The developments of the Egyptian crisis are prompting numerous questions related to their possible repercussions on the change movement that swept a number of Arab countries, amid hopes that this action would lead to the enhancement of the democratic transformation process in these countries. But the most urgent question today is related to the impact of these developments on the course of the Syrian revolution. Each internal side in Egypt perceives the recent developments based on its own interests. Hence, the team loyal to the army believes that its action was a necessary corrective move, serving the goals of the change process seen on January 25, 2011 and aiming to restore this revolution from the hands of the extremists and the "terrorists" (as described by the current regime) who wanted to steal it. For their part, the Muslim Brotherhood team and supporters view the recent developments as being a recanting of the goals of this revolution. Similarly, the various parties on the Syrian scene diverge when reading into what happened in Egypt and how it will affect them. The Syrian regime was the first to consider the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood authority in Egypt as being a confirmation of the legitimacy of the confrontation it is waging against the so-called terrorists in its country. In addition, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rushed to comment on the recent Egyptian developments, thus confirming the end of political Islam in the region while benefitting from the campaign against the failure of deposed President Muhammad Morsi after a year in power. The Syrian president believes that the clock has gone backward - i.e. prior to March 2011 - which authenticates his analysis of the reasons behind the eruption of the crisis in his country, as being a confrontation between the regime and the terrorist groups. And the credibility of his analysis is enhanced by the rhetoric used by the Egyptian army commanders. In addition, Al-Assad's belief in the soundness of his position is corroborated by the ongoing confrontation between the Egyptian army and the Western governments, due to these governments' positions towards the latest developments. Hence, Al-Assad believes he is also defending his country's sovereignty and free decision, as per the slogans currently being raised in Egypt and calling on the Western governments not to interfere in Egyptian affairs. However, while seeking to exploit the Egyptian developments in favor of his regime's stay in power, the Syrian president disregarded the clear contradiction between the goals of the operation carried out by the Egyptian army – which it said was in response to the crowded demonstrations staged to demand the ending of the MB power – and what has been and is still being done by the Syrian army since the eruption of the revolution, in terms of the oppression of the crowded demonstrations organized in the Syrian cities to demand the regime's toppling. In other words, the Egyptian popular reaction mostly welcomed and supported the operation carried out by the army, while the violence inflicted by the Syrian army on its people led to wide-scale disgruntlement against this army and to the dissent of a large number of its senior officers. Therefore, as hard as the Egyptian army tried to depict itself as being the "popular army," the oppression and massacres of the Syrian army and security forces enhanced their image as being forces working at the service of the ruling party and dominating sect against the interests of the country and its people. But this does not deny the fact that the Syrian regime benefitted from the blow addressed to the MB in Egypt, considering that the prevailing image in the region in regard to the failure of this experience constituted an undoubted defeat for the MB in Syria. And although the latter group did not comment on the developments in Egypt, the fear surrounding its project in Syria is not limited to the regime, which was hostile to them and fought them throughout decades, as it was done by the Egyptian regime. Indeed, many sides in the Syrian opposition – from those describing themselves as being secularists to the extremist Islamic movements – are opposed to the MB each for its own calculations and interests. In addition, there are doubts surrounding the widening of the MB's popular base in Syria in comparison with that of the Egyptian MB, which is not to be taken lightly and will be difficult to disregard in any future equation related to the Egyptian situation. The Syrian regime might have its own calculations and readings into the Egyptian developments. However, the exploitation of these developments by this regime remains unrealistic, due to the opposition facing it and the increase of the international pressures that are besieging it and demanding its departure. This is not to mention the recent transformations within the Syrian Coalition, which are enough to unify the opposition and its work plans in a way rendering it impossible for one faction to dominate it. This was likely done to preempt the hegemony practiced by the MB regime in Egypt over the country's affairs and capabilities.
