Tunisia launched the revolutions in the region. So will it trigger the era of revolution against the newborn governments of the Islamic movements, or will the latter be able to correct their course instead of setting the foundations for an era of bloody and intellectual terrorism, as the price to pay for this major change in the Arab Spring countries? Such an era would pave the way before crushing civil wars and overwhelming anarchy that will not be limited to the countries in question, and what is happening in Mali and in the Sahara states is probably the best expression of the consequences of the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya. At this level, what is happening in Syria and the neighboring states is heralding a similar outcome. So far, the Arab revolutions have failed to introduce security, stability, democracy, diversity and wellbeing as many had hoped they would. In addition, they failed to contain the extremist powers, at the head of which are Al-Qaeda and its likes, which use violence as a tool to induce change. This is revealed by the violence witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, as well as in Yemen and Libya and their surroundings. It is not meaningless for the Tunisians to express their anger towards the assassination of Chokri Belaid, one of the most prominent opposition leaders. It is not trivial for them to condemn the horror of the crime by saying that Ben Ali's and Bourguiba's regimes committed persecution, imprisonment, exile and torture but not murder(!) This return to the situation which existed under the former regime alone is enough to trigger the second revolution. In addition, what is being said in Egypt today about President Muhammad Morsi's regime is also not trivial. At this level, it is enough that it is being accused of monopolizing more powers than during the days of President Hosni Mubarak, while the security bodies are said to be carrying out worse practices than under the deposed regime and that the Muslim Brotherhood is controlling the administrations and institutions and practicing an enablement policy as though nothing had changed! But the pessimism wave towards the results of the Arab spring is not new. Indeed, it accompanied the Egyptian revolution ever since talk emerged about deals between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military. Later on, it turned out that the demands of the people on Tahrir Square to eliminate the special status enjoyed by the military institution were not met, and that the new constitution maintained the autonomy and privileges it previously enjoyed. This is exactly why it has so far sustained its neutrality towards what happened and is still happening, and why it settled for watching the situation. Moreover, its commanders do not wish to be led into an open confrontation with the various arenas as long as the political sides are fighting far away from it, and as long as it is enough for it to deploy around the public facilities to provide as much protection as possible. It is that same position that hastened the departure of Mubarak's regime, at a time when the security bodies and the police, whose rehabilitation and cleansing have been repeatedly called for by the Egyptians, practiced during the last demonstrations against President Morsi's regime the same horrors as the ones they committed during the first days of the revolution, if not more atrocious ones! The situation in Tunisia was not any difference, considering that the Ennahda movement found itself caught between two fires, i.e. that of the liberals, the leftists, the civil society associations and the deeply-rooted unions on one hand, and that of the Salafis who showed a tendency for violence and extremism on more than one occasion. The movement took into account the fears of wide factions of Tunisia society, especially since it found itself unable to govern alone although it is the largest bloc in the Constituent Assembly. It thus resorted to a tripartite alliance which offered nothing on the political level, despite the fact that at the beginning, the Tunisian experience seemed less acute than the Egyptian one. Indeed, Tunisian Islam remained less conservative than its Egyptian counterpart, due to Bourguiba's long term which led the country towards greater degrees of modernity on the social, legal and political levels, unlike the Egyptian society which remained more conservative despite all the efforts and attempts deployed since the days of the missions sent to the West by Muhammad Ali. And numerous comparisons were made between the Egyptian and Japanese experiences that were much similar in terms of the circumstances and situations at the end of the eighteenth century and the way they are today! The deposed regimes that practiced all sorts of tyranny knew how to annul political life, whether by striking, obstructing or annulling all partisan, unionist, journalistic and cultural structures. As for the remaining ones, they were directly linked to the state apparatuses and were dedicated to their service. Moreover, these tyrannical regimes adopted a policy enhancing divisions and differences between the various entities, and remained in power for a long time based on policies that suppressed the domestic arenas, either by taking sides with one of the two superpowers, or by claiming to be in confrontation with one of them. A quick look at the political scene in the Arab spring countries clearly and blatantly reveals what they are facing. At this level, the Islamic movements which based their strength on religion and its institutions were readier and more organized to fill the vacuum left by the former regimes. Consequently, they jumped to power, and began seizing the opportunities to gradually control everything. This was done by the Egyptian MB, which has been engaged in compromises since the eruption of the revolution and until this day, in order to implement the enablement policy and exclude its partners inside and outside the revolution, in the administration, the judiciary and the media, as well as in the government and the Shura Council. Furthermore, it relied on a constitution which was drawn up to allow the prevalence of the majority, despite the boycotting of wide powers and factions. Hence, the MB did not deal with the constitution as