell in the hands of the Islamic movement in Egypt, this was considered a victory for all the Islamic movements revived by the action. But later on, these same movements distanced themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood, after they saw the developments which led to its isolation from power. Whether this is a political reaction with a pragmatic background or a redrafting of the lines of convergence and divergence between the Islamic movements sharing the same reference, the impact of the Egyptian case will last a longer time, at least in terms of the continuation of the controversy surrounding the limits of political Islam at the level of the failure or success of the experience in power. Just like these movements were able to put forward a convincing and tempting alternative to attract voters who have grown sick and tired of the tyranny and monopolization of the authority, their short-lived experiences in power fueled disgruntlement and revulsion. And because the street is the same, a question is raised in regard to the causes of the failure and the ways to handle the crisis, as long as the exclusionist visions of both sides have failed. Usually, a political party's failure in the democratic experience leads to self-criticism, in order to get ready for the upcoming competitions in the context of the peaceful transition of power. And usually, this does not provoke any controversy surrounding the legitimacy of this party's existence, unless it is adopting ideas opposed to the agreed on social values. However, the manner in which the Egyptian MB was isolated and the insistence of the Freedom and Justice Party on returning to power, do not leave any room for any such transition unless all the sides accept to start over. As for the controversy surrounding the ratification of a consensual constitution, it only reflects a need for a higher law by which everyone would abide. Only then can power transition have a meaning. However, the problem at the level of the constitution in Egypt – but also in Tunisia – is that its preamble, clauses and content are still the object of controversy, just like the causality of which came first, the chicken or the egg. This is happening although the constitution is not a law imposed by the victor, but rather a consensual document drawn up by all the parties, especially when it comes to issues related to identity, principles, the distribution of powers, and these powers' autonomy. And just like its drafting cannot be monopolized by a party or movement enjoying the widest influence, as the latter could become a minority following any new elections, no partner can be kept from contributing to its ratification. The executive power is one of the components of the remaining powers, and its monopolization of such a decision is not a solution. In Tunisia, the discussion is revolving around the priorities of the current stage. And while the opposition is demanding the government's departure, the government is responding by saying it will not succumb to this demand until after the ratification of the constitution. But what guarantees that a constitution drawn up this way will please all the sides? Should the constitutional issue not be distanced from the influence of whichever power, especially during transitional stages? The Islamic movements that monopolized power – although based on the results of the ballot boxes – are probably blamed for having practiced power with a non-consensual mentality, or at the very least for having allowed the prevalence of a religious tendency over political measures and decisions. In light of these developments, it was no surprise to see the emergence of the dilemma surrounding the relationship between what is religious and what is political. In the Western countries, there are parties with religious references, but they distinguish between religious conservatives and political officials at the level of their practices. And some parties that allowed the prevalence of racist and radical tendencies saw the annulment of the electoral results. There is a great difference between changing societal structures and providing the conditions of change at the level of the economic, social and cultural structures. And those who rebelled against the Islamic movements did not do so because they shifted away from a purely religious course, but because they could not implement reformatory plans that would revive the hopes and rebuild the lost trust. In Egypt, the Islamists were excluded from power, while in Tunisia the demonstrations to topple the government are proceeding. In the meantime, Moroccan opposition parties and dignitaries are supporting the stay of the Islamists in power, not with the aim to block the way before any complaints regarding the importation of the Egyptian experience to affect the status of the Islamists in the country, but to separate between what is religious and what is political. If Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane's government is sustained, this would be due to the support of a parliamentary majority, while if it stops halfway, this would be due to the disintegration of the majority. And this is the safest way to exit the tunnel of the struggle over power.
