There is no doubt that the outcome of the referendum over the Egyptian Constitution Draft - whose last stage ended yesterday - will feature a majority of yeses for which the Muslim Brotherhood group has been yearning, and we can expect the eruption of wide controversy over these results. Hence, doubts will surround the integrity of the polling, similar to the ones which surrounded the integrity of its sponsor President Muhammad Morsi, after the latter promised he will not approve a Draft Constitution that is not consensual. In addition, objections will target the meaning of the referendum as long as half the Egyptian population rejected it, and many oppositionists will go back to clauses in the Draft which will become a constitution and criticize its content, especially the parts related to public freedoms, equality and the civil character of the state. But it is most likely that President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood group from behind him and his supporters among the Islamists, will not take all these objections into consideration, just like they disregarded all the demonstrations, sit-ins and demands seen prior to the referendum and between its first and second stages. Practically, and while awaiting the upcoming parliamentary elections which will be held three months after the ratification of the constitution – as it was also promised by President Morsi – the Shura Council that is almost totally controlled by the Islamists following the presidential appointments, will act as a legislative power instead of parliament. This will complete the circle of hegemony over all the domains, including the judicial one whose autonomy from the legislative power will be eliminated by the constitution, thus allowing the emergence of the facets of the “renaissance" raised by the group as a slogan for its electoral battles and against its oppositionists. Some MB leaders tried to issue reassuring statements in regard to the state of the constitution and the respect of the opposition's rights. And while the next months will reveal the extent of the seriousness of these reassurances, the mobilization and instigation against the opposition also reveal how much they are respected. We have seen on television screens and read in the papers about how the Imams (who are partisan cadres in the MB and the other Islamic groups) dealt with the principles of the constitution, the opposition and the rights, i.e. by completely disregarding these legal and civil concepts in their speeches and sermons. They have also divided the Egyptians into two groups: the believers who support the Draft Constitution and the MB policy, and the apostates and infidels who oppose them. The journalists also noted that most of the clashes which erupted between Morsi's supporters and the opposition started from a mosque whose speaker accused the oppositionists of being infidels, thus pushing the worshipers among the supporters of the opposition to condemn the mixing of religion and politics and causing the clashes. The polarization between two political factions on the Egyptian street has become clear, and according to one of them at least, it is related to faith and infidelity. This is creating a dam between the people of the same country and deepening the political rift which went from being a facet of political life to the essence of national reality. On the official and governmental level, it has become clear – based on all the governmental steps adopted since Morsi's election – that there is a monopolization tendency, whether through the direct attack on the various positions to grant them to Islamists, or through practices that distance the representatives of the opposition or push them to resign from their posts in order to appoint Islamists in their place. At this level, the experience of the constitutional committee constituted an archetype for what the Egyptian oppositionists have started to dub “the MB's infiltration" of power. Hence, since the election of one of its leaders as president, the Muslim Brotherhood group has started to tighten its grip around power and its various estates, while distancing the parties, committees and individuals calling for civil rule. These practices reached their peak in the Constitution Draft and the referendum, leading to the current popular rift and the civil clashes which we are witnessing and which will not stop with the proclamation of the outcome of the referendum, as long as the Egyptian civil society forces are able to object.