a social contract which should be agreed on between all the components, but rather as a political or doctrinal program that suits it alone and does not rise above parties and their projects. This is what Ennahda has tried and is still trying to accomplish. Yesterday, it rejected a proposal by one of its most prominent leaders, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, to form a government of competencies that does not represent a party or a faction, thus announcing its insistence on a partisan government that ensures its prevalence. This opposition between the movement's “salafis" and the prime minister, who was also its secretary general, exposed the dispute between the dove and hawk wings within it. During its last conference in the summer, Ennahda had tried to conceal this dispute just as it had tried to conceal its “secret organization" in the past, based on the accusations of its opponents. Indeed, during the last days of President Habib Bourguiba (1986 – 1987), the authorities uncovered what they considered to be a secret organization for the so-called Movement of the Islamic Tendency (from which Ennahda emerged in 1989) in the army and police. And at the beginning of the nineties, Ben Ali's regime exposed what it referred to as being a similar organization, which allowed it to pursue the Islamists and the movement's supporters and leaders. Today, its detractors are accusing it of having established what could be called a League for the Protection of the Revolution, which is nothing but its parallel army, considering that the regular army does not take its orders and instructions from anyone as announced by the minister of defense. This enhances a historical tendency to keep the military institution – for numerous reasons – far away from any coups and from politics in general. Ennahda's responsibility for the assassination of Chokri Belaid can only be determined by the judiciary. Nonetheless, it is politically and morally responsible, considering that the current government is accused of establishing a truce with the Salafis and extremists, and has secured the right climate for mayhem and the use of power against the opponents. As for Jebali's call for a new government of competencies, it is a blatant recognition of the failure of Ennahda's partisan government, although the Tunisians gave it a lot of time to achieve some of their demands and the promises it made. But what provoked the concerns of the revolutionaries were the extremist groups which were not forcibly suppressed and deterred by the security bodies, at a time when terrorism and violence are governing these groups' policy and have affected educational and media institutions. Still, the command of Ennahda decided to humor them, fearing that these groupings would blackmail it on the Islamists' arena. Is it too late for Tunisia, which launched the Arab spring, to launch a new experience that would spread in the other countries? Can Jebali proceed with a government of competencies, thus exceeding the authoritarianism which the sheikhs of his movement are trying to impose? Can he protect the existing modern structures and enhance the principle of concord between democracy and the Islamic parties, based on the Turkish archetype which established a democratic experience built on the Turkish MB's experience and the requirements of the European Union, thus drawing up an economic approach which strengthened the popularity of the Justice and Development Party? Last spring, his government officially abstained from imposing the principles of the Islamic Shariaa as the foundations of the new constitution whose draft has not yet seen the light. So will he present a Tunisian experience that would be contagious to the others? Improvisation, power frenzy, the lack of political experience and democratic culture, and the extremists' tendency to annul the others who are different, constitute real and serious threats facing the Arab spring. And instead of resorting to the street – just like the Egyptian MB has done on many occasions –to confirm its popularity, Ennahda has an opportunity to correct its course and regulate the intellectual and political differences in a transparent way and via democratic means, not through a dual discourse, while resorting to quick elections after their set date has passed. Tunisia has a slight chance of disproving the talk saying that the former tyrannical regimes provided a wide margin of security and stability, a minimum level of economic growth, and social unity, although haunted by fear and suspicion. So will the Arab revolutions end with the control of power by the Islamist extremists solely? The first step towards democracy is not just the organization of free and transparent elections, but also reaching an agreement over a new social contract with the participation of all the country's components, powers and parties, so that they are reassured about their future. There should also be concord over a constitution that is not dictated by the majority, regardless of its identity. Tunisia and Egypt are relied on to correct the course and prevent the spread of total anarchy, as the latter is threatening to affect the entire Arab region. In Libya, the tribal, regional and extremist Islamic powers are preventing the establishment of a single institution that would unify the country and its people. Yemen is getting ready to host a comprehensive dialogue conference, amid mounting secession calls between the North and the South that are threatening with civil wars. As for Iraq, it is steadily proceeding backward, with either a return to the project of civil war which erupted in the mid-nineties, or the emergence of a dictatorial regime similar to the one which existed during the days of Saddam, but enhanced this time around with the sectarian factor that is linking the country to the sectarian conflict throughout the region. The best diplomatic expression of this conflict was seen in Sheikh of Al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib's words to Iranian President Ahmadinejad a few days ago. Syria, on the other hand, is a completely different issue, not to mention the negative impact of change in North Africa on the domestic action of the Syrians and the calculations of those involved in the conflict over the entire Levant.
